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“What is the source of refreshment in nihilism?” T. S. Eliot asks in a 1950 
interview with Leslie Paul. Although Eliot was perhaps speaking rhetorically, his 
question is a perceptive one.  After all, if nihilism depends on humans’ empty existence 
to exist, then how can such an idea sustain itself? How can we resuscitate God after 
Friedrich Nietzsche infamously declared Him dead in 1882, an event that paved the way 
for the ominous nihilism of The Will to Power (1901)?  More broadly, how can nothing 
function not only as something, but the thing that will save modern value systems from 
the infinite abyss? To address these quandaries, it takes an intimate and extensive 
knowledge of two competing perceptions of nihilism: Nietzsche’s “new” 20th-century 
nihilism, an idea that declares all values meaningless, and the “old” nihilism that 
Nietzsche abandons. For Nietzsche, nihilism is a cataclysmic event, and the nothingness 
left behind is absolute.  It stands menacingly on the other side of the threshold, 
threatening modernity with complete collapse. On the other hand, Benedict de Spinoza, 
Immanuel Kant, and Georg W. F. Hegel—the philosophers of old nihilism—see creative 
potential in nothing and interpret God not as deceased, but reimagined. In this 
dissertation, I argue that W. B. Yeats and T. S. Eliot each pose similar questions in their 
work, and their knowledge of nihilist philosophers guide them toward a generative view 
of nothingness.   
 
 
 
 
 
My project expands and complicates the impact of Nietzsche’s nihilism on 
modernism. Through a brief historical exploration of nihilism, I show that the new 
Nietzschean nihilism commonly understood to have heavily influenced modernism—both 
as a literary and philosophical movement—is contested by a productive nihilism which 
predates Nietzschean publication and subsequent influence, thus eliciting divergent 
interpretations of loss and nothingness. While much scholarship focuses on modernism 
from the perspective of Nietzschean nihilism, I identify a countercurrent within literary 
modernism that draws upon an “old” tradition of nihilism that removes the negativity of 
nothingness, reclaims absolute annihilation, and instead imbues it with the generative 
capability to resist total emptiness and desolation. Specifically, my project analyzes 
Eliot’s and Yeats’s readings of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, who all participate in an “old” 
tradition of nihilism that Nietzsche abandons. The poets’ readings of “old nihilism” forge 
a generative view of nothingness in their work, which thus shields them from the loss of 
value that the new nihilism fosters.  In this way, the metaphysical notion of God is not 
“dead” for modernism, but reimagined.
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION
“What is the source of refreshment in nihilism?” T. S. Eliot asked in a 1950 
interview with Leslie Paul.1 Eliot may have been posing a rhetorical question, but it is 
nonetheless an incisive one. After all, if nihilism depends on the vacuity of human 
existence, if it relies upon emptiness for its own fulfillment, how can such an idea sustain 
itself?  How can we resuscitate God after Friedrich Nietzsche infamously declared Him 
dead in 1882,2 an event that paved the way for the ominous nihilism of The Will to Power 
(1901)? More broadly, how can nothing function not only as something, but the thing that 
will save modern value systems from collapse? To address these quandaries, it takes an 
intimate and extensive knowledge of two competing perceptions of nihilism: Nietzsche’s 
“new” 20th-century nihilism, a philosophy that declares all values meaningless, and the 
“old” nihilism that Nietzsche abandons. For Nietzsche, nihilism is a cataclysmic event, 
and the nothingness that it leaves in its wake is absolute. It stands menacingly on the 
other side of the threshold, threatening modernity with complete collapse.3 On the other 
hand, Benedict de Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, and Georg W. F. Hegel—the philosophers of 
old nihilism—see creative potential in nothingness and interpret God not as dead but 
                                                          
1 Leslie Paul, “A Conversation with T. S. Eliot,” The Kenyon Review 27, no. 1 (1965). 
JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4334503. 11.  
2 Nietzsche first writes the phrase “God is Dead” in The Gay Science (1882), section 108.  
The death of God enables the possibility of nihilism because there is nothing to fill the 
void left by His absence.  
3 Nietzsche uses this metaphor in section one of The Will to Power.  
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reimagined. W. B. Yeats and T. S. Eliot each pose similar questions in their work, and 
their knowledge of nihilist philosophers guides them toward a view of nothingness that is, 
ironically, generative and creative.  
The careers of Yeats and Eliot physically intersected at a lunch on early 
December 1922, but the pair also aligned themselves intellectually through their 
fascination with nothingness. The poets met for the first time before 1915 during Eliot’s 
ventures in London and, after not seeing each other for seven years, they dined together 
in London’s Savile Club in 1922. 4 Eliot, who desired prominent contributors for his then-
fledgling Criterion, seemed to enjoy their meeting greatly. In a letter to Ottoline Morrell, 
he showed appreciation for his private, extended conversation with Yeats, and called the 
elder poet “one of a very small number of people with whom one can talk profitably 
about poetry, and I found him altogether stimulating.”5 For his part, Yeats remarks that 
he felt “charmed” by Eliot, so the positive feeling was evidently mutual. Each poet 
experiences encounters with nothingness that leave him feeling both fascination and fear. 
The young Eliot of “Silence” (1910) saw a metaphysical revelation in the “terrifying” 
emptiness of an urban stillness. In The Trembling of the Veil (1918), Yeats sees 
nothingness as a state that will reveal a truth about the self. He envisions St. Simon 
                                                          
4 Eliot knew Yeats since at least 1915.  In a letter to Isabella Stewart Gardner from that 
year, Eliot revealed some details of his literary life in London: “The last time I was here I 
had the pleasure of meeting Yeats: he is now in Ireland, I believe because a play of Lady 
Gregory’s is coming to the Abbey. I am hoping for his return – he is a very agreeable 
talker.” 
5 T. S. Eliot, The Letters of T. S. Eliot, Vol I, eds. Valerie Eliot and John Haffenden (New 
Haven: Yale University Press), 2011. 806. 
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Stylites “upon his pillar” and St. Antony “in his cavern,” both saintly figures committed 
“to know themselves for fragments, and at last for nothing; to hollow their hearts out till 
they are void and without form” and finally to “summon a creator by revealing chaos.”6  
Their interest in nothingness only intensified through a shared and extensive study 
of philosophy, with both poets encountering philosophers who pose generative views of 
nihilism. Eliot’s studies at Harvard led him to discover minds like Benedict de Spinoza, 
Immanuel Kant, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche; Yeats’s 
interest in mysticism, Platonism, and philosophical idealism garnered a similar result.  
Yeats considered Spinoza a mystical philosopher above all else and observed that Hegel 
“made all things end in God’s realization of himself.”7 In Nietzsche, Yeats found a 
“strong enchanter” whom he read so much that it “made [his] eyes bad again”.8 The pair 
also commented on each other’s philosophies on multiple occasions. Eliot expressed 
admiration for Yeats’s Per Amica Silentia Lunae (1918), a work of philosophic 
reflection, in a review for The Egoist. The younger poet likens Yeats’s argument to a 
series of mazes and admits to being “lost” in the books second half, as if “in some 
delicious soft mist as that in which Venus enwrapt her son.”9 Eliot also compares the 
                                                          
6 W. B. Yeats, “The Trembling of the Veil” in The Collected Works of W. B. Yeats, eds. 
Richard J Finneran and George Mills Harper (New York: Macmillan), 1989.  128. 
7 Robert Snukal, High Talk: The Philosophical Poetry of W. B. Yeats. Cambridge 
England: University Press, 1973.  16. 
8 Letter from Yeats to Lady Gregory in 1902: “I have not read anything with so much 
excitement since I got to love Morris’s stories which have the same curious astringent 
joy.”  
9 T. S. Eliot, “Unsigned reviews of poetry and prose by James Joyce, Clive Bell, T. 
Sturge Moore, and William Butler Yeats” in The Complete Prose of T. S. Eliot: The 
Critical Edition: Apprentice Years, 1905–1918, eds. Jewel Spears Brooker and Ronald 
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Irish bard to a “phantasm” of divinity in his review of A Cutting of an Agate (1919), a 
“fantastic avatar supported by adepts and narthekophoroi.”10 Here, Eliot positions Yeats 
as a harbinger of change, an embodiment of a Dionysian spirit that that unearths wisdom 
from dream-like musings. In his “Introduction to The Oxford Book of Modern Verse” 
(1936), Yeats observes similar characteristics in Eliot’s writing and calls the younger 
poet a “satirist” who rejects “all rhythms and metaphors of the more popular 
romantics.”11 
The poets’ interest in change shows in their work; both Yeats and Eliot perceive 
the desacralization and loss of value in modern Europe and they express their concerns 
similarly. Eliot wrote The Waste Land in 1922 and through a “heap of broken images” 
managed to hauntingly articulate the philosophical, social, and cultural pitfalls that 
afflicted his world. Likewise, Yeats evaluates this era of philosophical modernity in A 
Vision (1925) where he criticizes artistic deterioration:  
 
Personality is everywhere spreading out its fingers in vain or grasping with an 
always more convulsive grasp a world where the predominance of physical 
science, of finance and economics in all forms, of democratic politics, of vast 
populations, of architecture where styles jostle one another, of newspapers where 
                                                          
Schuchard (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 2014. https://muse.jhu.edu/. 
724.  
10 The “narthekophoroi” were low-ranking Dionysiac worshippers; T. S. Eliot, “A 
Foreign Mind. A review of The Cutting of an Agate, by W. B. Yeats” in The Complete 
Prose of T. S. Eliot: The Critical Edition: The Perfect Critic, 1919–1926, eds. Anthony 
Cuda and Ronald Schuchard (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 2014. 
https://muse.jhu.edu/. 73. 
11 W. B. Yeats, “Introduction to The Oxford Book of Modern Verse” in Later Essays: The 
Collected Works of W. B. Yeats, V. 5, eds. Elizabeth Bergmann Loizeaux and William H 
O'Donnell (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons), 1994. 195. 
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all is heterogenous, show that mechanical force will in a moment become 
supreme.12  
 
 
Rather than focusing on Eliot’s disconnected fragments, Yeats highlights another form of 
nothingness, which is a flattening or conformity that results despite a heterogeneous 
landscape. The consequence is a tension between creation and lethargy resulting from a 
generalized modern desire for placation rather than a higher truth.13 On one hand, both 
Eliot and Yeats perceive the new nihilism’s shadowy presence, and this presence shows 
in their work; on the other hand, neither poet demonstrations an explicit acceptance of (or 
resignation to) the new nihilism. 
Yeats and Eliot convey a sense that truth, or something akin to truth, is a 
possibility, a sentiment that new nihilism would prohibit. As such, both poets convey 
resistance to new nihilism in their poetry and prose. Such resistance becomes clearer as 
the poets mature.  When Eliot declares that “human kind / Cannot bear very much 
reality” in “Burnt Norton” (1935), he highlights the difficulty of attaining absolute 
authenticity and truth rather than their nonexistence or humanity’s unwillingness to 
“bear” them. Furthermore, Yeats bases his entire view of history on the existence of a 
consistent, overarching patterns and cycles in A Vision, and like Eliot, he sees “truth” as a 
meaningful aspiration. In a January 1939 letter to Lady Elizabeth Pelham, Yeats writes 
                                                          
12 W. B. Yeats, A Vision (1925), The Collected Works of W. B. Yeats, V. 13, eds. 
Catherine E Paul, and Margaret Mills Harper (New York: Scribner), 2008. 206-7. 
13 Nico Israel, Spirals: The Whirled Image in Twentieth-Century Literature and Art (New 
York: Columbia University Press), 2015. 86. 
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“Man can embody truth but he cannot know.”14 On one hand, his statement seems as 
bleak as Ernest Hemingway’s empty “nada”; however, as Calvin Thomas argues, if we 
view Yeats’s phrase with the old nihilism in mind, we can see the implied inverse of the 
assertion, which would read something like, “The truth does not exist at all unless it is-
and as it is—embodied in and by man.”15 Creation therefore begins with a search for truth 
in an otherwise empty space that an individual then fills with pattern and structure. In this 
way, Eliot and Yeats actively put their shoulders to the metaphorical plow, but they do so 
to cultivate order and certainty, not merely to destroy. 
In this dissertation, I explore the complicated relationship between modernism 
and nihilism, an idea heavily influenced by Nietzsche’s Will to Power (1901). To do this, 
I first show that the idea of loss and nothingness is as much of a philosophical problem as 
a theological issue. While much scholarly discussion focuses on modernism’s 
relationship with religion and secularity, the connection between modernism and nihilism 
is, by comparison, glaringly overlooked. I also trace nihilism’s evolution from its pre-
Socratic origins to a 20th-century interpretation of the concept. I demonstrate that 
Nietzsche’s “new” nihilism is heavily shaped by a Russian interpretation of the concept, a 
theory of revolution that stresses the destruction of social institutions. Nietzsche applies 
this destruction not only to social institutions but to the existence of every value and 
                                                          
14 W. B. Yeats to Lady Elizabeth Pelham. January 4, 1939. W. B. Yeats, The Letters of 
W. B. Yeats, eds. Allan Wade (New York: Macmillan), 1955. 922. 
15 Ernest Hemmingway, “A Clean, Well-Lighted Place,” Hemingway: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. Robert P. Weeks (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall), 1962. 73; 
Calvin Thomas, “Knowledge and Embodiment in Yeats,” South Central Review 4, no. 4 
(1987): 53-60. http://doi.org:10.2307/3189027. 53-54. 
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presumed certainty ultimately underwritten by them. Thus, Nietzsche deviates from the 
term’s centuries-old understanding in the history of ideas. While the new nihilism’s 
shadow may undeniably hover over 20th-century Western culture, I argue that the “old” 
nihilism of Benedict de Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
influence a current within modernism that demonstrates a desire for an ordered, rational 
world and a reimagining of value systems. This old nihilism sees nothingness as 
provisional and prolific, and frames God not as a Judeo-Christian, all-powerful deity, but 
an absolutely negative guiding force. The old nihilists’ philosophies concerning vacancy 
and void, the Absolute, and sublime transformation extract the generative properties from 
nothingness that Nietzsche overlooks.     
The first chapter, “‘The Desert Is in the Heart of Your Brother’: Modernism’s 
New and Old Nihilism,” outlines the complex connection between modern and nihilism.  
It establishes the modernist readership’s submission to Nietzsche and the new nihilism, 
but also shows a rising countercurrent of an old nihilism that challenges the new.  
Through poets like Yeats and Eliot, whose readings of nihilism are shaped by Spinoza, 
Kant, and Hegel rather than Nietzsche, I show that modernism is not a hopelessly empty 
space, but a time ripe for creation. “‘The Dark Grow Luminous’: Yeats Reading 
Nihilism” turns exclusively to Yeats and attempts to chart his understanding of nihilism.  
Using his letters and prose, the chapter first acknowledges the poet’s lifelong interest in 
Nietzschean philosophy but concludes that he ultimately rejects the new nihilism.  
Instead, Yeats extracts the mystical quality from old nihilism and uses it to form a 
transformed god-like entity in A Vision (1938). “‘Surely Some Revelation Is at Hand’: 
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Yeats, Disaster, and the Generative Void” continues to investigate Yeats’s interaction 
with old nihilism. It interrogates images of disaster and catastrophe in his poetry and 
argues that he borrows these concepts from Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel. Through disaster, 
Yeats mines the creative generative capacity from nothingness and uses it to create a 
renewed system of reality.  
Chapter four, “‘They All Go into the Dark’: T. S. Eliot Reading Nihilism” shifts 
focus to Eliot and his understanding of nihilism. It draws upon my archival research at 
the King’s College, Cambridge Archive Center to reconstruct Eliot’s reading of old 
nihilism and shows that Eliot ultimately rejects Nietzsche as a gripping philosophical 
mind. Instead, his reading of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel lays the foundation for the poet’s 
return to belief in 1927 and demonstrates his view that nothingness is indeed generative.  
Finally, “‘Neither Plentitude nor Vacancy’: Eliot, Absolute Negation, and the Generative 
Void” continues to investigate Eliot’s use of old nihilism in his work. It looks at his early 
poetry from the March Hare notebook through to the Four Quartets and shows that Eliot 
views nothingness as a prolific void throughout his career. This prolific void is most clear 
in the Quartets, where Eliot establishes the “still point” as reality’s metaphysical 
foundation. 
In the years following their lunch at the Savile Club, Eliot’s and Yeats’s successes 
continued. Yeats won the Nobel Prize one year later and became the author of A Vision 
and The Tower (1928), while Eliot evolved into one of the most powerfully influential 
poets and critics of the twentieth century; he had written The Waste Land, become a 
member of the Church of England in 1927, and won his own Nobel prize in 1948. Their 
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careers changed dramatically subject-wise and their personal lives evolved to include 
unrequited love, strained marriage, and finally, a sense of peace, but their resistance to 
the new nihilism remains consistent. Both poets read Nietzsche and the philosophers of 
old nihilism to varying degrees. Eliot’s graduate studies introduced him to each of these 
philosophers, while Yeats encounters the old nihilists more organically through his 
interest in mysticism and idealism. Each poet succeeds in capitalizing on old nihilism’s 
generative space, and they built their own patterns, cycles, and structures in the emptiness 
that Nietzsche’s new nihilism left. Looking back now, Nietzsche’s new nihilism obscures 
what Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel were trying to say, and thus overlooks the value 
construction that Eliot and Yeats demonstrate. The emptiness left after God’s death, 
therefore, is not Joseph Conrad’s “horror,” but a space of salvation.16 As Yeats concludes 
in “Anima Hominis” (Per Amica Silentia Lunae, 1918), “I shall find … the void fruitful 
when I understand I have nothing.”17 
                                                          
16 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, ed. Robert Hampson (New York: Penguin), 1995.  
112. 
17 W. B. Yeats, Mythologies, (New York: Macmillan), 1959.  332. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
“THE DESERT IS IN THE HEART OF YOUR BROTHER”: MODERNISM’S NEW 
AND OLD NIHILISM
 
 
Nihilism stands at the door: whence comes this uncanniest of all guests? 
—Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (1901) 
 
 
Where got I that truth? 
Out of a medium’s mouth, 
Out of nothing it came… 
Out of dark night 
—W. B.  Yeats, “Fragments” (The Tower, 1928) 
 
 
I could not 
Speak, and my eyes failed, I was neither 
Living nor dead, and I knew nothing, 
Looking into the heart of light, the silence. 
—T. S. Eliot, “The Burial of the Dead” (The Waste Land, 1922) 
 
 
Introduction 
In his essay “The Literature of Nihilism” (1966), Paul de Man argues that “A 
literature of nihilism is not necessarily nihilistic” (164).18 While this idea may seem like a 
contradiction—indeed, what is nihilism if not nihilistic? —it raises an important issue.  
Even though an author writes a narrative that evokes themes or images usually associated 
with nihilism—nothingness, despair, empty space—it does not mean that the text falls 
                                                          
18 Paul De Man, “The Literature of Nihilism,” Critical Writings, 1953-1978, ed. Lindsay 
Waters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 1989.  164. 
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prey to a modern conception of nihilism. Thematic influence can in fact indicate 
exploration, or even resistance. This is the case with certain modernist authors and their 
engagement with modernism’s “literature of nihilism.”   
The aim of this chapter is to illuminate the complicated relationship between 
literary modernism and nihilism. To do this, I will first show that the disintegration of 
values is as much of a philosophical problem as it is a theological issue. While much 
scholarly discussion focuses on modernism’s relationship with religion and secularity, the 
connection between modernism and nihilism is glaringly overlooked. Then, through a 
historical exploration of philosophical nihilism, I show that the new Nietzschean nihilism 
commonly understood to have heavily influenced modernism—both as a literary and 
philosophical movement—is contested by a productive nihilism which predates 
Nietzschean publication (and subsequent influence), and challenges us to interpret a loss 
of value quite differently in the modernist period. This “new” nihilism is broadly shaped 
by Friedrich Nietzsche’s conception of the idea, which he outlines in The Will to Power 
(1901). Alfred Orage’s New Age played a significant role in disseminating Nietzschean 
philosophy to a wide modernist audience, and not long after, authors verbalized the 
destruction and collapse that they noticed transpiring in western society. However, this 
nihilism is heavily molded by a Russian tradition and thus deviates from the term’s 
centuries-old place in the history of ideas. While much scholarly discussion focuses on 
modernism’s relationship with new nihilism, the connection between modernism and a 
generative, “old” version of nihilism necessitates further exploration. This leaves an 
incomplete image of the simultaneous metaphysical disintegration and reconstruction that 
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transpired in Western Europe during the first half of the 20th-century. Through focusing 
on modernist literature and identifying the influence of Benedict de Spinoza, Immanuel 
Kant, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, whose “old nihilism” was abandoned by 
Nietzsche, I show the creative potential of nihilism that The Will to Power overshadowed. 
While the new nihilism’s shadow may undeniably hover over modernism, I investigate a 
generative current within literary modernism— a current that demonstrates a desire for an 
ordered, rational world and a reimagining of value systems—is tangible through the 
works of W. B. Yeats and T. S. Eliot. These writers, both avid readers of philosophy, see 
creative potential in nothingness and challenge the idea that as an aesthetic movement, 
modernism is largely infused with Nietzsche’s deceptive, negative, and veiled nihilism.19  
The differences between the old and new nihilisms can be conceived in terms of 
creation and destruction, and order and chaos. These two contrasting strengths leave 
modernists caught in the middle of two opposing forces: The Apollonian, a force that 
privileges the old nihilism’s value-positivity, rationalism, and idealism, and the 
Dionysian, a force that is dark, violent, and “hides behind the cheerful Apollonian 
façade.” It is the Dionysian that some scholars argue pervades much of literary 
modernism.20 For Nietzsche, the corrosiveness of the new nihilism could be countered, 
and he proposes Dionysian energy as the antidote that will cure this disease.  As Weller 
suggests, “The nihilism-countering force of this Dionysian art lies not in its power of 
                                                          
19 Kathryne V. Lindberg, Reading Pound Reading: Modernism After Nietzsche (New 
York: Oxford University Press), 1987. 24-25. 
20  Robert Gooding-Williams, Zarathustra’s Dionysian Modernism (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press), 2001. 
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imitation (mimesis) but rather in its power of transfiguration. In short, art for Nietzsche 
constitutes the overcoming of nihilism in its being free of morality and in its affirmation 
of life not through the faithful representation of that life but through its radical 
transformation.”21 This is perhaps a mistake in Nietzsche’s logic for a number of reasons, 
however.   
Leading Nietzschean scholar and translator Walter Kaufmann argues that in Ecce 
Homo Nietzsche attempts to clearly position himself as a philosopher “who is not an 
Alexandrian academic nor an Apollonian sage, but Dionysian,” an act that only 
emphasizes Nietzsche’s misplaced faith in the Dionysian.22 Indeed, the Dionysian holds 
the capacity to beckon the abyss, the all-consuming negative space that annihilates 
human importance at its core. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s Dionysian wisdom represents 
only a concord between two forces that is brief and transitory, and that such energies will 
nevertheless stay separate perpetually.23 Therefore, there is no solution that will result in 
permeant harmony or the reason.24 The Apollonian, on the other hand, has the ability to 
cover over the abyss, channel a higher truth, and attain self-knowledge.25 For Gillespie, 
Hegel’s “absolute knowledge” provides the “basis of permeant reconciliation.”26 Though 
                                                          
21 Shane Weller, Modernism and Nihilism, 40. 
22 Walter Kaufmann, “Editor's Introduction” in Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: Vintage), 1967. 202. 
23 Michael Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 
1995. xxi. 
24 Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, xxi. 
25 John Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press), 1991. 3. 
26 Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, xxi. 
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Nietzsche, for instance, considered the Dionysian to be the more powerful facet of the 
dichotomous pair as well as the ideal response to modernity and culture, the Apollonian 
allows for a reimagining of the societal and cultural disorder present during the modernist 
movement. As Gillespie states, “under the influence of Apollo, man has an unshaken 
faith in all things, including himself” (205).27 Yeats and Eliot are truth-seekers, artists 
who need a permanent solution to the threat of nothingness that looms over their 
historical space. Neither Nietzsche’s new nihilism nor his Dionysian remedy offer the 
type of resolution they need.   
Modern Loss of Value: An Issue of Philosophy and Faith 
The “Death of God” is a troubling prospect; it is an idea that leaves emptiness in 
its wake. Those left behind must contend with the vexed question of “where do we go 
from here?” Modernists were forced to try to answer this existential query in a historical 
space that was anything but stable. After the Age of Enlightenment, the modern crisis of 
belief and the political upheaval that mounted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-
centuries caused modern voices to cry out in anxiety over this loss of faith and stable 
value systems. Scholars and modernist authors alike highlight the early 20th century as 
the retrospective, perceived year that such tumultuous change began. Virginia Woolf 
reflects in her essay “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” (1924) that “On or about December 
1910, human character changed”28 and German poet Gottfried Benn wrote “1910, that is 
                                                          
27 Michael Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, 205. 
28 Virginia Woolf, “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” in Collected Essays, ed. Leonard 
Woolf (London: Hogarth), 1966. 319-337. 
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indeed the year when all scaffolds began to crack.”29 Charles Péguy asserts in a 1913 
essay that “the world has changed less since Jesus Christ than it has changed in the last 
thirty years,” and as Jane Goldman fittingly indicates, this places the modernists’ first 
critique of society in the 1880s (39).30 Roger Griffin, however, identifies Nietzsche’s 
Birth of Tragedy (1872) as the point when literary modernism reacts to these new issues 
most clearly for the first time. He argues that Nietzsche’s critique “goes beyond sphere of 
aestheticism and contemplative philosophy to the realm of cultural criticism and 
metapolitics, the antechamber of social and political action.”31 Here, nihilism’s 
significance as a historical event—a force that has now penetrated outside the realm of 
metaphysical supposing and into human experience—seems well-defined, and the earth-
shattering changes that Woolf, Benn, and others sense bring that force to life.         
A deicide of any sort perhaps courts a theological interrogation at first, so it is 
unsurprising that modernism’s relationship with religion and secularism has received 
much scholarly attention.32 That is, now that society must contend with secularity, what 
will replace those religious structures? As Norman Podhoretz explains, the theological 
                                                          
29 Thomas Harrison, “Introduction,” in 1910: The Emancipation of Dissonance 
(University of California Press), 1996. 1-18. 
30 Quoted in Roger Shattuck, The Banquet Years: The Origins of the Avant-Garde in 
France, 1886 to World War I (Freeport, N.Y: Books for Libraries Press), 1972. 1.; 
Goldman, Jane. Modernism, 1910-1945: Image to Apocalypse (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan), 2004. 39. 
31 Roger Griffin, Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning Under Mussolini 
and Hitler (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 2007.  94. 
32 There are of course many other studies, but see Lewis, Pericles. Religious Experience 
and the Modernist Novel. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010 and 
Wexler, Joyce P. Violence Without God: The Rhetorical Despair of Twentieth-Century 
Writers (New York: Bloomsbury Academic), 2017.  
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response to a modernist moral crumbling resembled the following statement: “[Writers’] 
creative works are legitimate but uninformed fumbling after solutions to problems of the 
spirit, works which could have been more efficiently ordered and more accurately 
construed had the author…been working within the framework of a well-articulated 
worldview.”33 However, this statement’s reasoning is circular and fails to consider the 
problem of value loss: it implies that spiritual questions and a lack of faith in a stable 
world are solved by having a stable, lucid perspective. If faith could no longer offer the 
ubiquitous solace it once did, then modernists could use this opportunity to interrogate 
the conflict between secularity and religion and reimagine an outcome that moves beyond 
that dichotomy. Matthew Mutter argues precisely that; he suggests that the “power” of 
several modernist writers including Yeats, Virginia Woolf and Wallace Stevens comes 
from “their dramatization of the tension between religious and secular emotions.”34  His 
conclusion indicates a compelling point, that modernism’s problem with religion is not 
the “explicit belief or disbelief in God” but “the entire fabric of thought and feeling 
implicit in the religious or secular imaginaries where belief situates itself.”35 A similar 
point can perhaps be applied to modernism’s “problem” with new nihilism’s nothingness 
and the despair that follows. 
                                                          
33 Norman Podhoretz, “The New Nihilism and the Novel,” in Doings and Undoings (New 
York: Farrar, Straus & Co.), 1953. 161. 
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While nihilism and secularism may seem similar, they are decidedly different 
ideas—nihilism invites a philosophical discussion, while secularism necessitates a 
theological examination—and as such, they require separate critical inquiries. Just as 
some critics like Pericles Lewis argue that rampant secularism does not define 
modernism, all modernists do not blindly accept the new nihilism. 36 While Nietzsche’s 
philosophy was widely read and disseminated, Eliot and Yeats absorbed a substantial 
amount of the old nihilist tradition through their reading of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel.  
For instance, in his essay “Bishop Berkeley” (1931), Yeats shows both intimate 
familiarity with and admiration for “the movement of philosophy from Spinoza to 
Hegel,” which he calls “the greatest of all works of intellect.”37 Eliot methodically read 
all three of these philosophers as a graduate student at Harvard, and even further 
distances himself from the new nihilism by dismissing Nietzschean philosophy as a 
“chaotic and immature intellectualism.”38 As Mutter suggests, an “ambivalence,” an 
unsureness or inconsistency regarding an idea itself, exists in modernism concerning 
secularization’s character and eventual outcome.39 If this is the case, then this same 
ambivalence also presents in modernists’ engagement with the new nihilism. Nihilism, an 
idea that has undergone shifts in philosophical denotation and connotation throughout the 
                                                          
36 In his book, Lewis argues that rather than resigning themselves to secularism, 
modernists instead verbally invoked the sacred without directly naming it, thereby 
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37 W. B. Yeats, “Bishop Berkeley,” in Later Essays: The Collected Works of W. B. Yeats, 
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Scribner’s Sons), 1994. 103. 
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centuries, is perhaps going to court some inconsistency both through its textual 
representations and the through the reactions that it elicits.        
Nihilism and Modernism: The Uncanniest of Guests and an Unstable Host 
Human history is certainly no stranger to nihilism. Nihilism, that “uncanniest of 
all guests” has plagued, hassled, and burdened minds since Gorgias wrote his famous 
trilemma in On Non-existence.40 Even though nihilistic subject matter captured writers’ 
attention previously, no other point in literary history seems so consumed with questions 
of nothingness and purposelessness than modernism. Articulating the relationship 
between two concepts with such enigmatic definitions is no small task, but leading 
nihilism scholar Shane Weller examines precisely this in Modernism and Nihilism 
(2011). In this study, Weller demonstrates the relationship between nihilism and 
modernism—including literary modernism—by arguing that it is impossible to garner a 
comprehensible understanding of literary modernism without acknowledging the decisive 
role nihilism played within.41 Invoking David Harvey’s contention that modernism is a 
“troubled and fluctuating aesthetic response to conditions of modernity produced by 
process of modernization,” Weller states that such “fluctuations” are nowhere more 
evident than in the history of modernism’s relationship to nihilism. 42 On one hand, then, 
                                                          
40 i. Nothing exists 
ii. Even if existence exists, it cannot be known iii. Even if it could be known, it cannot be 
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41 Shane Weller, Modernism and Nihilism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2011. 9 
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aesthetic modernism views itself and is viewed as the “counterforce to the nihilism of 
modernity” but on the other hand embodies the inherent material of nihilism.43 This 
situating of modernism and nihilism demonstrates how the two philosophies are 
inextricably linked and reinforces the claim that literary modernists wrote during a time 
when nihilism, old or new, could not be ignored.  
The voices of modernist literary critics themselves also acknowledged the 
presence of the “new nihilism” and its effects on contemporary modernist culture. For 
instance, Elliot Paul, a co-editor of transition magazine, contemplates nihilism’s effect on 
modernism in his essay “The New Nihilism” (1927). He muses that as a result of the First 
World War, “old values had become meaningless.”44 While Paul fails to directly cite 
Nietzsche in his essay, he draws upon the same tradition of the idea that Nietzsche used: 
a nineteenth-century Russian nihilism that breaks with the existing aesthetic, moral, and 
metaphysical institutions.45 More than two decades later, Norman Podhoretz argues a 
similar point in an essay of the same title (1958). He notes that the new nihilism and the 
loss of value it brings “informed almost every poem and novel of the modernist 
movement” to the point of nearly becoming a cliché.46 Furthermore, Herbert Read asserts 
in his introduction to “A War Diary” (1962) that “nihilism—nothingness, despair” was 
literary modernism’s “universal state of mind.”47 He argues that the main challenge 
                                                          
43 Weller, Modernism and Nihilism, 9. 
44 Elliot Paul, “The New Nihilism.” transition (May 1927), 166. 
45 Shane Weller, “Nietzsche among the Modernists: The Case of Wyndham 
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facing society after the death of God is the “conquest of nihilism,” but admits the world 
has failed to advance that agenda since Nietzsche’s declaration in the late nineteenth 
century.48 Unfortunately, God has not yet “risen from the dead” and society still lingers in 
uncertainty. All of these voices latch onto the palpable nothingness and hopelessness in 
modernist literature that new nihilism seems to consistently provoke.  
Read, Paul, and Podhoretz’s observations offer an insightful glimpse into the 
anxiety that new nihilism reflected in literary modernism; however, these reactions were 
all written retrospectively, and the critics had time to process the feelings and reactions 
that they observed. Modernist authors, though, expressed their unease and recorded 
observations at the time they happened. In “A Clean, Well-Lighted Place” (1933), Ernest 
Hemingway replaces the now-deceased God the Father with “nada,” Yeats cries that “the 
center cannot hold,” and Joseph Conrad’s Marlowe shudders against “the horror” that 
resides at the center of a corroded soul.49 These writers and critics were not nihilists 
themselves—they acted merely as vessels and expressed the value loss that the new 
nihilism contained.     
Naming Nihilism: Jacobi’s Critique of Fichte’s Idealism 
If modernist responses to the new nihilism are difficult to conceptualize, the 
ambiguity of the term “nihilism” is perhaps in partially to blame. While the seed of 
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nihilism was planted as early as pre-Socratic Greek philosophy, the concept did not 
receive a direct definition until the late 18th century.50 As Adorno and Martin Heidegger 
both suggest, nihilism did not receive a proper philosophical definition until March 21, 
1799 when German philosopher and novelist Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi wrote an open 
letter to Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In this letter, Jacobi accuses Fichte of “nihilism” due to 
his idealism’s leaving the “transcendental ego” intact but eradicating everything else.51  
Jacobi writes,  
 
Since outside of the mechanism of nature, I come across nothing but miracles, 
mysteries, and signs and have a terrible aversion to Nothingness, the absolutely 
indefinite, the utterly empty…particularly as the object of philosophy or goal of 
wisdom…I therefore do not see why I…should not be allowed to prefer my 
Philosophy of Not-Knowing to the Philosophical Knowing of Nothing, even if 
were only in fugam vacui.52 
 
 
While Jacobi’s indictment of Fichte’s idealism gives nihilism a proper name, this letter is 
partially responsible for concept’s corrosive reputation. Such corrosiveness and 
aggressiveness characterizes the nihilism that Nietzsche discusses in The Will to Power, 
and by extension, exemplifies the version that modernism must contend with.  It might be 
tempting to argue, then, that Nietzsche is just as much of a victim of this nihilism as the 
modernists, given Jacobi’s definition. However, Jacobi’s indictment was an 
epistemological criticism of Fichte’s idealism, not a full-scale foreshadowing of a 
possible cultural end. For Fichte, the “abyss” represents one’s inner self, and he 
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advocates for the stripping away of any impediments that block an individual from this 
infinity. Through this destruction, one moves toward the infinite by discovering an own 
unlimited freedom. Nietzsche picks up on a pessimistic but conceivable hazard of this 
idealism by the time he writes The Will to Power. Jacobi thus gave the term a 
philosophical definition and Nietzsche espoused it from Russian newspaper clippings.  53  
An act that may have seemed innocuous on Nietzsche’s part therefore bore weighty 
consequences for the term’s new, modern definition, and it is what Adorno describes as 
Nietzsche’s “adoption” of the term where it undergoes a “radical inflation.”54   
The New Nihilism: Nietzsche and His Russian Influences 
The topic of this section—Friedrich Nietzsche’s formulation of the new nihilism 
that hovers over literary modernism—is too immense to conquer even in an entire book.  
Nietzsche’s philosophy occupies a central place in literary modernists’ critique of 
modernity, particularly during interwar years.55 Scholars have cited the philosopher as a 
driving force behind the modernist movement and as the twentieth century commenced, 
his ideas posthumously distinguished him as the “liberator from religion and the prophet 
of the coming of the Superman.”56 Nietzsche’s implementation of nihilism encapsulated 
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the very spirit of the modern condition, which is why his appraisal of modernity as 
nihilistic wields a greater impact than any other philosopher of the age. With all of this in 
mind, it is clear Nietzsche’s touch on the idea is undeniably strong; indeed, the enduring 
grip of his “new nihilism” extends even beyond literary modernism without much of a 
challenge. For instance, existentialist Albert Camus branded nihilism as the most 
distressing problem of the 20th century, a statement that his essay The Rebel (1951) 
plainly enlivens. Here, Camus renders a frightening image of the new nihilism 
conquering society after the collapse of metaphysical systems ends in total negation, 
leaving a landscape plagued by absolute destruction, deep animosity, and a desire to 
depress and negate. And for Nietzsche himself, modernity is undoubtedly in a condition 
of nihilism, a nihilism that threatens to negate everything. The philosopher sees Western 
civilization as trapped within a “debilitating and demoralizing nihilism” that calls into 
question and even erases the central reality of our world.57 After society’s trust in the 
very fabric of metaphysical and epistemological concepts shatters, nothing is left but 
nothing itself.    
Nietzsche is perhaps infamous for his varying and at times even contradictory 
arguments in his philosophy, which makes him tedious and even exasperating to read.  
John Davidson, arguably the first British man of letters to pay attention to Nietzsche’s 
work, sums up the philosopher’s inconsistent language quite effectively.  He asserts, 
“[Nietzsche] starts from nothing and ends in nothing.  He proves and disproves, believes 
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and disbelieves everything; and he is as uncertain of the Nihilism to which he always 
harks back as he is of witchcraft.”58 With this in mind, I do not mean to suggest that 
Nietzsche identified as a nihilist; rather, he struggled to avoid such an outcome and 
proposed methods to combat nihilism. Through the recurring idea of amor fati, which he 
articulates in The Gay Science (1882), for instance, Nietzsche advocates that individuals 
accept their past, present, and future decisions and “love” their fates. If one loves his/her 
own fate, this places worth on something and prevents a collapse into nihilism. Other 
authors and philosophers also recognized this positivity in Nietzsche. In an 1891 essay in 
the Speaker titled “The New Sophist,” Davidson claims that Nietzsche regarded his 
nihilism as a “preface to a positive doctrine” rather than merely a finite conclusion that 
leads to nothingness.59 While Davidson’s point might be a bit too bold—Nietzsche 
largely viewed and feared nihilism as an ultimate outcome, not a precedent—he 
recognizes that same threat in Nietzsche: that he meant to caution against nihilism rather 
than advocate for it. Despite his inconsistencies, or the inconsistent ways in which he is 
read, Nietzsche’s importance to the new nihilism nevertheless stands: Modernist authors 
and critics, including Yeats, Ezra Pound, and D.H. Lawrence, still read and disseminated 
his ideas to a Western audience.  
While Davidson perhaps took notice of Nietzsche first, Alfred Orage, the editor of 
New Age literary magazine from 1907-1922, arguably gave him the widest readership.  
Scholars like David Thatcher have thoroughly demonstrated Orage and New Age’s 
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dissemination of Nietzschean material, but I wish to connect this to a spreading of the 
new nihilism across a modernist readership. Orage disseminated Nietzsche’s philosophy 
to a modernist British audience through his magazine, an instrumental publication for 
contextualizing the social and political matters that temper modernism.60 Orage studied 
Nietzschean philosophy from 1900-1907, and through his study, he noticed Nietzsche’s 
influence on contemporary British writers. In Friedrich Nietzsche, the Dionysian Spirit of 
the Age (1906), Orage declares:  
 
Friedrich Nietzsche is the greatest European event since Goethe.  From one end of 
Europe to the other, wherever his books are read, the discussion in the most 
intellectual and aristocratically- minded circles turns on the problems raised by 
him… Already half a dozen well-known English writers might be named who 
owe, if not half their ideas, at least half the courage of their ideas to Nietzsche.61  
 
 
Under the direction of Orage, New Age became a promoter for Nietzschean philosophy, 
and given the wide readership among Yeats and Eliot as well as other prominent 
modernist writers like D.H. Lawrence, H.D., and Ezra Pound, Nietzsche finally had the 
opportunity to become a reckoning force in literary theory and execution. As Orage 
claimed, “Nietzsche…is taken seriously in Germany; and, though handicapped by the 
advocacy of certain of his prophets, will have to be taken seriously here [in Britain].62 It 
was not long after Orage introduced Nietzsche to a British audience that Woolf saw a 
“change” in human character and Benn noticed the “scaffold” beginning to “crack.”  
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Nietzsche’s new nihilism’s impression on literary modernism, therefore, was certainly 
potent and spread rather swiftly.  
The “new nihilism” that Read, Podhoretz, and Paul all reference is exactly that—a 
reconceptualized version of nihilism that Nietzsche outlined in The Will to Power.   
Beginning with this text, Nietzsche introduced his perception of nihilism to the 
philosophical scene. In this text, he maintains that nihilism represents the fundamental 
rejection of all imposed values and a priori meaning. While the definition of nihilism in 
The Will to Power is indeed attributed to Nietzsche, it is important to remember how and 
when the work was published. Nietzsche died in 1900, so The Will to Power consists of 
fragments and selections from his notebooks that were compiled and published 
posthumously by his sister, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, who used one of Nietzsche’s 
outlines to arrange the portions of unfinished text.63 She maintained that the published 
version would bring his intended masterpiece to life, which Nietzsche had hoped to 
compose and name “The Will to Power, An Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values.”  
Since Förster-Nietzsche rather than Nietzsche himself is responsible for the book’s 
arrangement, some of the accusations against Nietzsche regarding its material are perhaps 
too severe.  Its publication history notwithstanding, The Will to Power still holds a place 
of significance for shaping modernism’s view of nihilism. 
While certainly not the sole subject discussed in The Will to Power, Nietzsche 
rather exhaustively deliberates on nihilism in the book. Nietzsche asks in its early pages, 
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“What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devalue themselves.”64 So, even the 
uppermost and seemingly steadfast mores will eventually lose their importance when 
faced with nihilism. For Nietzsche, objective order and structure do not exist, and so the 
world possess no inherent meaning. The nihilist, an individual who determines that all 
values are unsubstantiated and that logic and sense are powerless in such a world, must 
then break through the façades that shoulder all beliefs. He states,  
 
The most extreme form of nihilism would be the view that every belief, every 
considering-something-true, is necessarily false cause there simply is no true 
world.  Thus:  a perspectival appearance whose origin lies in us… To this extent, 
nihilism, as the denial of a truthful world, of being, might be a divine way of 
thinking.65  
 
 
New nihilism, then, in its purest implementation, denies the existence of every value, 
construct, and presumed certainty. Furthermore, through his use of “divine,” Nietzsche 
even seems to suggest that such a disposition is ideal. Given the extremity of Nietzsche’s 
statement and the ubiquitousness of his new nihilism, it is not surprising that some 
modernist writers internalized these ideas. Hemingway’s statement “Our nada who art in 
nada, nada be thy name thy kingdom nada thy will be nada in nada as it is in nada…Hail 
nothing full of nothing, nothing is with thee” drains the meaning from religion and even 
existence itself, replacing them instead with metaphysical emptiness.66 Likewise, in the 
“Eumaeus” episode of Ulysses (1922), James Joyce complicates the idea of objective, 
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practical meaning through the symbol of sounds. Stephen Dedalus muses that 
“Sounds…are impostors…Like names, Cicero, Podmore, Napoleon, Mr. Goodbody, 
Jesus, Mr. Doyle, Shakespeares were as common as Murphies. What’s in a name?”  
Chaos, then, flourishes through the epistemological crisis that nihilism fosters.   
According to Nietzsche, it is not enough for individuals to passively accept the 
universe’s lack of innate value and consequence. Rather, an individual should actively 
will and seek total negation. For Nietzsche, nihilism is not a problem of credible belief or 
an intellectual crisis, but as a pathology of human desire: either as a collapse of desire 
altogether or a self-deceit concerning what we actually desire.67 In effect, nothing is 
important or worth wanting. He claims that  
 
Nihilism does not only contemplate the ‘in vain!’ nor is it is the belief that 
everything deserves to perish; one helps to destroy one actually puts one’s 
shoulder to the plough; one destroys. This, if you will, is illogical, but the Nihilist 
does not believe in the necessity of being logical.68  
 
 
“Illogical” here suggests that such a nihilist relies on feeling rather than reason and 
reaches judgments that are derived from sensational perceptions, not intrinsic truths. 
Again, it is then perhaps understandable why modernism enveloped by Nietzsche’s 
nihilism; any hope for a logical, predictable pattern running the world seemed lost.   
However, for Eliot and Yeats, Nietzsche’s argument seems deficient. For 
instance, when Eliot declares that “human kind cannot bear much reality” in “Burnt 
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Norton” (1935), he highlights the difficulty of attaining absolute authenticity and truth 
rather than their nonexistence or humanity’s unwillingness to “bear” such concepts. The 
journey to discovery may not be forthright, but the truth is achievable.  Furthermore, 
Yeats bases his entire view of history on the existence of a consistent, overarching 
patterns and cycles in A Vision and like Eliot, he sees “truth” as a meaningful aspiration.   
In a January 1939 letter to Lady Elizabeth Pelham, Yeats writes “Man can embody truth 
but he cannot know.”69 On one hand, his statement seems as bleak as Hemingway’s 
empty “nada”; however, if we view Yeats’s phrase with Heraclitus and by extension 
Hegel in mind, we can see the implied inverse of the assertion, which would read 
something like, “The truth does not exist at all unless it is-and as it is—embodied in and 
by man.”70 Value-creation therefore begins with a search for truth in an otherwise empty, 
illogical space that an individual then fills with pattern and structure. In this way, Eliot 
and Yeats actively put their shoulders to the metaphorical plow, but they do so to 
cultivate order and certainty. 
Nietzsche’s Russian Influences 
It is clear that, given Nietzsche’s distrust in the modern system of values and 
truth, his nihilism draws upon a genealogy that shares his dubiousness even more 
strongly than Jacobi’s in his critique of idealism. This genealogy includes two of the most 
widely regarded writers on Russian nihilism: Ivan Turgenev and Fyodor Dostoevsky.  
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Elisabeth Kuhn traces Nietzsche’s sources to a few different texts, and each posits a 
nihilism that allows for nothing but negativity.71 In the summer of 1873, Nietzsche read 
Prosper Mérimée’s French translations and published comments on Turgenev’s novels 
Fathers and Sons (1862) and followed with Virgin Soil (1877) several years later. Both of 
these novels outline a nihilism that specifically emphasizes the renunciation of a 
manufactured political and theological faith. Strengthening his interpretation of nihilism, 
Nietzsche followed these readings with Paul Bourget’s Essays in Contemporary 
Psychology (1883).72  
Although these texts proved to be instrumental in determining his thoughts, it was 
Nietzsche’s reading of Dostoevsky in 1887, however, that most profoundly shaped his 
conception of nihilism, and this encounter explains the “explosion” of the term “nihilism” 
in the last two years of Nietzsche’s productive life.73 In particular, passages from 
Dostoevsky’s Demons (1872) reappeared consistently in Nietzsche’s notebooks from 
1887-1888, including the phrase “‘I am a nihilist, but I love beauty.”74 As Dostoevsky 
biographer Joseph Frank observes, the target of Dostoevsky’s critique of nihilism in 
Demons takes aim at Western rationalism, which includes the philosophies of Kant and 
Spinoza. Dostoevsky viewed rationalism as “inevitably leading to the replacement of the 
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Godman Christ, with his morality of love, by the Man-god of egoism and power.”75 The 
rationalist, then, simply “replaces” Christ as a moral foundation. As the personification of 
“rational egoism,” Dostoevsky’s nihilist is therefore, anti-Christian and anti-rationalist. 
This distrust in an established Christian tradition translates to Nietzsche’s denouncement 
of organized religion, and also perhaps informs his decision not to consider old nihilism 
when formulating his own understanding of the term.  
All of these events and ideas form the framework of Nietzsche’s complex and 
modified rendering of nihilism. He does not adopt the initial definition that Jacobi 
delivers, nor does he help us to grasp the tradition that Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel work 
within. Rather, Nietzsche deviates from a perception of the idea that boasts a history that 
is hundreds of years long and instead adopts an approach that borrows from early Russian 
existentialism. This was not necessarily a deliberate obscuration on his part, just perhaps 
an investigation of a nihilism that he believed more accurately characterized the modern 
condition.  Additionally, while it might seem too harsh to accuse Nietzsche of 
“misunderstanding” nihilism as Gillespie suggests –he did not participate in publishing 
The Will to Power, for instance, and therefore had no say in the final version of the 
arguments it contains—his interpretation nevertheless places modernism’s tradition of 
nihilism in the Russian existential mode instead of within a lineage that sees the 
usefulness of nothingness. The old nihilism, however, has not been banished from 
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modernism altogether, as writers like Eliot and Yeats form a countercurrent that creates 
and challenges the new nihilism’s emptiness. 
Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel: An Old Nihilism to Challenge the New 
After investigating Nietzsche’s new nihilism and its modernist readership, I now 
want to examine the tradition of old nihilism that Nietzsche’s philosophy obscured.  
Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, all of whom pose systems of thought that extract the creative 
potential from nothingness, lead this charge for modernism.  By deviating from an 
understanding of nihilism that originated in the fourteenth century, Nietzsche posed a 
departure from a view of a philosophical concept that existed for centuries. Therefore, 
“old” here does not necessarily mean outdated or departed, but instead, a “previous” 
tradition that existed before Nietzsche’s Will to Power. This tradition may appear 
forgotten by modernists due in part to the wide array of people who read Nietzsche and 
that his philosophy seems to correspond with the events surrounding modernism, which 
include traumatic war, degradation of art and culture, and existential doubt in religion. If 
considered more deeply, however, the old nihilism resurfaces in modernism as a 
countercurrent to the new, and it challenges the nothingness and fills it with potential. It 
is a nothing such as this—the nothing of Kant, Spinoza, and Hegel—that makes creation 
possible.   
The great wars and totalitarian regimes that plagued Western society since The 
Will to Power’s publication lends credence to society’s acceptance of his nihilistic vision.   
Nietzsche’s death of God does appear to facilitate a world that permits all things to 
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transpire. However, as Gillespie argues, we need to reimagine what the “death of God” 
actually signifies. For Nietzsche, God’s death is both liberating and frightening; on one 
hand, this event eradicates the western world’s reliance on religion as a source of 
morality, but it also leaves emptiness in its wake. This emptiness then breeds the 
valueless state of new nihilism that seeped its way into modernist art and literature. The 
tradition of nihilism before Nietzsche, though, focuses instead on a reclamation of 
nothingness: to see “nothing” as provisional and prolific. The desolation of new nihilism 
fades, leaving instead a human will and self-avowal that fills the empty space and 
prepares for construction rather than annihilation.  While they never mention the subject 
by name, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel all do precisely that: they posit a value-positive 
nihilism that captures a philosophical rather than theological Creatio ex nihilo.         
A philosopher whose contemporaries accused of atheism and pantheism, Spinoza 
enjoyed a boost in popularity in 19th and 20th century Europe, just in time for a modernist 
audience to take notice.76 His substance monism and consideration of plentitude and 
vacancy, which are two component parts of his system of ideas, especially portray the old 
nihilism’s value of value.   Sometimes called the “One Substance,” a portion of his 
“Theory of Attributes” discussed in the Ethics (1677), Spinoza claims that one infinite 
substance—he calls this substance “God” or “Nature”—is the only substance that exists.  
In what seems like a contradiction, however, this one substance possesses endless 
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attributes. Additionally, while the individual attributes exist autonomously and separately 
from each other, they are all nonetheless a part of the same metaphysical substance. 
Therefore, each one of the attributes yields the possibility of explaining the entire 
universe and everything in it. Concerning this notion, Spinoza posits that existence itself  
is “conceived as an eternal truth, just as is the essence of a thing, and therefore cannot be 
explicated through duration or time, even if duration be conceived as without beginning 
and end.”77   
Through his methodology, Spinoza perhaps leads us to the edge of the abyss of 
absolute emptiness, but he does not leave us there. Indeed, as Thomas Altizer claims, 
Spinoza’s substance monism does not reject nothingness’s creative capacity. Rather, he is 
instead one of the only modern philosophers who refuses to succumb to the “nihil,” the 
complete abyss, and instead aims to “deconstruct a uniquely modern nothingness.”78 He 
argues that Spinoza, rather than maintaining an abyss filled with nothing, removes the 
“negativity of nothingness” and that he “renders it as divine plentitude.” If so, this seems 
to concur with the “very logic of nihilism,” which is to condense the “something into 
metaphysically nothing and to attempt to have the nothing perform as something.”79 To 
extrapolate further, it appears that Spinoza’s brand of nihilism discussed in the Ethics 
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interprets the void and nothingness as having the potential for promoting an order that 
contrasts with the chaos of the new nihilism. 
If Spinoza’s vacancy and substance monism remove the negativity of 
nothingness, then Kant opens up the human subject for an epistemological “emptying 
out” with an idealistic twist. Eliot’s familiarity with Kant is substantial; he read the 
Critiques in his graduate seminar with Charles Montague and wrote three papers. Yeats 
latched onto Kant’s idealism. Kant’s system of ideas is foundational: it is even the space 
where nihilism perhaps initially manifests in post-Enlightenment philosophy, and his 
thought lies heavily behind philosophical modernism.80 Even the “death of God,” an 
event often attributed to Nietzsche, finds its foremost expression in Kantian antinomies, 
in which a whole generation of thinkers found “an unabridged gap between God and 
man.”81 Kant’s formulation of nihilism takes a rational approach as defined in his three 
Critiques: The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), The Critique of Practical Reason (1788), 
and The Critique of Judgment (1790). Perhaps fittingly, nihilism enters the discussion 
through an act of disappearance, where for Slavoj Žižek, the Kantian subject becomes “a 
non-substantial void” where Kant “asserts that the transcendental subject is unknowable, 
empty.”82   
This fading of the subject is not a simple undertaking and the process requires an 
epistemological regression, so to speak, to complete it.  In the first Critique, Kant wants 
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to stake a claim about the truth, and in doing so, he reduces the world to mere 
appearance. As Cunningham suggests, the world must dissolve before the Kantian subject 
can make any assumptions, to “say” anything.83 The second Critique steals nature away 
from the subject to examine “the good life” without any phenomenal intrusion, and thus 
the subject has lost the ability to “do” anything.84 Finally, in the third Critique, the 
subject’s world loses all “visible objects,” and so he/she can no longer “see” anything.85   
It is through these formulations that the Kantian subject will be the site of, what 
Cunningham calls, a “triple vanishing.” Through this vanishing, the “non-substantial 
void” that Žižek perceives has purged itself and, like Spinoza’s space between vacancy 
and plentitude, Kant provides us with a “nothing.” This “nothing” gives the subject, now 
completely “vanished,” the space to start the building process and construct an 
epistemological foundation that can later hold value and meaning.    
Hegel deepens Spinoza’s and Kant’s renderings of nihilism, as he takes the 
“nothing” they posit and makes it function as “something” of value. He recognizes the 
danger of romantic nihilism and attempts to overcome it by showing that the principle of 
negation does not lead to meaningless and despair; rather, it yields absolute knowledge 
and a rational, methodical ethics. Hegel extends Spinoza’s ideas on substance and the 
Kantian system of ideas and through his endeavor, he shows that nihilism is perhaps 
inevitable and even favorable. To contend with this inevitability, Hegel postulates a “true 
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nihilism” that “recognized and participated in the absolute” and “rejected the divine 
omnipotence in favor of the true omnipotence and dialectical rationality of absolute 
spirit,” which is based on negativity.86 For Hegel, the world, nature, and life are the 
manifestation and externalization of Geist, or the “Absolute Idea.”87 He states, “Geist is 
immortal; without it there is no past no future, but an essential now.”88 Furthermore, 
when connecting the Geist to the realm of particulars, nothingness becomes essential.  
Hegel declares, “Nothingness is the principle of all things…all proceeded from and 
returns to Nothingness…To obtain happiness, therefore, man must seek to assimilate 
himself to this principle by continual victories over himself; and for the sake of this, do 
nothing, wish nothing, desire nothing.”89 After establishing nothingness as the essence of 
existence, Hegel then proposes how this thing that nearly a century later will plague 
modernists can be used to support a carefully designed reality.       
To do this, Hegel must maneuver negation into functioning as “something,” a 
thing that has potential on its own. In his Science of Logic (1816), he outlines his view of 
absolute negativity: 
 
Becoming in essence, its reflective movement, is the movement of nothing to 
nothing, and so back to itself. The transition, or Becoming, sublates itself in its 
transition: that Other which arises in the course of this transition is not the Not-
being of a Being, but the nothingness of a Nothing, and this, to be the negation of 
a nothing, constitutes Being — Being only is as the movement of Nothing to 
Nothing, and as such it is Essence; and Essence does not have this movement 
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within it but is this movement, as a being that is itself absolutely illusory, pure 
negativity, which has nothing without it that could negate it, but negates only its 
own negativity, which is only in this negation, which latter is only in this 
negating.90 
 
 
For Hegel, the absolute is the nothing that negates itself, or, the annihilation of 
annihilation. However, this annihilation is not the harbinger of absolute destruction, 
though it may appear this way. Instead, Hegelian annihilation is not finite, and it does 
indicate a condition that, for the new nihilism, has the power to trap its inhabitants in a 
condition of tumult. Indeed, to recognize and understand such obliteration is to overcome 
it, according to Hegel.  Hegel’s overcoming leaps directly from the void, born into the 
world as an opportunity for creation; he declares, “out of this abyss of nothing…the 
feeling: God is dead…the highest totality in its complete seriousness and out of its 
deepest ground, at once all-encompassing and in the most joyful freedom of its form can 
and must arise.”91 In other words, no finite or infinite being exists, but all things are 
collapsed into the idea of negation itself, which then allows for a surmounting to take 
place. This is a form of nihilism that rebounds and reconstitutes itself as the most 
comprehensive order.92 Through Hegel, nihilism is given the attribute of potential 
creation, a characteristic that Spinoza and Kant built toward. Their three philosophies 
together help to form the “true nihilism,” a part of the history of ideas that Western 
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society in the early 20th century nearly misses thanks to Nietzsche’s reimagination of the 
concept.  
Conclusion 
Even currently, Western culture largely associates nihilism with disaster, 
destruction, and obliteration largely thanks to The Will to Power. However, as I have 
shown, nihilism is vastly more complex and multifaceted than Nietzsche’s work projects. 
John Xiros Cooper makes the accurate claim that nihilism is not a synonym for chaos and 
anarchy.93 It is instead often understood as a historical event, particularly of late-modern 
Western culture, when confidence in our “highest values”—religious and moral values—
rapidly deteriorates. If we consider Cooper’s remark, then modernist writers can respond 
in two possible ways to such an event: either through Nietzsche’s valueless conception 
that threatens modernism, or a response that sees potential in emptiness and endeavors to 
use nothingness as a space for creation. For Nietzsche, this tension of modernity’s answer 
to nihilism will elicit either a “decline and recession of the power of the spirit” or an 
“increased power of the spirit,” though he gives no clear answer to which result will 
win.94 On one hand, modernism must contend with God’s death, which engenders strong 
theological and moral implications, as well as the socioeconomic ramifications of 
capitalism, which highlight a culture where art is devalued and commodified. On the 
other hand, while the etymology of nihilism is based in “nihil,” there is more than one 
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way to rationalize and engage with nothingness and perceived value loss. Indeed, 
Cunningham calls nihilism “post-apocalyptic” because it is beyond being apocalyptic.95 
That is, it is an entity beyond the scope of mere negativity.   
French philosopher and theorist Maurice Blanchot begins his Writing of the 
Disaster, which connects old nihilism, and Hegel’s view of absolute negativity in 
particular, to history’s cataclysmic events. He begins with the statement “The disaster 
ruins everything, all while leaving everything intact.”96 This seems like a contradictory 
statement, and Blanchot’s next declaration does little to illuminate it. He continues, 
“When the disaster comes upon us, it does not come.”97 While this seems like a paradox, 
Cunningham answers that “nothing” has the power as both the disaster and preserver, 
something that is always already present and absent.98 This speaks to the recurring 
observations about nihilism: that the idea, historically speaking, emphasizes the positivity 
of nothingness rather than an complete negativity that came with Nietzsche. The question 
we must ask is this: What can possibly simultaneously devastate and shield everything? 
The answer to Blanchot’s quandary thus is “nothing.” Old nihilism’s disaster, which 
promises a provisional nothing, fails to remain bound to physicality.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
“THE DARK GROW LUMINOUS”: YEATS READING NIHILISM 
 
 
I think profound philosophy must come from terror.  An abyss opens under our 
feet; inherited convictions, the pre-suppositions of our thoughts, those Fathers of 
the Church…drop into the abyss.  Whether we will or no we must ask the ancient 
questions: Is there reality anywhere?  Is there a God? Is there a Soul? 
—W. B.  Yeats, “Modern Poetry: A Broadcast” (1936) 
 
 
Introduction 
In his essay “Bishop Berkeley,” (1931) Yeats strongly expresses admiration for 
the philosophers of old nihilism.  He declares that “no educated man will doubt that the 
movement of philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel is the greatest of all works of 
intellect.”99 This is indeed an audacious statement: Yeats implies that only a fool would 
object to his point, and his work substantiates the proclamation. Right around the point 
that Yeats began to read old nihilism, his poetry and prose incurred a noticeable stylistic 
and thematic shift. He moved away from the Romantic-infused language of his earlier 
volumes and toward a questioning of metaphysical truths and a less formal structure.  
This is perhaps unsurprising; by the time he published The Wild Swans at Coole (1917), 
Yeats was approaching middle age and had surrendered the years-long mirage of 
marrying his muse, Maud Gonne. He had spent the winters of 1913-1916 at Stone 
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Cottage with Ezra Pound where the younger poet served as his secretary; at the cottage, 
the pair could immerse themselves in their projects uninterruptedly. This volume is then 
fittingly infused with discussions of old age and deteriorating masculine gallantry and, as 
Terence Brown suggests, signals a man in deep personal, existential crisis.100 In Michael 
Robartes and the Dancer (1921), however, Yeats thunderously reveals the knowledge 
that he collected through his studies of the occult, mysticism, and philosophy with a 
forceful poetic voice.101 Importantly, at this volume’s publication, Yeats had been reading 
Benedict de Spinoza for at least a few years. The ideas that preoccupy nihilism are at 
their strongest in The Tower (1928), where Yeats communicates his disillusionment with 
the limitations of the physical world and the relationship of the mind and body. At this 
point, Yeats had read all three old nihilists—Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, and Georg W. F. 
Hegel—in careful detail. Since these topics did not surface with such strength when he 
began reading Nietzsche many years earlier, I suggest that the old nihilists helped Yeats 
engage with such concepts and form an expressed response to them. 
The aim of this chapter is to interrogate Yeats’s engagement with nihilism by 
predominantly using his letters and prose. I shall first investigate Yeats’s expansive 
reading of Friedrich Nietzsche and his potent admiration for the philosopher’s bold ideas.  
I establish Havelock Ellis’s “Nietzsche Series” as his initial introduction to Nietzsche and 
show that the series incited his livelong love of the philosopher. While Yeats undeniably 
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incorporated facets of Nietzschean philosophy into his poetic system, however, I argue 
that the poet resists The Will to Power’s new characterization of nihilism as bleak and 
empty. In fact, Yeats extracts Nietzsche’s generative concept of amor fati from the 
philosopher’s work, a disposition promoting a “love” of individual “fate” that modernist 
readers seemed to overlook. I then chart Yeats’s reading of the old nihilist philosophers 
Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, whose generative understanding of the idea removed 
nothingness’s negativity and imbued it with generative capabilities. Using its knowledge 
of mysticism, transcendental idealism, and the Absolute Spirit, Yeats uses old nihilism to 
establish a system of ideas that removes the negativity of nothingness and positions itself 
for transcendence rather than the destructive despair of modernism’s new nihilism.  
Finally, this chapter shows that Yeats proposes a renewed deific entity in A Vision that 
fills the emptiness left by Nietzsche’s “death of God” and makes divinity palpable for 
human understanding. As Michael Gillespie shows, the problem of nihilism lies in a 
“nominalist” conception of God that is terrifying and omnipotent, but when Nietzsche 
declared this God dead, the modern landscape had nothing else to fill the vacancy. 
Herbert Read acknowledged this problem, and while the main challenge facing society 
after the death of God is the “conquest of nihilism,” he maintains that the world has failed 
to advance that agenda since Nietzsche’s pronouncement.102 Consequently, society still 
dawdles in ambiguity because God has not yet “risen from the dead.”103 While the new 
nihilism left the idea of God deceased for a modernist audience, I argue that through his 
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image of the ethereal, enigmatic Thirteenth Cone, Yeats employs Spinoza’s substance 
monism, Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, and Kant’s transcendental idealism to propose a new 
kind of God that old nihilism reimagines for a modern age. This new divinity fills the 
barrenness that the new nihilism instigated and replaces it with procreative, transcendent 
qualities. 
Yeats In Context: The Modern Nihil 
If any one of the modernists are outwardly perfect candidates for embracing the 
new nihilism, it is perhaps Yeats. He not only contended with the aftermath of the Great 
War but also survived the period in Irish history known as “the Troubles,” a particularly 
calamitous interlude when Ireland fought for and won its independence from its 
colonizer.104 Bloody battles like the Easter Rising of 1916, the War of Independence from 
1919-1921, and the Civil War of 1922-1923 deeply marked Ireland’s physical landscape 
and collective consciousness, wounds that carved their way into Yeats’s poetry. Political 
uncertainty and turmoil lasted well after war formally ended, which bred continued 
unease and struggle.  As Sarah Cole argues,  
 
For the Ireland of the modernist era, three elements converge in this imaginary: a 
general tone of nihilistic resentment, sharing some of its language with the 
anarchist movement; a cycle of vengeance that superseded the ideal of 
generativity, especially potent in the post-Rising and post–First World War years; 
and, perhaps most simply, the possibility of being motivated by hatred.105  
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With political uncertainty and shared, unveiled disgust came metaphysical doubt, and 
also for Yeats, as Anthony Bradley argues, the Nietzschean sense that European culture 
was “moving toward a great catastrophe,” and that nihilism embodied the age’s leading 
“ethos” perhaps seemed like a logical philosophical disposition.106 Furthermore, he states 
that although Yeats’s body of work is not consumed by it, his poetry “meditates on more 
profound issues than the pragmatic issues of politics, and is for a time suffused with the 
nihilism that was to some extent the currency of literary modernism.”107 As Yeats himself 
says, “I feel that an imaginative writer whose work draws him to philosophy must attach 
himself to some great historic school. My dreams and much psychic phenomena force me 
into a certain little-trodden way but I must not go too far from the main European 
track.”108 Considering Ireland’s contentious atmosphere and Yeats’s personal struggle 
with war’s repercussions, it might be tempting to see him as continuing down the “main 
European track” into the abyss of new nihilism.      
However, a clear current in Yeats’s writing shows that he considers nihilism as 
procreative rather than the empty result of complete destruction.  Yeats’s interest in 
nothingness recurs in his work from his early writings until Parnell’s Funeral and Other 
Poems (1935), his last published volume of poetry.  And from the beginning, there are 
glimpses of his portrayals of nothingness possessing potential for value.  In “The 
Philosophy of Shelley’s Poetry” (1900), Yeats considers his “unshakable belief” and 
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asserts that “whatever of philosophy has been made poetry alone is permanent, and that 
one should arrange it in some regular order, rejecting nothing as the make-believe of the 
poets.”109 This emphasis on creation as knowledge is an early indication of Yeats seeing 
“nothing” as having value-potential.  In “Anima Hominis” (Per Amica Silentia Lunae, 
1918), Yeats concludes his discussion of the relationship between the self and the mask 
with a lucid realization.  He affirms, “I shall find the dark grow luminous, the void 
fruitful when I understand I have nothing, that the ringers in the tower have appointed for 
the hymen for the soul a passing bell.”110 His metaphor is condensed and vivid: only after 
negating the world’s fleeting images through a death knell can the “soul” achieve its 
“hymen” and begin to create. This idea—the conception of an absolutely empty but 
prolific void—reappears throughout all of his writing and highlights his desire to create, 
an idea that runs directly counter to the new nihilism.  In “A General Introduction for My 
Work” (1937), published less than a year before his death, Yeats declares, “A poet is 
never the bundle of accident and incoherence that sits down to breakfast; he has been 
reborn as an idea, something intended, complete.”111  The word “intended” here is 
particularly important.  Yeats, looking back on a poet’s existence, sees the abstract idea 
as ultimately presiding over an early, “incoherent” iteration that drinks his coffee in the 
metaphorical morning.  The “reborn idea” is patterned and refined, leaving the early 
version’s chaotic element out of the discussion. The “we” in Yeats’s statement instead is 
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the orderer, the architect that ascribes meaning to all things, and therefore understands all 
things.      
Yeats’s meditation on nothingness extends beyond his prose and recurs in his 
dramatic works and poetry as well. In his early tragedy Where There Is Nothing (1902), 
Paul Ruttledge preaches a new religion that clashes with civilization and counsels the 
demolition of all laws, cities, and churches. The townspeople, however, demand that he 
and his followers live outside of town. Through Ruttledge, Yeats establishes a fascination 
with “nothing” that manifests as both a finitude and the revelation of a positivity beyond 
that abyss.  Ruttledge declares in his dying line, “Remember always where there is 
nothing, there is God.”112 Furthermore, in “Meru,” one of his final published poems, 
Yeats interrogates the multifaceted nature of human existence: 
 
Civilisation is hooped together, brought 
Under a rule, under the semblance of peace 
By manifold illusion; but man’s life is thought, 
And he, despite his terror, cannot cease 
Ravening through century after century, 
Ravening, raging, and uprooting that he may come 
Into the desolation of reality.113 
 
 
Using “hooped,” a term that conjures images of his cyclical view of history, Yeats calls 
attention to the multifarious artifice that connects peoples and places. The aural openness 
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and looseness of “hooped” underscores this point: it suggests a slackenness that words 
like “woven” or “entwined” would fail to capture. The things that do the hooping, the 
“rule” and “peace,” now function as fragile and even false concepts that ought to be cast 
aside.  Since these concepts are loose and unable to hold civilization together, humanity 
diligently forges through to discover a more meaningful metaphysical reality. By 
deploying “ravening” twice, Yeats calls upon frenzy and almost animal-like hunger to 
describe the desire to reach the core beyond the artifice. The “terror” and “desolation” of 
reality, capturing that horror at the center of existence, do not deter humanity from 
repeatedly clawing until reaching that core, despite the core being empty of meaning. As 
Richard Ellman argues, the individual feels obligated to “strip illusion away” despite the 
terrifying nothingness that she/he will undoubtedly eventually discover.114 Therefore, 
“the horror” that viscerally upset Mr. Kurtz in Heart of Darkness after the veil is lifted is 
necessary for the people in “Meru.” However, that journey to the center is frightening.  
Yeats writes, “I am alarmed at the growing moral cowardice in the world, as the old 
security disappears—people run in packs that they may get courage from one another and 
even sit at home and shiver.”115 Yeats’s language does not reflect a gleeful anticipation of 
the old guard’s destruction. Rather, descent into annihilation disturbs him. 
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“That Great Enchanter”: Yeats Reading the New Nihilism 
Yeats’s captivation with the philosophy of Nietzsche, “that great enchanter,” is 
undeniable and widely studied. The purpose of this section, therefore, is not to 
recapitulate that influence but instead to investigate Yeats’s first encounter with 
Nietzsche, to identify which Nietzschean texts he read, and to show that he does not view 
nihilism, or nothingness, as the barren, nonredemptive wasteland that The Will to Power 
forecasts. Unlike fellow modernists like James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence, for instance, 
who also read Nietzsche and responded to nihilism in that new tradition, Yeats 
interestingly interacts with the idea in the old tradition. 116   
Scholars still debate Yeats’s first exposure to Nietzsche’s ideas because his own 
words conflict with the textual evidence. For instance, Yeats attributes his first reading of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy to John Quinn, a New York lawyer and benefactor of arts and 
literature. In a letter dated May 15, 1903, Yeats affirms this when he tells Quinn, “you 
have been the first to introduce me to Nietzsche.”117 Yeats’s statement is only partially 
true, however.  While Quinn is likely the first person to gift Nietzsche’s writings to Yeats, 
including copies of The Case of Wagner (1888) and A Genealogy of Morals (1887) as 
well as his personal copy of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1891) all before the end of 
September 1902, Otto Bohlmann remarks that Yeats may have meant this statement 
“diplomatically” so that Quinn would continue to support the poet’s work, and it thus 
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should not be taken as truth.118 In fact, Yeats probably read Nietzsche for the first time 
several years prior. Sometime between latter 1900 and 1902, Yeats purchased a pamphlet 
that contained English translations of Nietzsche’s writings.119 However, for Bohlmann 
and Yeats biographer Terence Brown, Yeats’s initial encounter with Nietzsche’s 
philosophy instead might have occurred as early as April 1896, where his “Rosa 
Alchemica” and “Two Poems Concerning Peasant Visionaries” were published in The 
Savoy120 alongside the first article in physician Havelock Ellis’s “Friedrich Nietzsche” 
series.121    
If Yeats did first encounter Nietzsche through Ellis’s articles, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that he appreciated the philosopher’s intoxicating and vigorous ideas from 
the start. Ellis describes Nietzsche in a way that casts him as innovative, heroic, and one 
of the loftiest thinkers in the history of philosophy. Yeats knew Ellis and the two men 
shared mutual acquaintances, and while Ellis was away from London in the summer of 
1895, Yeats and Arthur Symons, editor of The Savoy, shared the physician’s lodging in 
Fountain Court, Temple.122 In his first article, Ellis largely focuses on Nietzsche’s 
biography, from his family history to his leaving Basel though the last nine years of life 
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travelling and spending time at health institutions (92).123 Ellis then pushes beyond the 
biographical and casts Nietzsche in a visionary light, calling him “mystical” and a man 
who experienced “prophetic dreams” since he was a boy.124 He specifically calls Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra “the most extraordinary of [Nietzsche’s] works” and names its style 
“mystical in form, and recalling of the oracular aphoristic manner of the Hebrews.”125 
With such a mark for mystical aptitude, perhaps Yeats became drawn to Nietzsche 
because of Ellis’s characterization of the philosopher as “mystical,” a quality that the poet 
intensely privileged in his own writing.126 Yeats and Ellis appeared together in The Savoy 
again in July of 1896, where Ellis’s second “Nietzsche” article treats him even more 
favorably. Ellis begins this article by articulating that Nietzsche’s purpose for philosophy 
differs from “the average modern philosopher’s” preoccupation with “books and study,” 
which positions Nietzsche as someone above his contemporaries. It is Nietzsche’s focus 
on “a life to be lived” and “the essentials of fine living” that sets him apart.127 Finally, 
Ellis makes his most profound statement for Nietzsche’s philosophical aptitude in his 
third essay in The Savoy’s August 1896 issue, again appearing alongside Yeats’s poetry.  
Here, Ellis acknowledges that Nietzsche did indeed succumb to madness, but in a bold 
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rhetorical choice, he includes this malady as an indication of a martyrdom for the cause.  
He states,  
 
No doubt it was a consolation that Socrates was poisoned, that Jesus was 
crucified, that Bruno was burnt.  But hemlock and the cross and the stake proved 
sorry weapons against the might of ideas even in those days, and there is no 
reason to suppose that a doctor’s certificate will be more effectual in our own.128  
 
       
To compare Nietzsche to Jesus Christ and a pair of eminent martyrs is indeed daring and 
even inflammatory. Nevertheless, it is a statement that increases Nietzsche’s ethos by 
proxy, since Ellis includes him among the greatest thinkers of Western culture. When 
placed in the company of Socrates, the beloved father of Western philosophy, Jesus 
Christ, and celebrated martyr of science Giordano Bruno, Nietzsche’s ideas appear 
unstoppable despite his deteriorating mental state.     
After Yeats read Ellis’s unflinchingly positive portrayal of Nietzsche, he formed a 
enduring affection for the philosopher and was inspired to delve more deeply into 
Nietzsche’s work. He read Nietzsche’s most eminent texts, including Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra in 1902 and after he finished that, Yeats continued his reading in 1903 and 
devoured The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche contra Wagner (1895), The Twilight of the 
Idols (1889), The Antichrist (1895), On the Genealogy of Morals, and Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra for the second time.129 Yeats did not read The Birth of Tragedy (1872) until 
                                                          
128 Havelock Ellis, “Friedrich Nietzsche – III,” The Savoy: An Illustrated Monthly 
(London), August 1896. 63. 
129 Surette, The Birth of Modernism, 168. 
 
 
 
53 
 
1904, and even then, as Surette observes, he only studied select sections.130 After 
consuming this expanse of Nietzschean philosophy so swiftly, it is not difficult to 
determine how quickly Nietzsche’s ghost began to drift behind Yeats’s work. For Yeats, 
a man who was encouraged by occultist rites, mystical experience, and “elitist doctrines,” 
Nietzsche acted as a “councilor who gave instruction in self-mastery and the dominance 
of others in social contexts where mere hierarchy…could not be depended upon to 
enforce submission.”131 In a September 1902 letter to Lady Gregory, Yeats expresses just 
how much he admires the German philosopher. He calls Nietzsche “that strong 
enchanter” and essentially blames his lack of correspondence with Gregory on Nietzsche, 
in whom he states that Lady Gregory has a “rival.” He praises Nietzsche further and 
declares that he “completes Blake and has the same roots.”132 Terence Brown asserts that 
between 1902-1903, Yeats would undoubtedly become familiar with “the world of 
continuous struggle which he so compellingly evoked, included the struggle to create a 
mask.133 The “will to power” that Nietzsche hailed could gain a tangible articulation in 
two “related forms of mastery: over self and others, which is made possible by heroic 
self-mastery.”134 From the Nietzschean books he read, Yeats also absorbed the idea of an 
era’s end and the trouble that potentially awaited humanity on the other side of that 
termination.  While he credits his spiritual “instructors” with inspiring and cultivating his 
interpretation of history and its end, Surette remarks that Yeats derived “some of his 
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apocalyptic imagery” from a “more secular source”: namely, through Nietzsche’s 
images.135 
Yeats, Nietzsche, and Tragic Joy 
Though Nietzsche cast a lifelong spell on Yeats and shaped the poet’s ideas on 
multiple points, Yeats did not ascribe to Nietzschean nihilism. Yeats rather plainly rejects 
the new nihilism in 1903, just one year after he enthusiastically narrated his reading of 
Nietzsche to Lady Gregory. At this instant, he appears to express a preference for the 
Apollonian, an energy that inspires creation rather than destruction. In another letter to 
John Quinn, he expresses his dissatisfaction with Ideas of Good and Evil (1903), where 
Yeats mentions that the book’s ideas are “no longer true for him” because it is “too 
lyrical, too full of aspiration after remote things,” and “too full of desires.”136 Instead, he 
resolves that his next work will “be more creative” and he will communicate his ideas 
“by that sort of thought that leads straight to action” and “some sort of craft.”137 He 
states, “I have always felt that the soul has two movements primarily: one to transcend 
forms, and the other to create forms.  Nietzsche…calls these the Dionysiac and the 
Apollonic, respectively. I think I have to some extend got weary of that wild God 
Dionysus, and I am hoping that the Far-Darter will come in his place.”138 Yeats equates 
Dionysus with transcendence and Apollo with creation, and interestingly, the mode that 
will lead him to achievement and artistry. His word “weary” implies that Yeats had 
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engaged with the Dionysian, but that mode failed to yield the results he desired.  
Contrarily, Nietzsche’s aversion of the Apollonian mode is well documented, and he 
prefers instead the passionate but destructive Dionysian. While this statement is not 
enough to negate Yeats’s alignment with Nietzsche on certain principles, including the 
images of apocalypse in his works, his preference for the creative, stabilizing, Apollonian 
force rather than the frenzied obliteration of the Dionysian is a piece of evidence that 
distances Yeats from the destruction that exemplifies the new nihilism of The Will to 
Power.      
Even further separating Yeats from the new nihilism is the poet’s captivation with 
Nietzsche’s idea of amor fati, a concept that perhaps becomes buried for a modernist 
audience beneath the weighty nothingness and despairing aspects of the philosopher’s 
nihilism. Though he does not use the term specifically, I suggest that amor fati lies 
beneath several of Yeats’s ideas that imbue his later aesthetic projects, including “tragic 
joy” and the “heroic.” By engaging with amor fati, Yeats reemphasizes his commitment 
to value in a climate that questioned the possibility of an existence beyond existential 
despair.  Though he would eventually claim otherwise near the end of his life, Nietzsche 
never advocated for the new nihilism to occur, but instead cautioned against it. 139   
Through amor fati, the “love of fate” that Nietzsche introduces in The Gay Science, the 
individual places value on something—in this case, his/her fate—and thus can prevent 
the collapse into nihilism. As Orbis Litterarum points out, the phrase “tragic joy” only 
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appears once in Yeats’s poetry, but nevertheless remains a crucial component of his 
system of ideas.  Jahan Ramazani even connects tragic joy with the sublime, since the 
sublime transforms “the painful spectacle of destruction and death into a joyful assertion 
of human freedom and transcendence.”140 Additionally, as Terence Brown highlights, 
Yeats expresses his definition of tragic joy most clearly in “A General Introduction for 
My Work.” While discussing Shakespearean tragedy, Yeats declares:  
 
The heroes of Shakespeare convey to us through their looks, or through the 
metaphorical patterns of their speech, the sudden enlargement of their vision, their 
ecstasy at the approach of death.  The supernatural is present, cold winds blow 
across our hands, upon our faces, the thermometer falls, and because of that cold 
we are hated by journalists and groundlings.  There may be in this or that detail 
painful tragedy, but in the whole work none. I have heard Lady Gregory say… 
‘Tragedy must be a joy to the man who dies’.141  
 
 
For Yeats, the specific instances of poor fortune that a character experiences fail to 
characterize their entire existences as “tragic.” Rather, existence is not holistically tragic 
and should be loved and valued regardless of individual negative events. Yeats, then, 
shifts focus from the “fate” component of amor fati to an appreciation of whole 
existence. This appreciation of existence itself underscores tragic joy. 
 Yeats demonstrates the authority of tragic joy in “Lapis Lazuli” (New Poems, 
1938) where he reclaims tragic Shakespearean characters and positions them as “loving” 
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their existences. The speaker describes the scene of a play and the temperament of the 
actors who perform their tragic roles: 
 
All perform their tragic play, 
There struts Hamlet, there is Lear, 
That’s Ophelia, that Cordelia; 
Yet they, should the last scene be there, 
The great stage curtain about to drop, 
If worthy their prominent part in the play, 
Do not break up their lines to weep. 
They know that Hamlet and Lear are gay; 
Gaiety transfiguring all that dread.142 
 
 
The speaker assuredly labels Hamlet and Lear as blissful despite their violent ends. The 
stanza’s steady, melodic rhyme underscores this delight and lulls the reader into a 
contentment that matches that of the speaker. Yeats’s decision to highlight the actors’ 
perspectives rather than the viewpoints of the characters themselves is noteworthy: It 
shows that not only do the characters revel in their existences, but the actors perceive 
this, too. This recognition enables the actors to deliver their lines without becoming 
overwhelmed with grief and actively transforms the “dread” of the scene into merriment.  
If the characters can love their fates, then the speaker and audience share that same 
ability.       
Iterations of amor fati also manifest themselves in Yeats’s heroic, which extends 
his construction of values beyond the general idea of “tragic joy” and to the specific. 
Although it is difficult to fashion a single definition that fits all of Yeats’s heroic figures, 
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as John Byers has observed, they generally fall into two camps. The first are self-
conscious and impetuous because their roles necessitate an intensity for life and the 
second possess an “earth force” tenacity, and boldness, as well as “spiritual intensity.” 
Despite their differences, though, neither type of Yeats’s tragic hero succumbs to 
darkness and despair, but instead finds the worth in calamity. Yeats makes this clear in a 
1929 letter to T. S. Moore:    
 
The one heroic sanction is that of the last battle of the Norse Gods, of a gay 
struggle without hope… Our literary movement would be worthless but for its 
defeat. Science is the criticism of Myth. There would be no Darwin had there 
been no Book of Genesis, no electron but for the Greek atomic myth; and when 
the criticism is finished there is not even a drift of ashes on the  pyre…We free 
ourselves from obsession that we may be nothing. The last kiss is given to the 
void.143 
 
 
Amor fati, then, becomes the expression of the Yeatsian tragedy that advocates for value 
rather than worthlessness. The notion that Yeats latched onto amor fati rather than 
Nietzsche’s new nihilism, though he read and grasped both ideas’ respective texts, 
underscores his commitment to creation in a modern landscape that questions its 
existence. 
A Mystical, Transcendent Experience: Yeats Reading Old Nihilism 
The political turmoil that he experienced as an Irish national and an admitted love 
for Nietzsche’s philosophy outwardly casts Yeats as an ideal candidate for adopting the 
“new” attitude toward nihilism. However, his proclivity toward mysticism and the 
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plentitude of vacancy, transcendental idealism, and an Absolute, guiding Spirit shows 
Yeats instead engaging with the old nihilism of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel. As he did for 
Nietzsche, Yeats spoke enthusiastically about the philosophy of the three old nihilists, 
and he read their work in detail. Despite this, their influence on his view of nihilism 
appears inadequately considered. Furthermore, just as his interest in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy did not depend on the thinker’s new nihilism, Yeats did not read the three old 
nihilists specifically for their thoughts on nothingness’s creative potential. Despite this, 
his detailed reading of their philosophies did shape his consideration of concepts that are 
closely connected to nihilism, including the nature of reality, existence, and the divine.  
Ultimately, his reading of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel helped lead Yeats away from the 
abyss and toward a summit.      
 To understand Yeats’s engagement with the old nihilism of Spinoza, Kant, and 
Hegel, we must first consider what initially attracted him to their philosophies. That is, 
their association with mysticism and the sublime, two concepts that are related to 
nihilism. Yeats’s interest in mysticism as well as questions of existence and meaning 
manifested before his reading of either old or new nihilism, and as Graham Hough 
argues, his fascination with such quandaries developed at least as early as his 
involvement with the Theosophical Society beginning in 1885.144 Though his affiliation 
with the Society was brief compared to that of the Hermeneutic Order of the Golden 
Dawn, its significance endures because it was the first “esoteric system” that Yeats 
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interacted with.145 The Golden Dawn’s teachings functioned as an edifice that enabled 
him to place most of his subsequent interests within a general context, even once the 
content of its teachings had been modified or rejected.146 This includes an early interest 
in, what Hough deems, a version of God that is “boundless, Absolute, impassible, 
unknowable, and indescribable,” with the world existing as “emanations” from this 
“Absolute.”147 By extension, individual “souls” are small sprites or disconnected pieces 
of that single, infinite substance.148 To feel whole, those disconnected pieces are thus 
compelled to remerge with the god-like “One” from which they came, but to accomplish 
this they must undergo a “long pilgrimage through many incarnations, live through many 
lives both in this world and beyond.”149 These mystical subjects only intensify as Yeats’s 
career progressed, and again in 1892, the poet articulates his acute interest in mysticism 
when he writes to John O’Leary. He states, “the mystical life is centre of all that I do & 
all that I think & all that I write. It holds to my work the same relation that the philosophy 
of Godwin help to the work of Shelley & I have all-ways considered my self a voice of 
what I believe to be a greater renaisance [sic]—the revolt of the soul against the 
intellect—now beginning in the world.”150 Though a Nietzschean voice echoes in the 
background of Yeats’s words—through a revolt of sorts—these ideas pull the mystical 
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undertones from old nihilism rather seamlessly and further separate Yeats from new 
nihilism several years before he read either. 151   
The mystical “One” or “Absolute” that attracted Yeats merges qualities of 
Spinozan and Hegelian nihilism. Indeed, mysticism and nihilism are closely connected, 
and for Michael Hinden, represent the “two opposing poles of the Dionysian experience” 
with perhaps a significant deviation: mysticism begins with the destruction of subjectivity 
and the world of the subject. 152 In this way, the mystical experience begins with nihilism, 
but moves toward infinite affirmation through that same experience. Contemporary 
French philosopher Alain Badiou discusses this relationship in greater detail.  He states:  
 
Mysticism is a form of transmission that occurs outside of the rational 
transmission or communication of language. It consists of a pure experience of 
the infinite or, if you like, god, within the nothingness of being. The mystic 
immediately finds god when he destroys himself, his ego, and so on. It is only by 
accepting our finitude and accepting our fundamental and primordial nothingness 
that we can open up access to the glory of god.  
 
  
As we shall see, mysticism’s combination of nothingness and an experience of an infinite 
god-like entity is plainly discernable in Spinoza’s substance monism and Hegel’s idea of 
the Absolute Spirit. Given the existence of such entities in their philosophies, it is perhaps 
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expected and even fitting that Yeats viewed these thinkers as both philosophers and to an 
extent, mystics. Through his sustained interest in mysticism and by grasping onto similar 
qualities in Spinoza’s and Hegel’s writings, Yeats’s conception of nihilism develops in an 
old, generative vein rather than through the negative reading conception of the term. 
Furthermore, the relationship of the sublime to nihilism’s old tradition in 
particular is equally strong.153 That greatness beyond possible quantification, the sublime 
reaches beyond an aesthetic response and taps into the realm of reason, and like nihilism, 
wrestles with metaphysical and epistemological questioning. 154 Similar to mysticism’s 
relationship to nihilism, both nihilism and the sublime respond to a comparable idea.155 
William Slocombe visualizes these two responses as opposite sides of one coin. On one 
side rests “the sublime face” and represents individuals who “saw the ascent of man in 
their culture,” while the other side holds the “nihilistic” face of “those who saw the 
descent of God.”156 Accordingly, while most individuals perhaps interpret nihilism as the 
“negative signifier” and the sublime as the “positive signifier,” these ideas are not as 
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dissimilar as we might believe.157 This dissimilarity becomes even more apparent in 
Kant’s philosophy; his rendering of the sublime is noticeably absorbed in the “triple 
vanishing” of the Kantian subject, which is one of the strongest components of Kant’s 
nihilism.   
As with the term “nihilism,” Yeats does not explicitly use “sublime” to describe 
any specific facet of his system of ideas, but he nevertheless follows a tradition of 
Romantic sublime that is rooted in Kant.158 When he states in “The Philosophy of 
Shelley’s Poetry” that “it is only by ancient symbols…that any highly subjective art can 
escape the barrenness and shallowness of too conscious arrangement,” Yeats taps into a 
tradition of the sublime that, as Ramazani argues, descends from Blake and Shelley, both 
of whom draw on Kant’s sublime for definition.159 Yeats uses facets of the sublime to 
answer questions concerning human existence, but like Kant, also calls upon what Kant 
calls “transcendental idealism” to negotiate what seem to be contradictory elements of 
reality. By combining the old nihilism of Kant with Spinoza and Hegel, Yeats forms a 
conception of the divine that embraces infinite but generative negativity and reimagines 
the terrifying “God of will” that Nietzsche’s new nihilism declared dead without 
proposing a solution to the emptiness left behind.    
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The Pantheistic Mystic: Yeats and Spinoza 
Of the three old nihilists, Yeats most likely encountered the accused pantheist and 
atheist Spinoza first, and he saw the philosopher as innovative and a thinker who 
shattered conventional modes of contemplation. In his notes to The Words Upon the 
Window-Pane (1936), Yeats declares, “We should see certain men and women as if at the 
edge of a cliff, time broken away from their feet. Spinoza … stood there free at least from 
all prepossessions and touched the extremes of thought” (Variorum 965).160 Yeats read 
Spinoza by at least 1918, and in a May letter to his wife, relays that he just returned from 
Coole Park and had recently finished reading his medieval history books. In the same 
breath, he eagerly mentions that he “shall take to Spinoza next.”161 Yeats indeed appeared 
to follow this direction, and his 1920s library contained at least a copy of the 1916 edition 
of Spinoza’s Ethics and de Intellectus Emendatione. This edition combines the Ethics 
with the philosopher’s meditation on the problem of knowledge and the possibility of the 
mind’s perfection. In de Intellectus, Spinoza constructed a philosophical method that 
aims to aid the mind in creating sharp, well-defined ideas so that it may reach 
faultlessness. Unfortunately, according to his daughter Anne, whole cartons of books 
from Yeats’s library may have been lent to other authors or lost in repeated shuffling, and 
since his copy of Ethics and de Intellectus Emendatione is among this lost portion, it 
                                                          
160 Yeats, The Words Upon the Window-Pane, 965. 
161 W. B. Yeats, and Georgie Yeats, W. B. Yeats and George Yeats: The Letters, ed.  Ann 
Saddlemyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2011. 19; As Ann Saddlemyer notes, this 
was study in relation to the philosophy they were developing out of George Yeats’s 
automatic writing. 
 
 
 
65 
 
cannot be checked for annotations.162 We can thus assume that Yeats read this book, 
which contains Spinoza’s substance monism—the One Substance—plentitude, and 
vacancy, all of which comprise the foundation of his nihilism.        
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the mystical qualities of Spinoza’s philosophy caught 
Yeats’s attention.163 In a June 1918 letter to his father, Yeats calls Spinoza a “great 
heterodox mystic” of 17th-century ideas and claims that either “nearly all our popular 
mysticism derives from” his philosophy or from “a movement he was first to explain.”164 
To return to Where There Is Nothing, while Bohlmann argues that this play possesses 
Nietzschean echoes before Yeats read Nietzsche in great detail, and the protagonist’s 
advocating for the destruction of all law and order certainly gives merit to this point, 
Ruttledge’s final line that “where there is nothing, there is God” is also Spinozan in 
concept. Spinoza contends that the One Substance—which he also calls “God”—leads us 
to the abyss of emptiness but turns that nothingness into divine plentitude, therefore 
imbuing it with infinite possibility. So, this line gestures toward the possibility of creation 
after Ruttledge’s life seems to be left in as much collapse as the “ecclesiastical ruins” that 
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Testament Christianity”, Harvard Theological Review, July 1911, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 311-
329.  In his book Hellenistic Ways of Deliverance and the Making of Christian Synthesis 
(1970), pragmatist John Herman Randall, Jr. associated Spinoza with this branch and 
called the philosopher a “rationalist with overtones of rational mysticism” (3).   
164 Yeats, Letters, 650. 
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he and his band inhabit. When everything else is stripped away and only nothingness 
remains, infinite, divine plentitude flourishes.   
Spinoza’s enemies and followers alike ruthlessly levied charges of pantheism 
against the philosopher for centuries, but Yeats admired this quality.165 Donning the mask 
of Michael Robartes, Yeats associates Spinoza with pantheism in his typescript to A 
Vision when he states, “at eleven one discovers now a pantheistic image of a man little 
more precise than my own legs when I study them through water where I am bathing and 
now the reason[ed] conviction of Spinoza.”166 Furthermore, he asserts in A Vision that  
 
In Spinoza one finds the phase in its most pure and powerful shape. He saw the 
divine energy in whatever was the most individual expression of the soul, and 
spend his life showing that such expression was the world’s welfare and not…a 
form of anarchy.167  
 
 
Yeats recognizes the order and clarity in Spinoza’s system that courted the pantheism 
accusations, and his admiration for these qualities is palpable. For the pantheist, God is 
indistinguishable from the world and nature, and while labeling Yeats as such might be 
too extreme, he, like Spinoza, did demonstrate pantheistic sentiments. In “Among School 
Children” (The Tower, 1928), for instance, Yeats ends his interrogation of opposing 
forces that comprise existence with a pointed rhetorical question: 
 
                                                          
165 Scholars still debate whether Spinoza was indeed a “pantheist,” and if so, to what 
extent. 
166 W. B. Yeats, Yeats’s Vision Papers, eds. George Mills Harper, and Mary Jane Harper 
Basingstoke (Hampshire: Palgrave), 2001. 31. 
167 W. B. Yeats, A Vision: The Revised 1937 Edition, eds Margaret Mills Harper and 
Catherine E. Paul (New York: Scribner), 2014. 50. 
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O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer, 
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole? 
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance, 
How can we know the dancer from the dance?168 
 
 
 Here, Yeats’s implication is pantheistic. The leaf, blossom, and bole collapse into one 
image, with each distinct part indistinguishable from the next. He then extends his 
inquiry to stake a claim about the constitution of the divine: that one indeed cannot 
extricate the “dancer” that is nature from the god-like “dance.” The mystic and 
pantheistic elements that Yeats pulled from Spinoza’s philosophy aids in his construction 
of divinity that becomes most apparent in A Vision. This figure comprises boundless but 
procreative nothingness that follows an old nihilist tradition and reforms God in a way 
that makes sense for Yeats.   
The Sublime and Nihilism: Yeats and Kant 
If Yeats saw Spinoza as a pantheistic mystic whose One Substance allowed for 
creative potential, then Kant acted as his articulator of the sublime and transcendental 
idealism. In a 1928 to T. Sturge Moore, he states that from Kant “descended two great 
streams of thought, the philosophy of will in Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Bergsen, James, 
and that of know-ledge [sic] in Hegel, Croce, Gentile, Bradley and the like.”169  In 
Yeats’s mind, this places Kant as a driving force behind many of the great modern 
philosophers, counting several whom Yeats himself read, such as Hegel, Croce, and 
Bradley. As with most ideas, Yeats’s own interaction with the sublime through tragic joy 
                                                          
168 Yeats, “Among School Children,” 215. 
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descends from a rich tradition of ideas that were shaped by years of critical inquiry.  
While it is well established that Nietzsche’s philosophy also molded Yeats’s view of 
tragic joy, if we limit our understanding to purely a Nietzschean one, we neglect the 
inspiration of Kant’s old nihilism present in the concept. Since Yeats owned a 1911 copy 
of The Critique of Judgment, we can accept that he was familiar with Kant’s 
consideration of the sublime, even though he did not annotate the text.170 As Jefferson 
Holdridge argues, Kant’s idea of “negative pleasure” and Yeats’s “terrible beauty,” 
“tragic ecstasy,” and “tragic joy” share a common experience in their “coincidence of the 
negative and positive in any experience of the sublime.”171   
The sublime and old nihilism share a link through generative negativity. It is a 
concept that can both inspire the negative feeling of “terror” and elevate an object to a 
state of magnificence. To say that Kant’s interpretation of the sublime is a complex 
subject is an understatement, and scholars still tirelessly debate its true nature.172  
However, the sublime’s importance to his old nihilism, including the vanishing of the 
subject appears quite strong. What is clear, though, is that the “terrible” component of the 
sublime preoccupies Kant’s meditation on the subject. Whereas other thinkers like 
                                                          
170 See Edward O’Shea, Descriptive Catalog of Yeats’s Library, item no. 1053: Kant’s 
Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. 
171 Jefferson Holdridge, Those Mingled Seas: The Poetry of W. B. Yeats, the Beautiful 
and the Sublime (Dublin: University College Dublin Press), 2000. 31. 
172 For examples of divergent views concerning Kant’s sublime, see Paul Crowther, The 
Kantian Sublime (1989); Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (1993, ch. 7); 
Malcolm Budd, “Delight in the Natural World: Kant on the Aesthetic Appreciation Of 
Nature: Part III: The Sublime in Nature,” British Journal of Aesthetics, 38: 233–250 
(1998); and Henry Allison, “Kant's Antinomy of Teleological Judgment,” Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 30 (2000): 25–42. 
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Edmund Burke argue that sublimity ascends from an object that provokes terror, Kant’s 
depiction shows an object existing as objectively terrifying, but the individual viewer 
does not truly fear it. This may seem contradictory, but through this paradox, Kant 
reveals a vital feature of the sublime: that it is vast, but humans can indeed understand its 
immensity.173 By demonstrating such an understanding, Kant transforms the sublime 
from a terrifying object of nature to something intricately connected to the rational 
mind.174 He clarifies this point in The Critique of Judgment (1790) when he declares, 
“Nothing, therefore, which can be an object of the senses is to be termed sublime … The 
sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind 
transcending every standard of sense.”175  “Transcendence” stands out as an integral 
power of the sublime; for Kant, it “raise[s] the energies of the soul above their 
accustomed height” and imbues humans with the courage to confront nature itself.”176 
This power thus casts the sublime as part of the “supersensible” world, unbound by 
temporal and corporeal constraints, and formless and free.177 Its nebulous properties and 
detachment from the physical realm make the sublime a vehicle that helps thrust the 
subject away from “visible objects” and toward a nonsubstantial void. This means that, 
for Kant, the sublime “is found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately 
involves, or else by its presence provokes, a representation of limitlessness, yet with 
                                                          
173 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, ed. Nicholas Walker Oxford, World's Classics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2007. 70. 
174 Kant, Judgment, 68-75.  
175 Kant, Judgment, 98 
176 Kant, Judgment, 100. 
177 Holdridge, Those Mingled Seas, 33. 
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super-added thought in its totality.”178 Kant’s dense language aside, the sublime’s 
connection with old nihilism distills to this: negativity yielding positivity. The sublime 
incites terror in the human subject, but though that terror, it yields transcendence. 
The sublime, though, does not solve the problem of nihilism for either Kant or 
Yeats. For Kant, transcendental idealism represents a reconciliation between humans and 
the divine that would both acknowledge negativity and enable the subject’s vanishing.  
What he framed as the answer to his antinomies,179 quandaries that expose an 
insurmountable chasm between humans and the divine, Kant defined transcendental 
idealism in The Critique of Pure Reason as the view that “space and time are merely 
formal features of how we perceive objects, not things in themselves that exist 
independently of us, or properties or relations among them.”180 Rather, “objects in space 
and time are said to be ‘appearances’, and we know nothing of substance about the things 
in themselves of which they are appearances.”181 Matthew Gibson explains further and 
highlights that Kant’s transcendental idealism was a “result of the a priori forms of the 
mind which bestowed continuity to phenomena and allowed the mind to make cognitive 
                                                          
178 Kant, Judgment, 35. 
179 Kant’s antimonies, outlined in the Critique of Pure Reason, are contradictions which 
he believed follow necessarily from our attempts to conceive the nature of transcendent 
reality.  There are four of these: two “mathematical” and two “dynamical.” They are 
connected with (1) the limitation of the universe in respect of space and time, (2) the 
theory that the whole consists of indivisible atoms (whereas, in fact, none such exist), (3) 
the problem of free will in relation to universal causality, and (4) the existence of a 
necessary being 
180 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, eds. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New York: Cambridge University 
Press), 1998. 33. 
181 Kant, Reason, A239. 
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judgments of experience.”182 Although it is uncertain how much of The Critique of Pure 
Reason that Yeats read, his 1915 copy of the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics 
(1783) offers several telling clues that show his acquaintance with the chief components 
of Kant’s transcendental idealism. In the book, Yeats marked a passage that delineates 
Kant’s antinomies in the section “First Part of the General Transcendental Problem” and 
dog-eared several other pages.183   
The intrigue that Yeats scribbled onto the pages of his book awakens in his own 
writing as well, and he appears quite troubled by these antinomies, as he demonstrates on 
multiple occasions in A Vision. Though he does not explicitly call his solution to the 
antinomies “transcendental idealism,” Yeats’s response appears quite similar to Kant’s 
original formation. To reference “A General Introduction for My Work” again, Yeats 
continues his meditation on knowing through creation by quoting from the Chandogya 
Upanishad, a sacred Hindu anthology that focuses on the importance of speech, language, 
song and chants to humans’ quest to answer metaphysical questions and premises as well 
as knowledge and salvation. Yeats writes: “A wise man seeks in Self those that are alive 
and those that are dead and gets what the world cannot give” and comments, “The world 
knows nothing because it has made nothing, we know everything because we have made 
everything.”184 While W. J. McCormack notes the negativity in Yeats’s transcendental 
statement, this collapsing of “everything” and “nothing” shows the dissolution of 
                                                          
182 Kant, Reason, A104. 
183 See Edward O’Shea, Descriptive Catalog of Yeats’s Library, item no. 1052: Kant’s 
Critical Philosophy. Vol. 2. 
184 Yeats, Essays, 509-10. 
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everything that the subject knows. 185 It removes all that the subject can assume, do, and 
see, thus giving the subject the ability to redefine the world. The sublime in Kant, 
combined with transcendental idealism, Yeats executes a counter to nihilism that allows 
for the vanishing of the subject and a reimagined view of the divine.  
The Absolute Spirit: Yeats and Hegel 
In addition to Spinoza’s substance, Yeats applies Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, or 
Geist, to fashion his conception of God in a modernist landscape that where God was 
already declared dead. Of the three old nihilists, Yeats held the most books on Hegel in 
his personal library. These texts encapsulate and interrogate the major components of 
Hegel’s philosophy, including his conception of the Absolute Spirit, his view on history, 
and the Hegelian dialectic, which evidently influenced Yeats’s theory of the Mask.186 
Though Yeats did not encounter Hegel until later in his life and the philosopher’s 
influence over his system of ideas perhaps appears ostensibly limited even after this first 
encounter, Hegel’s thought lingers in the background of Yeats’s most extended and 
complex ideas.187 This belatedness, as Barry Sheils suggests, characterizes Yeats’s 
                                                          
185 See McCormack, W. J. Blood Kindred: W. B.  Yeats: The Life, the Death, the Politics. 
Pimlico, 2005. 
186 According to O’Shea’s catalog, these texts include What Is Living and What is Dead 
of the Philosophy of Hegel (1915) by Croce; A Commentary on Hegel’s Logic (1910) by 
McTaggert, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (1918) by McTaggert; Studies in the 
Hegellian Dialectic (1922), by McTaggert; and Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel’s 
Philosophy and Especially His Logic (1894) by Wallace; For more information on Hegel 
and the Mask, see Joseph Valente, “Nation for Art’s Sake: Aestheticist Afterwords in 
Yeats’s Irish Revival.” Marjorie Howes & Valente, Joseph. Yeats and Afterwords (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 2014. 
187 Barry Sheils, W.B., Yeats and World Literature: The Subject of Poetry (London: 
Routledge), 2016. 163.  
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position as “one of the self-designating last romantics” who preferred to dwell on mature, 
weighty topics—being an “old man persisting into a new age”— that contrasted with the 
whimsical topics of other romantic poetry, and it is within Yeats’s “primary image of late 
decline—this caricature, / Decrepit age [...]’— where he plants his “most vigorous and 
modernist tropes.”188 Something stirred Yeats as he reached his middle years, and the old 
nihilism of Hegel helped form a vehicle and trajectory for his changing, forceful designs.        
Yeats uses the Hegelian dialectic to shape his theory of the Mask, but the poet 
revises Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, which extends Kant’s formulation of the idea, to shape 
an infinite being of negation that encompasses reality’s entirety. Given the breadth of 
books on Hegel’s philosophy in his library, Yeats was familiar with his concept of the 
Absolute Spirit and its importance to the thinker’s view of negativity and nihilism. For 
Hegel, the Absolute Spirit’s connection to nothingness is essential. He declares, 
“Nothingness is the principle of all things…all proceeded from and returns to 
Nothingness…To obtain happiness, therefore, man must seek to assimilate himself to this 
principle by continual victories over himself; and for the sake of this, do nothing, wish 
nothing, desire nothing.”189 Before interrogating Hegel’s conception of the Absolute, we 
must first investigate the idea’s inception in Kant. In The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), 
Kant considers humans’ impossible but insatiable yearning for the Absolute— the 
ultimate, unconditioned reality as it is in itself, not distorted by projection through the 
conceptual mechanisms of thought—despite the empirical realm’s ever present grasp: 
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“The light dove cleaving in the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might 
imagine that flight would still be easier in empty space.”190 Though the dove might think 
it would be more desirable to fly in complete nothingness, it is the air, that resistance, that 
enables the dove to fly in the first place. For Kant, then, a priori truth upholds the 
absolute and does not allow for complete nothingness to exist. Our own mental apparatus 
orders space and time, and supplies the concepts by means of which we understand 
experience.191         
Yeats shares a similar “yearning” for the Absolute and desires a method for 
epistemologically ordering the world around him, and this desire forged a large portion of 
his interest in such a concept. As Robert Snukal perceptively highlights, Kant’s solution 
for interacting with the Absolute can be turned into Yeats’s insistence that the world is a 
product of the human mind.  Space, time, the laws of causality, are all forms of thought 
which create the world.192 Continuing his pursuit for the Absolute, Yeats drew from 
Hegel’s nihilism a negation that will sustain creation and support a reformed image of 
divinity. Through the Absolute Spirit, Hegel posits a fundamental reality through a 
“metaphysico-religious” interpretation of God. Hegel’s own conception of Absolute 
Spirit, like Spinoza, courted charges of pantheism and even outright atheism against the 
philosopher, and thus he is considered by some to be the “grandfather of the death of God 
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theology.”193 Such a situation stems from Hegel’s desire to escape the understanding of 
God as something “over and against creation,” and by doing this, as Cunningham argues, 
Hegel releases his philosophy from ontotheology.194 As a result, Hegel’s conception of 
the divine, his Absolute Spirit, is not bound by a “creator/creation distinction,” which 
allows this entity to exist “beyond ontic categories.”195 For Hegel, the Absolute is rooted 
in negativity:  
 
The end that is sought is the Absolute itself. It is already present- how could it 
otherwise be sought? Reason produces it only insofar as Reason frees 
consciousness from limitations. This subsuming of limitations is conditioned by 
the pre-supposed unlimitedness.196  
 
 
From his notes to Fighting the Waves (1930), after he read Hegel’s conception of the 
Absolute, Yeats has this to say about the concept:  
 
Move upon Newton’s town, 
The town of Hobbes and of Locke, 
Pine, spruce, come down 
Cliff, ravine, rock: 
What can disturb the corn? 
What makes it shudder and bend? 
The rose brings her thorn, 
The Absolute walks behind.197 
                                                          
193 In God in Exile: Modern Atheism (1968), Corlelio Fabro equates Hegel’s philosophy 
with pantheism (534).  For further reading on atheism accusations against Hegel’s 
philosophy, see Kojeve, Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. (London: 
1969) Cornell University Press.  71.  For further reading on Hegel as the grandfather of 
the death of god philosophy, see Charles Taylor, Hegel (1975): 495. 
194 Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 101. 
195 Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 101. 
196 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s 
System of Philosophy, trans. H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: State University of 
New York Press), 1977. 49. 
197 Yeats, Variorum, 570. 
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While we cannot be certain, it seems logical that Yeats obtained this concept of the 
Absolute from Hegel since Newton, Hobbes, and Locke did not consider the concept in 
such terms. The rose, the recurring symbol in Yeats that connects the poet’s subjective 
feelings to a divine essence, brandishes the thorn of truth that will force the corn, society, 
to lose its illusion and reach the Absolute, Hegel’s end-in-itself. While none of this has 
transpired in the context of the poem, the image of the Absolute “walking behind” 
indicates that such an outcome is forthcoming. Through Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, Yeats 
forged a generative foundation that was not influenced by The Will to Power. This 
foundation of old nihilism gave Yeats the philosophical tools to fashion a new god-like 
figure for a modernist audience that comes to fruition in A Vision.     
The New God of Old Nihilism: A Vision’s Thirteenth Cone 
From his early works until his last volume of poetry, Yeats sees the creative 
potential in nothingness, a perception that contrasts with modernism’s new nihilism. This 
positive flow of an otherwise negative space assembles the foundation of Yeats’s 
conception of the divine: an ethereal figure that materializes most lucidly in A Vision 
(1925; 1937). In this text, the mysticism, execution of an absolute, guiding spirit and 
positioning of the sublime in Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel all collide to birth such an entity.  
The all-powerful, fear-inducing God who Nietzsche declared dead therefore finds a 
reimagination in Yeats’s Thirteenth Cone, an entity built with the pieces of the three old 
nihilist’s philosophies. Unlike Nietzsche, Yeats follows the old nihilist tradition that 
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refuses to leave the world with nothing in God’s place; rather, he devises a figure of 
infinite but generative nothingness that can foster all of reality.   
The story of A Vision’s inception is familiar tale, if not a peculiar one. What 
Terence Brown has called “one of the strangest acts of imaginative collaboration in all 
literary history,” it is a project born in 1917 from the automatic writing experiences of 
Yeats and his new wife, George.198 Though the “fragmentary messages” from the 
“unknown communicators” seemed initially unclear to the pair, they rapidly transitioned 
into revealing “little less than a whole philosophy of life and death.”199 Those 
“communicators,” who Yeats also names “instructors,” represent a transmission between 
the living and the dead for the poet, a dialogue beyond this temporal and spatial plane, 
and the information they exposed showed the foundation of reality itself. This “system,” 
as Yeats calls it, merges the poet’s aesthetics, his philosophy of history, and occult and 
mystical interests in a work that dominates his mental energy for the remaining twenty 
years of his life.200 A Vision, as Alan Gillis points out, doubles as a “sub-Viconian 
blueprint of the plot of world history, and a supposedly comprehensive catalogue of 
psychological possibility.”201 For Yeats had long been seeking, and in A Vision finally 
found “a system of thought that would leave [his] imagination free to create as it chose 
                                                          
198 A Vision is not a direct transcription of the automatic writings, Yeats indicates that 
“the documents [the automatic writings] are very confused, and what I have written is 
less based upon what they say than upon my knowledge of the system as a whole”  
199 Hough, The Mystery Religion of W. B. Yeats, 61-62. 
200 Hough, The Mystery Religion of W. B. Yeats, 62. 
201 Alan Gillis, “W. B. Yeats: Among the Deepening Shades” in Irish Poetry of the 1930s  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2005. 160.  
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and yet make all that it created, or could create, part of the one history and that the 
soul’s.”202     
While the Nietzschean influence on A Vision is undeniable, the presence of Kant, 
Spinoza, and Hegel appears equally as strongly and imbues the book with its old nihilistic 
characteristics. By the time he published the first version in 1925, Yeats had already read 
all three old nihilists in detail, and their influence only deepened in the 1937 edition. In A 
Vision, Yeats created a complex system of spirituality, using the image of interlocking 
gyres to map out the development and reincarnation of the soul. To do this, he 
incorporated the mystical, pantheistic qualities that he admired in Spinoza; puzzled over 
Kant’s antinomies and deployed the philosopher’s transcendental idealism and sublime; 
and borrowed heavily from Hegel’s view of history and his model of an Absolute Spirit. 
The three old nihilists are shades in the background in A Vision 1925 (referred to as AV A 
henceforth), gently guiding Yeats toward generative negativity, and their inspiration on 
his conception of the divine in A Vision 1937 (referred to as AV B henceforth), the 
Thirteenth Cone, shows that behind his system is an old nihilism that pushes away the 
shadow of the new. 
Spinoza’s presence in AV A is concentrated but strong, and his apparition only 
increases in AV B. In both editions, Yeats uses Spinoza as an example of Phase Eleven, 
where the Will is exemplified by “the Image Burner,” the Mask by Rejection and Moral 
Indifference, the Creative Mind by Moral reformation and self-assertion, and the Body of 
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Fate by enforced belief. In this phase, Yeats condemns organized belief, calling it a 
“contagion,” and names the man of this phase as “half-solitary” and “one who cannot 
inhabit the solitude he defends.”203 This association of Spinoza with a man who upholds 
but cannot participate in solitude casts the philosopher as a champion of difference, but 
one who cannot fully enjoy its benefits. Spinoza proposes a modified version of God that 
emphasizes all-encompassing negation, and was condemned for it. Yeats elaborates on 
Spinoza embodying Phase Eleven, claiming that  
 
His Mask, under the Body of Fate, would have forced him to seek happiness in 
submission to something hard and exterior; but the Mask, set free by Creative 
Mind, that would destroy exterior popular sanction, makes possible for the first 
time the solitary conception of God.204  
 
 
This further connects this philosopher with offering a renewed deity, one that Yeats 
seems to favor, in the face of opposition. As John Herman Randall succinctly 
summarizes, Spinoza’s enterprise culminates in a “vision, a ‘Oewpta’, of the logical 
structure of the world” whose “ultimate goal” is to “see the part of your own human 
reason and mind in that structure-to perceive the union that obtains between the human 
mind and the whole of Nature.”205   
Spinoza’s connection with a transformed deity of negativity is clear in A Vision, 
and equally as distinct is Kant’s visage. This philosopher’s antinomies puzzle Yeats in 
the book’s two editions, and he meticulously ruminates over them twice.  In the section 
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titled “Stories of Michael Robartes and His Friends: An Extract from a Record Made By 
His Pupils,” Yeats dons the mask of Robartes and levies his first attempt to reconcile the 
antinomies, an approach that focuses on love. He muses, “Love contain all Kant’s 
antinomies, but it is the first that poisons our lives. Thesis, there is no beginning; 
antithesis, there is no end. Exhausted by the cry that it can never end, my love ends; 
without that cry it were not love but desire, desire does not end. The anguish of birth and 
that of death cry out in the same instant.”206 Due to its sheer brevity, love cannot offer the 
reconciliation that Robartes needs: no sooner does “one love die” that “another takes its 
place,” rendering it an inadequate concept to rest reality.207 However, of greater 
consequence to Robartes, and perhaps by extension Yeats, is Kant’s third antinomy. As 
Harper and Paul note, Yeats underlined Kant’s third antinomy in his copy of Kant’s 
Critical Philosophy for English Readers (1915). Again speaking through Robartes, Yeats 
interrogates the third antinomy:   
 
…thesis: freedom; antithesis, necessity; but I restate it.208  Every action of man 
declares the soul’s ultimate, particular freedom, and the soul’s disappearance in 
God; declares that reality in a congeries of beings and a single being; nor is this 
antinomy an appearance imposed on us by the form of thought but life itself 
which turns, now here, now there, a whirling and a bitterness.209 
 
    
                                                          
206 Yeats, A Vision (1937), 29. 
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Yeats distills Kant’s antinomy to its most basic parts: freedom and necessity. He 
acknowledges that “death cannot solve the antinomy” because “death and life are its 
expression.”210 Returning again to the idea of love, Robartes momentarily posits that 
marriage may solve this antinomy, but he quickly retracts that proposition: “The marriage 
bed is a symbol of that eternal instant where the antinomy is resolved. It is not the 
resolution itself.”211 This statement, according to Guinn Batten, reveals the irony at the 
core of Kant’s antinomies: human knowledge and imagination “exceed any experience, 
given the finitude of human embodiment.”212 While marriage might be the antinomy’s 
resolved form, it is an unattainable solution because “were more than a symbol could 
man there lose and keep his identity, but he falls asleep.” That “sleep,” for Yeats, is the 
same as “the sleep of death,” which momentarily leaves the antinomy unsolved.213 
Neither Robartes nor Yeats answer this problem at this point, but “belief is renewed 
continually in the ordeal of death” indicates that out of the void comes generation.214  
While Spinoza’s and Kant’s specters permeate A Vision’s content, Hegel’s 
dialectical method in Lectures on the Philosophy of History seems to underpin the 
groundwork of Yeats’s system. For the philosopher, human history and culture are 
manifestations of Geist’s in the world. More specifically, he grants individual humans, 
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and particularly world history’s eminent epic heroes, the ability to facilitate change, while 
whole cultures and civilizations exemplify each historical phase. Yeats structures A 
Vision quite similarly, with iterations of the Four Faculties presiding over each phase and 
specific individuals, both past and present, exemplifying those characteristics.215 
Furthermore, Hegel associated history’s beginning with Asia and its end with Europe, 
with “nature” epitomizing Asian culture.216 As Yeats observes, when Hegel “identifies 
Asia with Nature; he sees the whole process of civilization as an escape from Nature; 
partly achieved by Greece, fully achieved by Christianity.”217 
He continues to borrow from Hegel’s Lectures to say “Oedipus—Greece—solved 
the riddle of the Sphinx—Nature—compelled her to plunge from the precipice, though 
man himself remained ignorant and blundering,” a definition that Yeats “accepts.”218   
Even though Yeats writes that he disputes Hegel’s alignment of Asia with Nature in the 
                                                          
215 Yeats also encapsulates the Faculties as ‘Thought and will . . . effort and attainment’ 
(AV B 135) and ‘Thought and inclination, fact and object of desire’ (AV B 183), so that 
one can roughly equate Creative Mind with thought, Will with inclination or 
bias, Mask with what we strive for or desire, and Body of Fate with fact or attainment. 
216 From Lectures on the Philosophy of History: “a myth more generally known is that of 
the Phoenix as a type of the Life of Nature; eternally preparing for itself its funeral pile, 
and consuming itself upon it; but so that from its ashes is produced the new, renovated, 
fresh life. But this image is only Asiatic” (89). 
217 Yeats, A Vision (1937), 149. 
218 Yeats, A Vision (1937), 149; In The Philosophy of History, Hegel narrates the 
transition from the Egyptian to the Greek world as follows: “Wonderfully, then, must the 
Greek legend surprise us, which relates, that the Sphinx — the great Egyptian symbol — 
appeared in Thebes, uttering the words: “What is that which in the morning goes on four 
legs, at midday on two, and in the evening on three?” Oedipus, giving the solution, Man, 
precipitated the Sphinx from the rock. The solution and liberation of that Oriental Spirit, 
which in Egypt had advanced so far as to propose the problem, is certainly this: that the 
Inner Being [the Essence] of Nature is Thought, which has its existence only in the 
human consciousness” (241). 
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Sphinx’s riddle, Neil Mann observes that the Hegelian cycle resembles his own launch of 
the “two-thousand-year, lunar month of civilization (1000 BCE),” and perceives this as 
“becoming nature—which in this case is primary—at Phase 1, when a primary West 
impregnates East” (118).219 Hegel’s impact on this facet of trajectory and outward 
manifestation of Yeats’s system remains clear and begins even before AV B, when Yeats 
clearly connects Hegel’s history with the Absolute Spirit. In his “Introduction to The 
Holy Mountain” (1934) Yeats observes that from the moment Oedipus solved the “wily” 
Sphinx’s riddle, “that Sphinx was compelled to leap into the abyss” and “from that 
moment on, intellect or Spirit, that which has value in itself, began to prevail, and now in 
Hegel’s own day, the climax had come, not crippled age but wisdom.”220 Yeats’s 
connection of the Hegelian “Spirit” with a thing that possesses “value in itself” exhibits 
his association of the Absolute with an essential cause of reality, an immortal entity that 
past and future cannot exist without.221  This aspect of Hegelian nihilism combined with 
Spinoza’s and Kant’s contributions to the subject make up the pieces of Yeats’s 
reimagined divine entity: The Thirteenth Cone. 
The “Thirteenth Cone” is conceivably one of the most confusing, yet significant 
symbols in Yeats’s Vision system. However, I want to show that Yeats’s Thirteenth Cone 
is another iteration of nothing: a shape without a form, and a simultaneously real and 
                                                          
219 Neil Mann, “The Thirteenth Cone” in W. B. Yeats’s ‘A Vision’: Explications and 
Contexts, eds. Neil Mann, Matthew Gibson, and Claire Nally (Clemson, SC: Clemson 
University Digital Press), 2012. 118. 
220 Yeats, Later Essays, 151. 
221 Hegel, History, 79. 
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illusionary entity. While Yeats can only truly say what the Cone is not, we can use these 
clues to infer what it is: Because everything participates in and relates back to the Cone, 
it is infinite, but generative negativity. In AV B, Yeats struggles to find adequate words to 
describe its visage, and he settles by calling it a “geometrical” being that also possesses 
an “illusionary form.” This entity, a limitless shape without a definitive body and a 
receptacle for enlightenment, connects Yeats’s idea of God with the old nihilist 
philosophy that shaped his interaction with the divine. Perhaps because of its elusiveness, 
much criticism exists on this topic, and the argument that the Thirteenth Cone resembles 
a deity for Yeats is not new. 222 Not only does Yeats say this himself, but others such as 
Neil Mann have explored this topic in depth. However, its overt connection to old 
nihilism has gone completely unnoticed. Indeed, the Thirteenth Cone retains components 
of Spinoza’s One Substance and Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, and serves as Yeats’s Kantian 
transcendental idealism answer to the philosopher’s antinomies that puzzled Yeats since 
AV A. As Mann suggests, Yeats’s positioning of the Thirteenth Cone echoes not only 
Spinoza’s and Hegel’s old nihilisms, but Gottlieb Fichte’s as well, whose system of ideas 
first garnered the term “nihilism” in the history of ideas.223 This similarity places the 
Thirteenth Cone’s foundation in the tradition of old nihilism, as this facet of Yeats’s 
system shares little in common with new nihilism. It is here that the substance monism, 
the One Substance of Spinoza’s old nihilism, and Hegel’s Absolute Spirit shapes the 
                                                          
222 For a survey of criticism, see Ron Heisler, “Yeats and the Thirteenth Æon,” Yeats 
Annual 13 241-52. For a comprehensive analysis of the concept, see Neil Mann, “The 
Thirteenth Cone” in W. B. Yeats’s ‘A Vision’: Explications and Contexts, 159-93.  This 
includes the Cone’s connection to Plotinus’s “One.” 
223 Neil Mann, “The Thirteenth Cone,” 161. 
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poet’s rendering of the divine, thus carving a path to a new conception of divinity rather 
than new nihilism’s deicide. 
While appearing most complete in AV B, the Thirteenth Cone emerges in various 
stages of augmentation in several of Yeats’s texts. For instance, though not a wholly 
actualized figure yet, the concept comes to life in his August 26, 1918 automatic script 
session and grows riper in AV A.224 In AV A, Yeats calls the Cone the “Thirteenth Cycle,” 
which represents a new series beyond the extent of current history. Yeats clarifies the 
Cone’s characteristics and more closely connects it with a deific being as he expands his 
ideas between AV A and AV B.  He explains in A Diary 1930, “Berkeley thought in the 
Commonplace Book that ‘we perceive’ and are passive whereas God creates in 
perceiving.  He creates what we perceive. I substitute God for the Thirteenth Cone, the 
Thirteenth Cone therefore creates our perceptions—all the visible world—as held in 
common by our wheel.”225 Interestingly, this was the same year that Yeats meditated on 
                                                          
224 W. B. Yeats, Yeats’s Vision Papers, vol. 2, eds. George Mills Harper, and Mary Jane 
Harper (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave), 2001. 24; Yeats first mentions the Thirteenth 
Cycle as a sphere rather than a cone in AV A.  He states, “…we say that the first cycle 
sent its first soul into the world at the birth of Christ, and that the twelfth will send its last 
soul immediately before the first of the New Fountain.  Then there will come the first in a 
new series, the Thirteenth Cycle, which is a Sphere and not a cone. He later revises this 
point of view in AV B.  Furthermore, in AV A, Yeats closely connects the Thirteenth 
Cycle to the Daimon, another murky entity in his system, who in Per Amica Silentia 
Lunae shapes the mask, thus evoking the anti-self. In A Vision, all things are present in an 
eternal instant for the Daimon: “She is not phasal…she is that being united to man which 
knows neither good nor evil…She is revealed to man in moments of prevision and 
illumination and in much that we call good and evil fortune, and yet, seeing that she 
remains always in the Thirteenth Cycle, cannot accompany man in his wanderings.   
225 Yeats, Later Essays, 320. 
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the Absolute in Fighting the Waves, where the entity stands waiting at the end, an idea 
that in his old age he will “sing them to the Garrets and Cellars.”226 For Yeats, this Cone 
represents the operational configuration of the divine, the “ultimate reality…neither one 
nor many, concord nor discord,” which is “symbolized as the phaseless Sphere.”227     
In early drafts of AV B, Yeats describes this entity in Hegelian language. He 
elaborates, “The particulars are the work of the thirteenth sphere or cycle which is in 
every man and called by every man his freedom.”228 In Yeats’s system, the Sphere 
represents the ultimate reality that exists beyond the gyres; for AV B’s 1937 publication, 
however, Yeats changes “Sphere” to “Cone” to render the idea tangible enough for 
human understanding, as the mind cannot comprehend the full infinity of the Sphere.229 
This alteration aside, Yeats’s explanation that all “particulars,” or substances, participate 
in the Cone resembles Hegel’s description of the Absolute Spirit, that negative body from 
which the world, life, and existence all stem.230 Hegel’s Absolute Spirit further gives 
shape to the Thirteenth Cone and Yeats’s different kind of God born of negativity 
through the act of giving a tangible “shape” to an otherwise shapeless, intangible concept.  
In What Is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, a book that Yeats read in 
earnest,231 Benedetto Croce lucidly explains the Hegelian Absolute as follows:   
 
                                                          
226 Yeats, Variorum, 570. 
227 Yeats, A Vision (1937), 193. 
228 Yeats, A Vision (1937), 302. 
229 Yeats, A Vision (1937), xlvii. 
230 Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 106.  
231 According to O’Shea’s catalogue of Yeats’s library, this book contains several 
instances of underlining and annotations (70). 
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It is the absolute, which is no longer a parallelism of attributes or an indifference 
to both; but which accentuates and confers new significance on one of the terms, 
which, in virtue of that new significance, absorbs and brings the other within 
itself. Thus substance becomes subject, the absolute determines itself as spirit and 
idea; and materialism is overcome. Thus too reality is no longer an internal 
confronting an external: nature…has neither nut nor shell, but is all of a piece. 
The one is not beyond the many, but is the many; spirit is not beyond body, but is 
body. And supernaturalism is overcome.232  
 
 
Yeats’s characterization of the Thirteenth cone as “neither one nor many” closely follows 
Croce’s description of the Hegelian Absolute Spirit. Yeats can only use language of 
negation to characterize the Cone, a technique that he borrows from Croce, and by 
extension Hegel. Since the Absolute also shows the “one” as inseparable from the 
“many,” Yeats and Hegel both leave us with a divine force that exists in terms of infinity.  
To show the negativity of the Thirteenth Cone and the Absolute, Yeats and Hegel also 
use similar rhetoric. That is, they both describe their divinity in terms of what it is not.  
Yeats expresses this through the words “neither” and nor,” with the Hegelian Absolute 
requiring the same negating phrases. Therefore, Yeats’s Thirteenth Cone is a divine force 
of absolute but procreative negation that gestates all of existence’s “particulars,” and 
Yeats revises Hegel’s Absolute Spirit to give it shape.   
Yeats’s expression of the ethereal Thirteenth Cone is likewise uncannily similar 
to Spinoza’s characterization of his One Substance in the Ethics (1677). Spinoza defines 
the One Substance—which he also calls “God”—as “being absolutely infinite—that is, a 
substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite… 
                                                          
232 Benedetto Croce, What Is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, trans. 
Douglas Ainslie (New York: Russel and Russel), 1969. 110-111. 
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essentiality God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses 
eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.”233 By equating God to substance, 
Spinoza edges dangerously to committing the “sin” of pantheism that courted both 
reproach from his contemporaries and Yeats’s admiration. The philosopher elaborates 
further in “Proposition XI,” and declares, “either nothing exists, or else a being absolutely 
infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either in ourselves, or in something else 
which necessarily exists. Therefore a being absolutely infinite—in other words, God—
necessarily exists.”234 Yeats’s collapsing of the Cone into an entity that exists as place 
and thing, while superficially contradictory, also mirrors the negating abilities of the One 
Substance. That is, both entities pull a “something” out of a “nothing.” Each is a 
boundless “place” and a thinking “thing” simultaneously: Spinoza plainly uses “infinite” 
to describe the One Substance’s unlimitedness, and Yeats calls the Thirteenth Cone 
“phaseless.” Just as for an infinite substance, for a thing to be “phaseless,” it needs to 
lack a defined visible form, a trait that implies negativity. Also comparable to Spinoza’s 
substance, Yeats’s “phaseless sphere” with endless attributes represents a completeness 
that transcends human experience, idea, and form.235 Everything and nothing inhabit this 
cone, like Spinoza’s substance, and thus an endless capacity for understanding exists in 
this amorphous “nothing.” As Randall states, this place of Spinoza’s is an “impersonal 
realm, the knowability of the world, the rationality of experience, intelligibility, logical 
                                                          
233 Benedictus De Spinoza, Ethics, ed. G. H. R Parkinson, Oxford Philosophical Texts 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2000. 4. 
234 Spinoza, Ethics, 8. 
235 Neil Mann, “Thirteenth Cone,” 162. 
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structure; thought, not thinking, reason, not reasoning.”236 Spinoza’s desire to define God 
as “existing in only a philosophical sense” further underscores the One Substance’s 
connection to Yeats’s Thirteenth Cone.  Spinoza wanted to prevent any 
“anthropomorphizing of God,” and while Yeats aimed to make the Cone more tangible 
for human understanding, the ethereal language he uses also resists 
anthropomorphization.237 When considered together, it seems clear that Yeats 
incorporates facets of Spinoza’s One Substance into his system to deliberately reimagine 
God in a way that removes the entity’s paternalism and still fills the emptiness that new 
nihilism leaves in its shadow. 
Yeats also casts the Cone as the savior of humanity, and by doing so, he 
reimagines what it means to be a savior. He explains that it “is that cycle which may 
deliver us from the twelve cycles of time and space,” in which “live all souls that have 
been set free and every Daimon and Ghostly Self.”238 On one hand, the language that 
Yeats employs to describe the Thirteenth Cone implies an extension of the Judeo-
Christian God that new nihilism declares dead.  Indeed, his emphasis on the Cone’s 
“delivering” humanity from the confinement of the twelve cycles and the “setting free” of 
souls imply an active, liberative deity not unlike Christ. However, as Gibson indicates, 
the Cone seems to possess power to release humanity from movement rather than any 
                                                          
236 John Herman Randall, “The Intelligible Universe of Plotinos,” Journal of the History 
of Ideas 30, no. 1 (1969): 9. https://doi.org/10.2307/2708241. 
237 Steven M. Nadler, Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind (Oxford: 
Clarendon), 2004. 229. 
238 Yeats, A Vision (1937), 210-211. 
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type of moral trespass.239 Such a removal from motion itself harkens to the mystical 
nothingness of Spinoza and Hegel: they each propose a philosophical rather than 
theological god-like figure that is intricately connected to nothingness. In this way, 
Yeats’s interest in what he considered the old nihilism’s—Spinoza’s and Hegel’s—
mystical and pantheistic qualities guided his deity away from a recycled Judeo-Christian 
form to a renewed vision of the divine.   
Through Spinoza and Hegel, Yeats’s fashioned the Thirteenth Cone as the divine 
entity of old nihilism, but its utility extends even further: the substance demystifies the 
antinomies and becomes a Kantian, transcendental idealistic solution to their confounds. 
In this way, Yeats offers a generative, ordered alternative to new nihilism’s emptiness. 
For Yeats, the antinomies wove themselves so tightly into the fabric of existence that he 
claimed, “The whole System is founded upon the belief that ultimate reality…falls in 
human consciousness…into a series of antinomies.”240 They are so powerful that they 
block the Sphere, the Thirteenth Cone’s true form, from human imagination. Like Kant, 
Yeats wrestles with the antinomies and attempts to resolve them. To accomplish this, he 
fuses aspects of transcendental idealism with the Thirteenth Cone. Indeed, Kant believed 
that ideas, knowledge’s visceral material, exist because certain realities occur 
independently of human minds. While he supposed that these “things-in-themselves” 
must remain forever unknown, individual interaction with the “things” can foster 
                                                          
239 Matthew Gibson, “Timeless and Spaceless”? in W. B. Yeats’s ‘A Vision’: Explications 
and Contexts, eds. Neil Mann, Matthew Gibson, and Claire Nally (Clemson, SC: 
Clemson University Digital Press), 2012. 112. 
240 Yeats, A Vision (1937), 187. 
 
 
 
91 
 
experience and settle the antinomies.241 This is evident in The Critique of Pure Reason, 
where Kant argues,  
 
There could be inhabitants of the moon, even though no human being has ever 
perceived them, must of course be admitted; but this means only that in the 
possible progress of experience we could encounter them; for everything is actual 
that stands in one context with a perception in accordance with the laws of the 
empirical progression. Thus they are real when they stand in an empirical 
connection with my real consciousness, although they are not therefore real in 
themselves, i.e., outside this progress of experience.242 
  
 
This statement gives an important indication of the way Kant considered experience. As 
Paul Janz argues, a Kantian “appearance” is not necessarily an actual experience, but a 
possible one.243 Yeats, however, extends Kant’s “possibility” into a nothing, and 
dissolves everything that the subject knows. As Gayatri Spivak notes, Kant loiters in 
Yeats’s “basic premise that Reality is systematically refracted by the perceiving mind and 
in his suggestion that at least the principle of computation of these refractions can be 
exposed if the unifying form of consciousness is discovered and grasped.”244 In this way, 
Yeats renames Kantian transcendental idealism as “revelation,” and as Spivak observes, 
the Thirteenth Cone represents the space where the human mind absorbs this “unifying 
consciousness.”245 Yeats takes Kant’s vanishing subject and extends that into a removal 
                                                          
241 Lucy Allais, Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and His Realism (Oxford: Oxford 
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242 Kant, Pure Reason, 493. 
243 Paul D. Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking 
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or transcendence, thereby turning the Cone into a mystical, philosophical “savior” that, 
rather than delivering the individual from sin, moves the mind beyond the antinomies 
themselves.   
This transcendence via Kantian vanishing results in a mind that accepts its reality. 
In “All Soul’s Night,” the Epilogue to A Vision, Yeats writes, 
 
How it is whirled about,  
Wherever the orbit of the moon can reach,  
Until it plunge into the sun;  
And there, free and yet fast,  
Being both Chance and Choice,  
Forget its broken toys  
And sink into its own delight at last.246 
 
 
The soul suffers a tumultuous existence, “whirling about” as the moon’s “orbit” carries it 
“wherever.” However, once it falls into the sun, the soul achieves autonomy and joy.  In 
this stanza, Yeats’s word choice again implies a generative outcome via negation: with an 
active “plunging” and a “sinking,” the soul becomes “free” and will ultimately discover 
its own “delight.” Through a representation of limitlessness in the sun, the subject 
undergoes its Kantian vanishing, and as Mann astutely reveals, “Chance and Choice” 
convey the “fundamental antinomy,” a dilemma that Yeats verbalizes as “one can think 
about the world and about man, or anything else until all has vanished but these two 
things, for they are the first cause of the animate and inanimate world.”247 For Mann, 
                                                          
246 Yeats, A Vision (1937), 221. 
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Chance and Choice’s blending signifies the “resolution of the antinomies that can only 
occur in the Sphere.”248 The subject vanishes into procreative nothingness through 
“forgetting” everything that it previously experienced but finds a fundamental satisfaction 
in this dissolution.     
Conclusion 
Yeats’s experience with political turmoil and colonization superficially cast him 
as the perfect harbinger of the new nihilism, especially given his love of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. For J.H. Miller, Yeats’s journey begins in nihilism, and with this he enters a 
“new reality” through his discovery of the “richness of the finite moment.”249 Miller’s 
argument appears valid, but it needs an important clarification: Yeats’s engagement with 
nihilism does not align with the new nihilism of Nietzsche. Instead, his nihilism follows 
in the old tradition that commences not in an abysmal nothing but an infinite experience 
within nothingness. The sheer breadth of Yeats’s career further distances him from the 
grip of new nihilism. Before the publication of The Will to Power, the 36-year old Yeats 
had already published several texts and immersed himself in mystical and philosophical 
environments, which shaped his impression of nothingness and divinity. Because of this, 
he perhaps engaged in a culture of nihilism that, at least for a few years, remained 
inspired by the concept’s definition in the history of ideas and untainted by The Will to 
Power. These old nihilistic sentiments only amplified after Yeats read Spinoza, Kant, and 
Hegel, and consequently seemed to leave Nietzsche’s The Will to Power out of his 
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system of ideas. While Nietzsche’s ghost never strays far from Yeats, we cannot allow 
that shade to overshadow Yeats’s old, generative interaction with the new nihilism.   
Not only does Yeats resist the new nihilism’s grasp, but he refuses to leave the 
idea of divinity lifeless for a modern landscape. While Nietzsche’s new nihilism declares 
God “dead” without attempting to “resurrect” the figure, Yeats engages with old nihilism 
to fill that empty space. As Gillespie astutely observes, the problem of nihilism stems 
from a concept of God that casts the being as a “terrifying, transrational, transnatural 
figure of will” whose “absolute power reduce[s] nature to chaos of radically individual 
and unconnected beings.”250 Spinoza and Hegel resist this picture in their philosophical 
systems and sculpt transformed conceptions of God that leave the entity neither dead nor 
terrifying, but instead more palatable for human consumption. This reveals a figure of 
generative negativity that contains and guides human existence. Yeats’s own views of the 
divine exist beyond Judeo-Christian terms and incorporates mysticism and occultism, and 
the mystical and pantheistic considerations that he observed in old nihilism helped him 
shape his new god for a modern age. Through his Thirteenth Cone, Yeats proposes such a 
divinity that absorbs Spinoza’s substance monism and Hegel’s Absolute Spirit. This 
Thirteenth Cone thus solves Kant’s antinomies and shows Yeats participating in a 
generative tradition of nihilism where the divine possesses infinitely negative but 
generative qualities. Though the abyss still lingers menacingly, Yeats thus endeavors to 
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banish the chasm of complete nothingness that Nietzsche’s new nihilism leaves a 
modernist audience to surmount. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
“SURELY SOME REVELATION IS AT HAND”: YEATS, DISASTER, AND THE 
GENERATIVE VOID
 
 
The Soul. Seek out reality, leave things that seem. 
The Heart. What, be a singer born and lack a theme? 
The Soul. Isaiah’s coal, what more can man desire? 
The Heart. Struck dumb in the simplicity of fire! 
The Soul. Look on that fire, salvation walks within. 
The Heart. What theme had Homer but original sin? 
—W. B.  Yeats, “Vacillation,” VII 
  
 
Introduction 
In the essay “Modern Poetry: A Broadcast” (1936), three years before his death, 
Yeats recalls his merriment with the Rhymers’ Club at the Cheshire Cheese in London. 
His talks with the club members at the tavern stirred up weighty issues, including the 
pessimistic considerations that “nothing of importance could be discovered” and “only 
philosophy and religion could solve the great secret.”251 Paradoxically, though, neither 
philosophy nor religion could illuminate the darkness of secrecy because they “said all 
their say years ago.”252 However, Yeats seems to offer an alternative that could 
reinvigorate philosophy for a modern audience: a nihilistic mix of terror and the abyss. 
He declares,  
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I think profound philosophy must come from terror.  An abyss opens under our 
feet; inherited convictions, the pre-suppositions of our thoughts, those Fathers of 
the Church Lionel Johnson expounded, drop into the abyss.  Whether we will or 
no we must ask the ancient questions:  Is there reality anywhere?  Is there a God?  
Is there a Soul? We cry with the Indian Sacred Book: ‘They have put a golden 
stopper into the neck of the bottle; pull it!  Let out reality!’253  
 
 
The abyss that Yeats poses appears to consume all that is dated and unworthy, and in 
their place, it establishes a renewed “reality” more fitting a modern audience. This 
fruitful capacity exemplifies the qualitative essence of the generative that the old nihilists 
create. For Yeats, this void embodies the space left behind by disaster, the thing that 
encapsulates revelation and fosters a new era of being. Indeed, in a 1903 letter to John 
Quinn, Yeats declares that “I think I have to some extent got weary of that wild God 
Dionysus, and I am hoping that the Far Darter will come in his place”254 This is an early 
clue that Yeats does not accept the Dionysian mode of disaster, even though much of his 
poetry focuses on disaster not unlike the chaos which the wine god heralds. As Harold 
Bloom declares, 
 
Shelley and Schopenhauer were questers, in their very different ways, who could 
journey through the Void without yielding to the temptation of worshiping the 
Void as itself being sacred. Yeats… implicitly decided that he too would rather 
have the Void as purpose, than be void of purpose.255 
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As Elizabeth Kuhn argues, one of the most “significant modernist questions” is how one 
should “respond to a world of dislocation and fractured temporality in which identity has 
become fragmented beyond recognition.”256 For Kuhn, Yeats’s answer is “intensity.”257  
Indeed, intensity for Yeats sees the stable center breaking loose and things falling apart 
but left in the wake of that destruction is not complete and unredeemable nothingness. 
While it seems counterintuitive that disaster necessarily creates, one must keep in mind 
this question: what comes after Yeats’s implied apocalypse, or “disaster”? As 
Cunningham asks, why can’t a “nothing” do the job of a “something”?   
In this chapter, I investigate Yeats’s interpretation of “the disaster” and 
“catastrophe.” To do this, I first examine the consequences of the disaster’s failure in the 
transitional volume Responsibilities (1914), which Yeats wrote before reading old 
nihilism. This failure, I argue, leads to cyclical dissatisfaction. I then interrogate how 
Yeats borrows representations of “disaster” from Benedict de Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, 
and Georg W. F. Hegel and executes these images in his later poetry, including Michael 
Robartes and the Dancer (1921), The Tower (1928), and The Winding Stair and Other 
Poems (1933). Considering his interest in creation that these volumes exhibit, I argue that 
Yeats uses the gnostic catastrophe of Spinoza, Kant’s reduction of the subject into a 
nonsubstantial void, and the Kantian and Hegelian sublime to diminish chaos to stillness 
and draw light from the void. This allows him to extract the Apollonian, creative capacity 
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from nothingness and imbue the void with creative possibility, an aim that he ultimately 
reaches at the conclusion of The Winding Stair. 
The Poetry of a Failed Disaster 
Disaster, apocalypse, and catastrophe. Critics have employed each of these words 
to characterize Yeats’s mystical, philosophical approach to writing.  For instance, Stan 
Smith notes a “pervasive” vision of all three in Yeats, particularly after A Vision 
(1925).258 Similarly, as Graham Hough states, Yeats writes A Vision in an established 
literary mode: that of “apocalypse” and “revelation.”259 Holdridge then connects Yeats’s 
rhetorical use of disaster to an approach that instigates transformation; he argues that 
Yeats sees “violence and mockery” as “prophetic of change that ‘Heaven suffereth 
violence and the violent bear it away’.”260 The epochs that form the poet’s system in A 
Vision therefore begin and end in violence and catastrophe, which shows Yeats’s use of a 
negating, destructive, but generative force.  For Yeats, the choice to explore disaster 
through poetry finds its roots in his philosophical influences. In “Anima Hominis” (Per 
Amica Silentae Lunae, 1918) he declares, “He only can create the greatest imaginable 
beauty who has endured all imaginable pangs, for only when we have seen and foreseen 
what we dread shall we be rewarded by that dazzling unforeseen wing-footed wanderer. 
We could not find him if he were not in some sense of our being and yet of our being but 
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as water with fire, a noise with silence.”261 Only through disaster and suffering can one 
find a meaningful sense of magnificence. Contrary to Nietzsche’s dark, violent, 
Dionysian, which holds the power to beckon the abyss of complete nothingness, Yeats 
sees a redemption in disaster that summons an old nihilistic, Apollonian will. His “wing-
footed wanderer” arrives at the point of utter “dread” and reclaims catastrophe as prolific.  
As I have shown previously, the formal and contextual characteristics of Yeats’s 
poetry changed utterly by the time he read the texts of old nihilism. Michael Robartes 
and the Dancer (1921), The Tower (1928), and The Winding Stair and Other Poems 
(1933) demonstrate the language of catastrophe that destroys its subject while longing for 
a redemptive outcome. “Catastrophe” finds its lineage in the Greek “κατα” and 
“στρέφω,” which together mean “I overturn.” This is precisely how Yeats views human 
history, and it aligns rather seamlessly with an old nihilistic determination of nothingness.  
Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel all illustrate the subject, whether the individual person or the 
idea of God and Nature, as using the void of nothingness for redemption after 
experiencing a dissolution of “everything.” It is important to note that all three of these 
old nihilists view the disaster as ultimately Apollonian—a levelling occurrence that 
leaves a void in its wake. By applying this generative view of disaster to his later 
volumes of poetry, Yeats eliminates the threat of utter nothingness that characterizes 
Nietzschean nihilism.   
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Interestingly, though, it is the disaster’s failure for Yeats that incites more fear 
and discontent than its success, and he explores this restlessness in Responsibilities 
(1914). Yeats externalizes “genuine creation” as a “presence made from absence,” as he 
meditates on his own confrontation with the disaster. For Yeats, the Responsibilities 
poems indicate a stylistic and thematic departure from the idealistic “Celtic Twilight” to 
the unforgiving realities modernity. As he repeats in “September 1913” (Responsibilities 
1914), “Romantic Ireland’s dead and gone, / It’s with O’Leary in the grave.” Archaic 
words like “ye,” as George Bornstein perceptively highlights, are absent from this 
volume, and in their place is a “language of poetry [that] coincide[s] with … passionate, 
normal speech.”262 However, Yeats wrote these poems before reading old nihilism, and 
while he begins to consider disaster in this volume, he fails to engage with the creative 
potential that such an event leaves behind. “The Cold Heaven” exemplifies the futility of 
a failed disaster.   
“The Cold Heaven” represents a disaster-like event that fails to yield a 
transformation. It begins in medias res and with an aura of frenzy; the speaker 
“suddenly” sees “the cold and rook-delighting heaven / That seemed as though ice burned 
and was but the more ice.” The sublimity of the setting stirs the speaker until 
“imagination and heart were driven / So wild that every casual thought of that and this / 
Vanished.”263 Though the scene’s fervor appears strong, it does not facilitate a disaster 
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J. Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1997), 125. 
 
 
 
102 
 
that yields a generative nothingness. The “vanishing” fails to entirely level the scene; not 
only does it leave “memories” intact, but those memories “should be out of season,” 
which implies that they are obsolete or unnecessary. As the light seems to pierce the 
speaker, only a purgatorial question remains: will the soul be “stricken / By the injustice 
of the skies for punishment?”264 It is neither impending damnation nor even the hope for 
salvation that preoccupies the speaker’s thoughts; that is, he wonders is, not when.                
While Yeats stops short of producing a transformative disaster in “The Cold 
Heaven,” he depicts the consequence of missing the disaster’s redemptive qualities in 
“The Magi.” This outcome is eternal dissatisfaction. The poem shows a speaker who 
envisions the Nativity scene from the perspective of an outside, bewildered individual.  
He paints a scene for the lifeless statues, superimposing his own observations onto the 
figures: 
 
Now as at all times I can see in the mind’s eye, 
In their stiff, painted clothes, the pale unsatisfied ones 
Appear and disappear in the blue depths of the sky 
With all their ancient faces like rain-beaten stones, 
And all their helms of silver hovering side by side, 
And all their eyes still fixed, hoping to find once more, 
Being by Calvary’s turbulence unsatisfied, 
The uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor.265 
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Far from occupying a scene of chaos, the poem’s subjects are static. The Three Kings, as 
the speaker perceives, sport “stiff, painted clothes” and their “pale, rain-beaten,” stone-
like faces reveal an antiquated longing. The poem’s unvarying abab rhyme scheme 
confines these figures; they cannot escape through a break in form, as the poem leads the 
“mind’s eye” to the concluding “floor,” the lowest point in the space of the poem. Even 
the progressive tense of “hovering” and “hoping” traps the figures; while “hoping” might 
suggest desire or potential for movement, the lingering impression of “hover” 
immediately quells any expectation of liberation. Their unsatisfied “fixed eyes” reveal a 
vexation that plagues Yeats himself. As A.N. Jeffares argues, the Magi are unsatisfied 
“because they represent Yeats’s belief that the Christian revelation was not final…Christ 
is uncontrollable because he is not final.”266 It seems clear that Christ’s resurrection and 
the upheaval it triggered could deliver neither the Magi nor Yeats from dissatisfaction.  
Disaster, in this case, fails to completely negate the metaphysical space of the poem, and 
thus a generative void cannot form. The lack of finality that Jeffares highlights vexes 
both the Magi and the speaker, who “now” and “at all times” see a vision of the 
“unsatisfied,” motionless figures. Both are confined in an apocalyptic circle of inaction 
that disaster’s failure directly causes.  
Despite the failure of Christ’s disaster, the Magi nevertheless long for a 
deliverance from their immobility. For Michael Wood, they eagerly seek unrest and the 
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promise of “Calvary’s turbulence,”267 the event that summoned them to the child in the 
manger.268 The Magi, rather than pursuing a transformation, seek the turbulence itself; 
they ignore what might hide in the core of turmoil as their eyes “still fix” on the next 
disaster.269 For Yeats, these figures represent “the habitual image suggested by the blue 
sky,” as if they are doomed to remained chronically unsatisfied.  Rather than acting as a 
generative void, the sky in this poem seems to swallow the figures as they episodically 
“appear and disappear” into the abyss of blue.  And this is their failure as well as the 
failure of new nihilism: the inability to reap “the disaster” for its creative properties.   
The Disaster of Old Nihilism: Yeats, Gnostic Catastrophe, and 
the Levelling of Everything 
When it comes to comprehending and depicting the disaster in his poetry, Yeats 
garners information from Gnosticism, a perhaps unlikely adjacent philosophy to old 
nihilism. 270 However, the poet gains his knowledge of Gnosticism from a perhaps 
equally unobvious source: his reading of Spinoza.  While critics have attributed Yeats’s 
writing of the disaster and apocalyptic mode to Gnosticism, they overlook Spinoza as a 
                                                          
267 “When Jesus had cried out again in a loud voice, He yielded up His spirit. At that 
moment the veil of the temple was torn in two from top to bottom. The earth quaked and 
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likely source for these ideas.271 As Bloom suggests, Yeats did read Gnostic texts, but 
“generally in dubious versions or misleading contexts.”272 Since, if Bloom is correct, 
Yeats studied Gnostic texts under ambiguous and even questionable circumstances, it is 
possible that he instead absorbed these concepts through Spinoza’s nihilism. For instance, 
we know that he owned and most likely read Spinoza’s Ethics and de Intellectus 
Emendatione, which scholars have linked to Gnosticism. 273 Two statements in particular 
link Yeats’s consideration of the Gnostic vision to Spinoza’s nihilism. He uses one to end 
one of his final letters: “The last kiss is given to the void. The second appears in Where 
There Is Nothing; Yeats writes “We sink in on God, we find him in becoming nothing—
We perish into reality.”274 Heather Martin highlights both of these statements as 
exemplifying the same message. If so, Yeats’s Gnostic vision moves compellingly close 
to Spinoza’s nihilism, whose One Substance leads us to the abyss of emptiness but turns 
that nothingness into divine plentitude, therefore imbuing it with infinite possibility. 
                                                          
271 For instance, Steven Hoeller calls Yeats a “friend and follower” of Gnosticism.  
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Through they may seem at odds, Gnosticism and old nihilism share perceptible 
similarities. For Hans Jonas, the Gnostic movement’s connection to disaster is clear.  He 
argues that the Gnostics grasped the particularly unnerving idea that the human condition 
has been fulfilled and performed “with all the vehemence of a cataclysmic event.”275  
Consequently, he maintains that we may illuminate nihilism’s disaster by juxtaposing it 
against Gnostic catastrophe.276 Additionally, in Agon: Towards A Theory of Revisionism 
(1983), Bloom argues that any “adequate theory of poetic creation also must be a 
catastrophe theory. What is called creation, in art, is both a creation of catastrophe and a 
creation by catastrophe.”277 He elaborates further, stating that catastrophe is “already in 
the condition of language, the condition of the ruins of time.”278 For Bloom, the act of 
writing a poem entails a crisis: the external calamity that the poet reacts to reflects an 
internal struggle that he/she must also confront. Bloom contends further that poems 
themselves are “gnostic catastrophe creations.” Indeed, creation is itself a catastrophe, a 
succession of tragedies created by an imperfect designer.279     
Yeats takes the “nothing” that his system needs from Spinoza, and this enables 
him to efface both God and Nature. The disaster seeps into Spinoza’s philosophy rather 
unexpectedly: That is, through the erasure of Nature and a lingering Gnostic spectre. On 
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one hand, Spinoza’s iteration of old nihilism appears antithetical to Gnosticism; however, 
like the Gnostic God, Spinoza’s “deity,” so to speak, does exist beyond attribute and 
negation because it is only attribute and negation. Spinoza’s philosophy contains a 
“dualism within-monism” that collapses God, or the “One Substance,” and Nature into 
one article. For Cunningham, this duality embodies the “logic” of nihilism because each 
entity cannot exist apart from the other: “God is made manifest in Nature, Nature 
manifests in God.”280 Consequently, Spinoza can allot efficacy to “both” in the absence 
of “each,” a formulation that enables him to interpret the “nothing” as “something.”281  
Such a provisional nothingness animates the void while banishing the negativity from 
nothingness. For Spinoza, the One Substance consequently “provides” Nature with 
existence and vice versa.282 Through its negating power, the One Substance thus supplies 
a nothingness that fosters existence. As Alain Badiou suggests, “Let us say of [Spinoza] 
… he offers a salvation that promises nothing.”283 This “nothing” ultimately directs 
Yeats’s rendering of disaster to the void.   
In addition to the Ethics and Gnosticism, Yeats obtains his understanding of 
generative disaster through his reading of Kant. For instance, in the Opus Postumum 
(1804), Kant aligns the phenomenal “World” with the noumenal “God” and vice versa. 284  
                                                          
280 Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, vix. 
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However, as Cunningham points out, this dualism also yields monism, one which Kant 
eventually calls the “Totality.”285 While we cannot be certain how much of the Opus 
Postumum that Yeats read, he did own and annotate a copy of Kant’s Critical Philosophy 
for English Readers (1915), which outlines many of the concepts that the Opus tackles.286  
Kant’s “disaster” materializes when he reduces the subject, the “absolute I,” to a 
functional nothingness. Like Spinoza, it appears that Kant found usefulness in 
diminishing a “something” to a “nothing,” and even further utility in using that negated 
space to function as something. His reduction of the subject to a nothing is an obvious 
example of this, but like Spinoza before him, Kant proposes a dualism that provides 
nothing.  Humans, as Kant states, are the sight of a disappearance that triggers an object 
to be purely phenomenal and causes the noumenal to exist simply as the phenomenal; this 
act functionally negates and dissolves the object. Ultimately, Yeats’s endeavor aligns 
with Kant’s own: to unite “God” and the World through humans in the wake of a 
negating force.   
Finally, Yeats’s thorough reading of Hegelian old nihilism gives the poet a picture 
of a destruction that annihilates destruction itself. The annihilation and the emptiness that 
the disaster leaves behind is thus a conditional, transitionary space—the consequential 
void that fosters creation. Of the three old nihilists, Yeats read Hegelian philosophy most 
extensively; he housed eight different books on Hegel in his personal library, including 
The Logic of Hegel (1892); What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel 
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(1915); and Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic (1918).287 For Hegel, the absolute is the 
nothing that negates itself, or, the annihilation of annihilation. This iteration of disaster, 
like the disasters that Spinoza and Kant postulate, is not the harbinger of absolute 
destruction. However, it requires that the individual recognizes the disaster’s creative 
potential; if the individual can do this, the provisional nothingness that disaster leaves 
behind is truly provisional. As Hegel declares, “out of this abyss of nothing…the highest 
totality… at once all-encompassing and in the most joyful freedom of its form can and 
must arise.”288 Yeats revises this language when he commands reality to be released in 
“Modern Poetry,” and he gestures toward this idea in “The Cold Heaven” when the 
speaker “[takes] the blame out of sense and reason.”289 Here, the hollowing out concludes 
in “crying” “trembling,” and “rocking,” and if the speaker can transcend these tumultuous 
emotions, the “highest totality” becomes an accessible consequence.     
Yeats’s representation of “the disaster” in his poetry noticeably borrows from the 
old nihilism of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel. As I have shown, Yeats stands on the precipice 
of depicting a generative disaster in Responsibilities, but he stops just short of lucidly 
presenting this outcome in these poems. Beginning with Michael Robartes and the 
Dancer, the first volume after he read old nihilism, the poet’s disaster suggests a 
transformation, and in his later volumes, a transcendence. By combining disaster with a 
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generative, Apollonian will, Yeats reaches the void of old nihilism that yields plentitude 
and creation.            
Yeats and Blake: The Dionysian Daemonic and the Apollonian Sublime 
To gain a holistic understanding of Yeats’s old nihilistic use of the disaster, we 
must first consider his engagement with both the constructive and destructive wills: The 
Apollonian and Dionysian. Yeats’s place in literary history is unique: he stands as one of 
the last “Romantics” and travels across the threshold of modernism. He began his career 
in the 19th century and ended it in the mid-twentieth century. This is perhaps a critical 
reason why Nietzsche’s new nihilism held little power over Yeats: he already rooted 
himself in a tradition of old nihilism that Romanticism grappled with, which interrogates 
the nature of God and the sublime. So, the negative, destructive nihilism that more 
accurately threatens Yeats is what critics label “the daemonic,” an energy born of similar 
origins as the Dionysian. Yeats makes the connection between the daemonic and poetry    
through his reading of William Blake, who used the daemonic mode to interrogate the 
nature of divinity. However, Yeats answers the questions that Blake poses through the 
absolute negativity that characterizes old nihilism. By doing this, he drives away the 
malevolent force that the daemonic heralds and replaces it with an Apollonian, creative 
energy.         
It is through Blake’s example that Yeats connects the daemonic to poetic aptitude. 
Blake, whom Yeats casts as one of the “great artificers of God who uttered great truths to 
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a little clan,”290 felt a deep admiration for the English poet.291 Blake extended 
Romanticism’s fascination with sublimity and divinity in “The Tyger” (1794) by tapping 
into the tradition of the daemonic. Through a series of questions, the speaker meditates on 
the nature of the divine: 
 
When the stars threw down their spears  
And water’d heaven with their tears:  
Did he smile his work to see?  
Did he who made the Lamb make thee?  
 
Tyger Tyger burning bright,  
In the forests of the night:  
What immortal hand or eye,  
Dare frame thy fearful symmetry?292 
 
 
The poem’s trochaic, chant-like rhythm quickly pulls the reader through the poem, as if 
the speaker is hurried and needs his questions answered swiftly; the symmetrical stanza 
lengths emphasize the speaker’s question of symmetry in the poem. Here, Blake uses 
both structural and the literal word “symmetry,” often considered a property of divinity 
and artistic beauty, combined with “fearful” to conjure images of sublimity, a thing that 
captivates and frightens. 293 Throughout the whole poem, the speaker questions the tiger’s 
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existence: who or what could have made such an awe-inspiring creature? And, did this 
same creator fashion both Christ the “Lamb” as well as the fire-forged tiger? These 
stanzas position the tiger, as Gillespie argues, as not merely a destroyer, but a “sublime 
destroyer” that simultaneously “attracts” and “terrifies” the reader.294 The “fire” that 
surrounds the tiger underscores the two repetitions of “dread,” a term that indicates an 
existential anxiety concerning an anticipated event. This event, if Gillespie’s reading is 
accurate, is destruction, with the tiger leading the charge.295 At the poem’s conclusion, 
the unknowable tiger stays “alien, inhuman, incapable of speech, a nightmare vision of an 
incomprehensible engine of destruction.”296    
Even though Yeats showed a life-long interest in the occult and fancies that edge 
dangerously close to a malevolent, supernatural connotation of “daemonic,” the definition 
that I propose takes its namesake from the Greek term daimon or daimonion. Such 
daimons are transitional spirits between humans and the divine.297 As transitionary 
beings, they inhabit the sphere between gods and human beings in some tales, while in 
others they are “indwelling” spirits.298 As Gillespie comprehensively explains, the 
“daemonic” is a “dark and powerful but essentially negative will underlying 
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phenomena”.299 This will can arise from the divine but ultimately opposes it. Thus, it 
“empowers and liberates certain individuals but also catapults them beyond the bounds of 
conventional morality into what is simultaneously an exalted state of superhumanity and 
a degraded state of bestiality.”300 Goethe, for instance, provides a contemporary 
Romantic explanation of the daemonic’s “power,” stating “I cannot rid myself of the 
notion that the daemons, who enjoy teasing us and joy at our pain, set up individuals so 
alluring that everyone aspires toward them, yet so great that no one can reach them.  So 
they set up Raphael…Mozart…Shakespeare.”301 The daemonic, Goethe continued, was 
absent in his Mephistopheles because the daemonic “had nothing in it of the spirit that 
denies, being positive and efficacious.”302 Yeats himself first writes extensively of his 
“Daimon” in Per Amica Silentia Lunae: 303 
 
Daemon and man are opposites; man passes from heterogeneous objects to the 
simplicity of fire, and the Daemon is drawn to objects because through them he 
obtains power, the extremity of choice. For only in men’s minds can he meet even 
those in the Condition of Fire who are not of his own kin... His descending power 
is neither the winding nor the straight line but zigzag, illuminating the passive and 
active properties, the tree’s two sorts of fruit: it is the sudden lightning, for all his 
acts of power are instantaneous. We perceive in a pulsation of the artery, and after 
slowly decline.304 
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The Daimon becomes more prevailing and animate in A Vision, where all things are 
present in an eternal instant for the this entity: “She is not phasal…she is that being 
united to man which knows neither good nor evil…She is revealed to man in moments of 
prevision and illumination and in much that we call good and evil fortune, and yet, seeing 
that she remains always in the Thirteenth Cycle, cannot accompany man in his 
wanderings.305 If we interrogate Yeats’s language, however, we see that his daemonic 
already deviates from the established Romanic definition in a noteworthy way: he 
recognizes the entity’s creative, Apollonian potential.   
 The true horror of the daemonic is the force behind the Blake’s tiger: a terrible, 
alarming, shadowy creator, and for new invention to transpire, this creator must be 
overcome. Blake confronts the daemonic in his poetry through ambiguity; he gives no 
answers, but instead only asks continuous questions. Hegel, however, turns the daemonic 
destroyer of Romantic nihilism into an agent of reason. Hegel reacts against “capricious 
divine omnipotence in favor of true omnipotence and dialectical rationality of absolute 
spirit.”306 Like the new nihilism, Hegel shows a rejection of the will of a God ruling over 
humanity, but he fills that gap rather quickly with rationalism and the Absolute. Any 
uncertainty left by the sublimation of God dissipates with a switch to the “becoming” of 
absolute negativity.  For Hegel, 
 
Becoming in essence, its reflected motion, is thus the motion from nothing to 
nothing and thereby back to itself.  The transit or becoming overcomes itself in its 
transit; the other, that becomes in this transit, is not the non-being of a being, but 
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the nothing of a nothing, and this being the negation of nothing, constitutes being.  
–Being is only as the motion of nothing to nothing, so it is essence; and this does 
not have its motion in itself, but rather it is absolute appearance itself, pure 
negativity, with nothing outside of itself that negates it, but that negates itself 
through its negative itself, that only is in this negating.307  
 
   
This “buried reality” is embodied in the much studied “The Second Coming” (Michael 
Robartes and the Dancer, 1921). Unquestionably inspired by A Vision (1925), “The 
Second Coming” narrates the end of an epoch in history and gestures toward the 
beginning of another. The space exists in state of limbo because the current era has not 
yet absolutely ended, and the new era still awaits its beginning. In this poem, Yeats 
confronts the mysterious maker of the daemonic through negation.  
Similarly to “The Cold Heaven,” “The Second Coming” ends in mystery, but this 
time, Yeats gestures toward regeneration. Like Blake, Yeats meditates on these ideas 
through questions, as if inviting the reader to question these concepts simultaneously with 
him. Yeats writes the poem in roughly iambic pentameter, but this meter “falls apart” as 
early as the first line, “turning and “turning in the widening gyre,” in a mix of dactyls 
and ends in a trochee.308 As the iamb’s mirror image, the ending trochee’s falling rhythm 
magnifies a descent and pulls the reader through to the end of an era as the gyre enlarges. 
The dactyls, often used in Greek and Latin elegiac poetry, further underscore the idea of 
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termination, but elegy contrasts with this poem’s content: Yeats excitedly anticipates the 
era’s end rather than mourns it.   
Continuing the visage of brokenness, the second stanza is 14 lines—the length of 
a sonnet—and the first is eight lines, approximately half the length of a sonnet, as though 
the first stanza was interrupted or abruptly halted by a traumatic event.  Here, the speaker 
narrates an imminent catastrophe: 
 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere    
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst    
Are full of passionate intensity.309 
 
 
The daemonic, Dionysian language consumes these lines.  As if prophesizing modern 
society’s fate at an era’s end, Yeats casts ominous darkness on the “blood-dimmed tide,” 
an image that conjures thoughts of The Book of Revelation’s apocalyptic blood moon.310 
The apocalyptic torrent then relentlessly inundates “innocence,” a term often associated 
with purity and goodness. However, innocence also indicates an artlessness, a thing that 
lacks culture and craft, and a naiveté that suggests a naturalness resulting from 
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unawareness of the effect one is producing on others. For this “innocence” to be drowned 
means to eliminate a wide-eyed crudeness that has worn out its welcome. Yeats nearly 
inverts the desired effect of the Book of Revelation: he privileges the “worst,” who 
exhibit a raw strength at this era’s end while the “best” fall languidly to the side, 
unwilling or unable to do.  
Adding to the poem’s desire for knowledge, Yeats follows this stanza with 
“Surely some revelation is at hand,” a statement that demands a profound change. While 
the speaker could be desperately begging for this revelation, indicated by his repetition of 
“surely,” he appears to immediately conjure it by shouting “the Second Coming!” and 
summoning a sphinx out of Spiritus Mundi. 311 Like Hegel, Yeats believes that a 
dialectical process motivates historical events. Further, his belief that humans can 
glimpse this progression reveals a “common consciousness” not unlike the “world soul.” 
It is because of this process “and in the comprehension of the unity of opposites, or of the 
positive in the negative, that speculative knowledge consists.”312 Yeats changes Blake’s 
“tyger” and the poet’s questioning of the creative force behind it into a “shape with a lion 
body and the head of a man,” the harbinger of a renewed era. A reference to the sphinx, 
the master puzzler of antiquity, shows that Yeats’s creature is an amalgamation of two 
distinct forms, setting it apart from both human and animal.   
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The terror that surrounds the “rough beast” is not purely Dionysian for two 
reasons: The sphinx’s association with the provisional nothingness of the void and its 
heralding of eventual creation. The terror behind the sphinx, just like the terror behind 
Blake’s tiger, is the creative force that drives it. Like Blake’s tiger, the sphinx is strange 
and nightmarish: the vision “troubles” the speaker’s “sight” and its presence startles the 
surrounding birds.  Even the creature’s movements are threatening, as it presses forward 
painfully deliberately, “moving its slow thighs” while trapesing across the land. Despite 
these similarities to Blake’s tiger, Yeats’s sphinx deviates because it is an entity 
comprised of prolific nothingness. As Bloom observes, he “welcomes the second birth of 
the Egyptian Sphinx both emotionally and intellectually.”313 Firstly, the creature 
possesses “a gaze blank and pitiless as the sun.” It is impossible to meet the sun’s stare 
with the naked eye for an extended amount of time, but if one can manage a quick 
glimpse, he/she would only see a sphere of bright light with no discernable features. The 
light’s intensity masks the sun’s true form from the beholder. The “blankness” of the 
sphinx’s face thusly exhibits not nothingness, but an unknown potential.  
 Furthermore, the desert, a place of complete nothingness, bears this sphinx: it is a 
creature born of nothing and created not by a menacing divine entity but summoned out 
of the collective unconscious. “Pitiless” too draws upon a language of negation and 
implies a lack of feeling rather than an active desire to view suffering. Such images, for 
Daniel Albright, are striking, but the critic is more enthralled with the negative, vacant 
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background that Yeats uses to display them. Albright indicates that through the Sea, sky, 
desert, Yeats aspires to “find an image large enough and blank enough to mirror the 
ultimate things.”314 This aspiration quite expressively animates the poet’s goal for his 
writing that he outlines in Mythologies (1917): “I shall find the dark grow luminous, the 
void fruitful when I understand I have nothing, that the ringers in the tower have 
appointed for the hymen for the soul a passing bell.”315 In a rhetorical move that mimics 
the rising and falling of all things into Spinoza’s One Substance, Albright sees all of 
Yeats’s images as rising out of a void, and subsequently descending back into that 
void.316   
Additionally, a creature born of the desert’s void, Yeats’s sphinx’s existence 
displays similarities to Hegel’s idea of absolute negativity. As Hegel explains in The 
Science of Logic, “the negative appears as the mediating element, since it includes within 
it itself and the immediate whose negation it is.”317 The desert, then, acts as this 
“mediating element” that breeds this blank sphinx and portent of the new era. No sooner 
does the sphinx appear that the darkness overtakes the image again and it disappears from 
the speaker’s sight. This creature heralds the current epoch’s end and the new one’s 
beginning, unlike the tiger’s connection to destruction. As the sphinx slowly moves 
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forward, disturbing the environment around it, it approaches closer to bringing upon the 
disaster and ushering in newness.  
Yeats’s sphinx in “The Second Coming,” possesses an ancestry that belongs to 
the void; it brings the disaster of the old era’s destruction. However, this symbol also 
overlaps with the representation of the sublime in old nihilism.318 The daemonic does 
indeed share similarities with the sublime, including an ability to elicit both fear and 
fascination from a human subject. However, Kant’s old nihilism in particular withdraws 
the sublime’s transformative capacity more viscerally. For Gillespie, the daemonic is “a 
force that evokes fascination and fear but does not yet exercise power over actuality.”319  
This is where old nihilism’s sublime holds such a power, and Yeats deploys it to pull the 
buried Apollonian energy out of the daemonic’s dense Dionysian haze. Kant’s sublime 
shows an object existing as objectively terrifying, but the individual viewer does not truly 
fear it.  He clarifies this point in The Critique of Judgment (1790) when he declares, “The 
sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind 
transcending every standard of sense.”320 The sublime is therefore a part of the 
“supersensible” world, unbound by temporal and physical constraints, and formless and 
free.321 Its nebulous properties and detachment from the realm of particulars make the 
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sublime a vehicle that helps thrust the subject away from “visible objects” and toward a 
nonsubstantial void. The subject thus reaches beyond the idea of terror and toward a 
generative levelling.  
Through the mind’s rationalization, sublimity acts as a vehicle for a revelation or 
even a transformation, which is what Kantian nihilism aims to do. In the modern age, 
aesthetic experience has become increasingly individualized, found in solitude, and this 
highly individualized aspect of aesthetics is itself a result of “a breaking of the soul and 
world into fragments,” as Yeats writes of history beginning in the eighteenth century.322  
As Yeats articulates, “The world begins to long for the arbitrary and the accidental, for 
the grotesque, the repulsive, and the terrible, that it may be cured of desire, and the 
moment has come for the ninth gyre.”323 This “curing” for Yeats necessitates a vanishing 
of the subject, in this case the collective consciousness of modernity. After a reduction to 
the absolute nihil, Yeats’s void becomes fruitful.  
A Sublime Transformation: The “Terrible Beauty” and the Void 
Yeats’s sphinx and Blake’s tiger both embody the sublime’s perfect blending of 
beauty and terror, allure and repulsion. Like the tiger, the sphinx brings with it an 
impending destruction that will change the face of reality, and Oedipus undergoes a 
change that allows him to know only his mind.  Extending Kant’s implementation of the 
concept, Yeats latches onto the sublime’s transformative quality and distills that into 
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transcendence through his tragic joy. While Nietzsche’s influence on tragic joy displays 
through a “love of fate,” Yeats calls upon Kant’s sublime to transform terror of 
annihilation into a state of near divine perfection. Such an action, as Holdridge notes, will 
transport the individual to another plane.324   
In “Easter, 1916” (Michael Robartes and the Dancer, 1921), Yeats combines the 
ideas of tragedy and ecstasy together in his haunting refrain “a terrible beauty is born.” 
Repeated three times, as if to actively evoke a movement beyond the physical world, his 
phrase suggests that the Easter Rebellion of 1916 possessed a nearly God-like power to 
not only “change” but “change” and “transform utterly” the trajectory of Ireland. The 
terrible beauty, devoid of definite form, positions the subject for a movement beyond 
physical understanding. In this way, the Kantian limitlessness that Yeats adopts does not 
lie in the possibilities for Ireland’s future; rather, the subject vanishes because of this 
transformation, which can lead to a transcendence. At the poem’s beginning, the speaker 
recalls the insignificant interactions he experiences with the people of his town in a 
foreboding tone that matches the disconcerting change about to take place:   
 
I have passed with a nod of the head    
Or polite meaningless words,    
Or have lingered awhile and said    
Polite meaningless words… 
Being certain that they and I    
But lived where motley is worn:    
All changed, changed utterly325 
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Again, the speaker emphasizes the inconsequential exchanges between he and the 
townspeople though repetition. “Meaningless” here conjures not only images of the 
desolate new nihilism, but perhaps more specifically, action without intent. That is, the 
speaker partakes in these routine pleasantries because they are expected, or “polite,” 
rather than substantial. However, tapping into the Kantian sublime changes the 
“meaningless words” that the speaker twice admits to uttering and replaces them with the 
“terrible beauty.” Likewise, the sublime event that introduces the “terrible beauty” 
removes and replaces the “motley” fabric, a symbol that evokes images of foolish jesters. 
This act consequently eliminates the subject in the process: the “they” and the “I” are 
transformed, but the speaker does not reveal into what.  In the poem’s final stanza, the 
sublime event’s transformative reach expands past the speaker’s town to “wherever green 
is worn.” Through this transformation, Yeats leads us to the Kantian nonsubstantial void: 
the entire erasure of what used to exist. The birth of the “terribly beauty” concludes the 
poem, an indication that the subject’s vanishing is complete. It seems, then, that 
transcendence is a Yeatsian rendering of the Kantian nonsubstantial void. For Yeats, 
tragic joy marries two contradictory perceptions of a single feeling that is “the nobleness 
of the arts is in the mingling of contraries, the extremity of sorrow, the extremity of 
joy.”326 Yeats expresses Kant’s formless limitlessness in the space between those 
extremes within that mingling.  
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One way that Yeats accomplishes this feat is through the figure of Oedipus. For 
Yeats, Oedipus represents a human embodiment of the sublime. In A Vision, Yeats asserts 
that the tome will “proclaim a new divinity” in Oedipus:   
 
Oedipus lay upon the earth at the middle point between four sacred objects, was 
there washed as the dead are washed, and thereupon passed with Theseus to the 
wood’s heart until Amidst the sound of thunder earth opened, “riven by love,” and 
he sank down soul and body into the earth.  I would have him balance Christ who, 
crucified standing up, went into the abstract sky soul and body…He raged against 
his sons, and this rage was noble…He knew nothing but his mind, and yet 
because he spoke that mind fate possessed it and kingdoms changed according to 
his blessing and his cursing.  Delphi, that rock at earth’s navel, spoke through 
him, and though men shuddered and drove him away they spoke of ancient 
poetry, praising the boughs overhead, the grass under foot, Colonus and its 
horses.327 
 
 
Yeats’s language is striking and ferocious in this passage. Words like “thunder,” “rage,” 
and “shuddered” give life to the daemonic as it entirely trembles the landscape. But 
amidst all of this frenzy lies a transformation and a “balance.” Delphi possesses and 
transforms Oedipus into a medium that leaves him enraged but also triggers the men to 
“bless joyfully” the language of poetry.328 As Jahan Ramazani argues, the transformation 
of terror into joy is “the sublime’s affective structure, and the spontaneous movement of 
language from one mind to another is the intersubjective course of the sublime. The 
powerful speech of Yeats’s Oedipus makes overt the violence of the sublime.”329  
Another significant aspect of Yeats’s Oedipus is his association with metaphysical 
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disappearance. He sinks “body and soul” into the void of the earth and seems to surface 
knowing “nothing but his mind.” The character seems to emerge as a transformed 
subject, a result that closely resembles Kant’s vanishing and the philosopher’s view of the 
sublime. By making Oedipus “disappear” and leading us to the void of the “terribly 
beauty,” Yeats injects Apollonian transformation into an atmosphere filled with 
Dionysian destruction and catastrophe.Thus, Yeats’s disaster edges even closer to 
uncovering the new beginning that he desires.  
The “Unsatisfied Ones” Satisfied: Yeats’s Fruitful Void 
Through his reading of old nihilism, Yeats applies an Apollonian version of the 
sublime to uncover a generative transformation that the daemonic, Dionysian façade 
masks. We stand now on the precipice of creation that must be birthed into existence.  
For Yeats, birth is intertwined with his reclamation of “the disaster” and destruction. The 
speaker of “The Second Coming” asks what newness will be “born” out of the old 
world’s demolition and “Easter, 1916” declares the nativity of a transformed reality.  
Both poems were born of real-world disasters: Ireland’s Easter Rising and the First 
World War. Furthermore, Yeats also sees the terror, the daemonic consequence of the 
rebirth. In “The Mother of God (The Winding Stair and Other Poems, 1933), a dramatic 
monologue spoken by the Virgin Mary, the speaker asks, “What is this flesh I purchased 
with my pains, / And bids my hair stand up?”330 Yeats, donning the mask of the new 
mother, embodies humans’ reaction to a sublime event: an all-consuming fascination with 
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its beauty and terror. As the mother contemplates, “This love that makes my heart’s blood 
stop / Or strikes a sudden chill into my bones.”331 Her simultaneous attraction and 
repulsion, love and fear, solicits a forward-progress. Although the mother fears the 
“fallen star that [her] milk sustains,” the birth has already transpired. Only the uncertainty 
left in the wake of such new-ness remains. If Yeats sees a rebirth spring from the 
destruction’s aftermath, he continues to fashion this void and clarifies it in The Tower and 
The Winding Stair. 
In The Tower (1928) and The Winding Stair and Other Poems (1933), Yeats 
descends ever closer to the unforgiving abyss, but before it can consume him entirely, he 
finds the redemptive void that he seeks. Perhaps befitting of such a descent, the temper of 
the poems in both these volumes is indeed, as Yeats calls The Tower, “bitter,” and 
“verges on nihilism.”332 As Bradley perceptively notes, “the idealizing dream of Ireland 
that dominated the early romantic verse of Yeats has become “a modernist nightmare” in 
The Tower.333 The order of the poems in the volume The Tower is perhaps noteworthy as 
well, since Yeats deliberately chose their placement. It follows, then, that Yeats may have 
conceivably intended the relative calmness of “Sailing to Byzantium” to frame and put in 
heartening perspective the poems that come directly after; that is, “The Tower,” 
“Meditations in Time of Civil War,” and “Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen” because their 
systems, content, and sentiments are quite  perplexing and alarming.334 For Bradley, 
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however, he more likely intended to simulate the slope from order into near chaos and 
anarchy mapped by several of his later poems.335 But as we shall see, near is a vital 
additive to Yeats’s chaos: Like Spinoza and his substance monism, he leads us to the 
edge of the absolute emptiness, but he does not leave us to be consumed by the Dionysian 
abyss. Rather, old nihilism’s Apollonian qualities redeem annihilation and cultivate the 
void.    
Yeats’s poetic masks often long for nothing. In “Meditations in a Time of Civil 
War” (The Tower, 1928) the “daemonic rage” which “imagined everything” haunts the 
poem’s landscape, and the “rage-hungry troop” magnifies the discontent chaos.  
However, the troop appears to so desperately long for emptiness that he “plunges toward 
nothing” with his “arms and fingers spreading wide / For the embrace of nothing.”336 The 
figure seems frenzied in his quest for nothingness: the speaker calls him “belababouring” 
and “tormented,” “biting at an arm or face” as he moves head-on into the abysmal scene.  
While the speaker fails to understand the trooper’s desire and Yeats does little to describe 
this nothingness, it is clear that the trooper is drawn to it. His outstretched extremities 
long and reach for it, as if this nothingness will offer him something more than he 
currently possesses. It is this alluring quality to nothing that temps and terrifies, but also 
leads the speaker to “abstract joy” and “half-read wisdom of daemonic images” at the 
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poem’s close. While still incomplete, nothing’s glimmering of a gratification from within 
the void begins to form.   
Nothingness appears as transformative in “Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen” (The 
Tower, 1928). Here, Yeats extends the image of the “rage-d riven…troop” who longs for 
the void to include a sublime vanishing of the subject that edges closer. Although rooted 
in the Irish Home Rule struggle, “Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen” is a poem full of 
vanishing; indeed, it begins at Kant’s third stage of vanishing with the disappearance of 
material objects. The speaker recalls, “Many ingenious lovely things are gone…,” and 
even the things that otherwise seemed impervious to the vanishing, like “Phidias’s 
famous ivories / And all the golden grasshoppers and bees” also are “gone.”337 Human 
accomplishments in art, law, and philosophy are reduced to “pretty toys,” but the “toys” 
now belong to the past. Time, for Mutter, changes everything, and human perception is 
quite susceptible to such an alteration.338 A vanishing of all material objects in a subject’s 
world lays the foundation for a nonsubstantial void. Yeats primes the human subject for 
transformation by negating all achievement and physical items, but it is the “swan” that 
undergoes this change first.   
The swan appears in several of Yeats’s poems as a symbol of imagination, 
timeless existence, and conquest. In “Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen,” though, this 
mysterious bird connects visibly to the void.  First, Yeats bonds the swan directly to the 
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human soul; the speaker expresses, “Some moralist or mythological poet / Compares the 
solitary soul to a swan; / I am satisfied with that.”339 As Rachel Billigheimer shows, we 
can credit Plato for first connecting the swan with the soul. In the Phaedo, Socrates 
pronounces: Will you not allow that I have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the 
swans?... because they are sacred to Apollo, they have a gift of prophecy, and anticipate 
the good things of another world; wherefore they sing and rejoice on that day [of their 
death] more than ever they did before.”340 Given that Yeats read the Phaedo, we can 
assume that he understood the swan’s connection with an Apollonian spirit as well as the 
bird’s celebration of its own destruction. 341 More fascinating still, however, is that the 
sublimity that Yeats’s swan embodies shares similarities to Kant’s sublime disaster and 
transformation.342 Through the swan, Yeats stages the soul’s advancement into sublime 
change, a move that leads it to the void’s edge. The posture that the swan takes before 
“that brief gleam of its life be gone” is dignified and undaunted: its wings are “half 
spread for flight” and its “breast is thrust out in pride / Whether to play, or to ride / Those 
winds that clamour of approaching night.343 The swan, and by extension the human soul, 
then shifts to an active seeker of the disaster and destruction, as it “has leaped into the 
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desolate heaven.”344 In a move that alludes to Kant’s view of the sublime, this bird fails 
to fear the “desolate heaven’s” immensity or vastness, despite the object’s quantitatively 
terrifying sensation. The terror that this void elicits exists as incredibly real and hostile.  
It can:    
 
bring wildness, bring a rage  
To end all things, to end  
What my laborious life imagined, even  
The half-imagined, the half-written page345 
 
 
The vision of the soul leaping into the desolate heaven can bring wildness and even 
existence-ending rage; for Billigheimer, the life and the half-imagined and the half-
written page that the poet has imagined may terminate.346 Additionally, as Mutter 
elaborates, the poet is “half persuaded to join in the prevailing mood of cynicism and 
destruction; it is tempting to acquiesce in nihilism, even to jettison his own poetry.”347 
The speaker’s use of “can” in this passage rather than “will” or “does,” however, is 
noteworthy: while the soul’s deliberate bounding has the power to potentially summon 
such disaster and wildness, this outcome is not guaranteed; it is merely a possibility. 
Attaining order and renewed creation are the unspoken alternative consequences to 
leaping into “desolate heaven” of this poem’s void.  
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Whereas the vision of the swan-soul leaping into the void elicits a potentially 
fearsome outcome, it is an act of “good violence” spawned from a genuine yearning. 
Mutter connects the soul’s actions directly to “good violence,” which he calls 
“aristocratic, heroic, creative, and passionate.”348 This “good violence” bears similarities 
to the redemptive disaster of old nihilism, an Apollonian force that enters in one of 
Yeats’s most diminutive poems: “Fragments” (The Tower, 1928). This poem meditates 
on language and truth as springing from the void of darkness and is one of the clearest 
instances of Yeats’s void at last fostering creation. His title, which indicates a whole 
entity that experienced a destructive dismantling, implies a necessary reconstruction from 
the remains of the disaster. The speaker attacks John Locke for leaving us with the waste 
of the physical world and for underestimating the source of their own inspiration.349 As 
an empiricist, Locke denied the existence of an innate truth; for Yeats, he failed to see 
that the “Garden died.” By contrasting the empirical with the unperceivable, Yeats 
positions nothing-as-something; in this case, a “something” that prophesizes:     
 
Where got I that truth? 
Out of a medium’s mouth, 
Out of nothing it came, 
Out of the forest loam, 
Out of dark night where lay 
The crowns of Nineveh.350 
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Revelation in this poem comes after disaster.  Nineveh, once a powerful city and capital 
of Assyria, fell at the hands of Babylon. But that nothing finally reveals something 
definite: the truth, born from the bare soil and darkness. The truth springs from the void 
of darkness, an entity that negates the ability of the sense to perceive. Finally, Yeats 
imbues his void with creative properties, an achievement that only amplifies in The 
Winding Stair’s “Byzantium” and “Vacillation.” 351     
The sublime and nihilism’s disaster again continue expanding in “Byzantium” 
(The Winding Stair and Other Poems, 1933). Each of the poem’s stanzas moves from 
pentameter to tetrameter to trimeter lines, only to end with a pentameter line that now 
seems expansive; this reflects the narrowing and intensity of the experience the poem 
strives for. While we are accustomed to reading this poem as an allegory of the aesthetic 
process, it is yet another exercise in Yeats’s rendering of the Kantian sublime. In the 
commentary to his Collected Poems, Yeats reveals that he “warmed [him]self back into 
life with Byzantium” after falling ill. A “poem that befit [his] years,” “Byzantium’s” 
structure oscillates between varying line lengths that perpetuates the “images that yet / 
fresh images beget.”352 The aroma of flame that “no faggot feeds” and no storm 
                                                          
351 The tone and concerns of The Winding Stair to some extent overlap with those of The 
Tower; indeed, Yeats originally intended “Blood and the Moon” and other poems to be 
included in The Tower. Also, “Byzantium” and “Sailing to Byzantium” are quite 
obviously linked, but not so obviously, for Bradley, are “Byzantium” and “All Souls’ 
Night.” The former anticipates the imagery of “Byzantium” as much as “Sailing to 
Byzantium” does: the midnight hour, the cathedral bell, mummies, and ghosts are 
common to both. 
352 W. B. Yeats, “Byzantium,” in The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats, ed. Richard J. 
Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1997), 248. 
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“disturbs” hovers menacingly over the landscape, threatening to consume metaphysical 
reality and drag it into utter terror. In a move that Holdridge casts as the “negative” 
sublime latching onto the “positive” sublime, the fire threatens to eviscerate all a priori 
truths and leave us “with nothing but the abyss.”353 Yeats crafts the soundscape of 
“Byzantium” with harsh, abrupt dins; a cathedral gong reverberates and night-walkers 
warble their song, but these sounds “recede” as the distained “complexities” of “all that 
man is” enters the scene. “Unpurged images” are unrefined, as if the flame has not yet 
lapped their edges. For these entities, transformation to sublimity has not yet occurred.  
Once the flames envelope the day’s images, as Ramazani articulates, they will “simplify 
through intensity” and “burn away the accidents of the chaotic life.”354 
Just as the “rough beast” appeared out of Spiritus Mundi’s desert, the speaker 
experiences another vision that sees the potential in disaster. He reveals:     
 
Before me floats an image, man or shade, 
Shade more than man, more image than a shade; 
For Hades’ bobbin bound in mummy-cloth 
May unwind the winding path; 
A mouth that has no moisture and no breath 
Breathless mouths may summon; 
I hail the superhuman; 
I call it death-in-life and life-in-death.355 
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Does the “superman” refer to the image, man, or shade that the speaker sees? It doesn’t 
seem likely. This image is the embodiment of contradiction: the speaker first describes it 
as an image, refines his description to form a human, only to negate the first statement 
and cast it once again as mere image. This figure seems wrapped up in circularity: it has a 
mouth but cannot use it because the figure lacks moisture and breath; however, the 
potential for utility nevertheless exists, even if not yet actualized. Furthermore, Yeats’s 
superman sees the proclivity for creation beyond the disaster. Death and life collapse into 
one image to form a nothing that functions as something, a nothing devoid of negativity.  
In Kant’s dynamical sublime, there is the sense of annihilation of the sensible self as the 
imagination tries to comprehend a vast might. As Bloom highlights, the negative formula 
in this poem mirrors Phases 15 and 1 of A Vision, where “human incarnation is 
negated.”356 However, Yeats’s annihilation is neither absolute nor finite; instead, it is 
provisional. This is what the speaker achieves by collapsing death into life and life into 
death: the fusing of each negates the other, thus preparing a space for transformation. In 
this case, the transition between lives. 
 This is where the disaster of old nihilism enters the poem most prominently.  
Amid the fury, fire, and “mire” of the landscape, a regeneration of sorts begins to 
transpire.  The “smithies,” who the speaker surrounds with hellish descriptions of metal 
and flame, surge the landscape’s bedlam forward and bring the destruction, but the scene 
is not one of utter annihilation. “Begotten” and “beget” appear a total of three times in the 
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poem’s second half. As if they spring from the void itself, the flames are their own cause 
and “begotten of flame,” and the “spirits” “blood-begotten,” made of flesh, are “dying 
into a dance / An agony of trance.”357 Their death, however, exists as celebrated, as 
“dance” and “trance” amalgamate into a sublimity that fuses merriment and pain. These 
images, sprung from the destruction and disaster of the action appear to process in a 
never-ending litany that fills the space of the poem. Through this sublime, Yeats seems to 
gesture toward Kant’s postulation that “no phenomenon can disappear” as the “images … 
yet / fresh images beget.”358   
After the sublime, the idea of negation enters the poem to add supplementary 
explanation of Yeats’s procreative disaster. As Miller argues, Yeats aims to yield to God 
in this poem as a phase of “total objectivity.”359 For Miller, “Byzantium” comes close to 
removing all distinctive qualities from the soul so that it might reach God without 
qualities.360 Unlike Miller, I do not suggest that Yeats means to reach “God” in this 
poem, but the purging of an excess firmly anchors this idea in old nihilism. Spinoza’s 
Gnostic erasure of God and Nature, an act of pure negation, promises the purged 
“nothing” that to which Miller and Yeats allude. Additionally, this is a process of “losing 
idiosyncrasy” to reach total objectivity again relates to Kant’s vanishing of the subject 
and Hegel’s absolute. For Hegel, absolute negativity is supposed to be a first principle, a 
ground from which everything else flows. While Miller uses the phrase “total objectivity” 
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to characterize Yeats’s “yielding” to the divine, the poet depicts this surrender as 
anything but quiet and passive. Instead, he leaves us with a “dolphin-torn, gong-
tormented sea.” For all of the poem’s eradicating language, a Dionysian, ferocious rage 
still overwhelms the final line. In this ultimate line, Yeats reveals that exorcism is violent: 
Kant’s vanishing, Hegel’s annihilation of annihilation, and Spinoza’s gnostic disaster all 
require fury.      
After transforming the subject and warding off the abyss, Yeats fully actualizes 
the generative disaster in “Vacillation” (The Winding Stair and Other Poems, 1933).  
This is where he animates the void and finds the “dark grow luminous,” as he set out to 
do in “Anima Hominis” (Per Amica Silentia Lunae, 1918). Like Eliot, Yeats uses the idea 
of “betweenness” in “Vacillation” to indicate a transitionary space, and he situates the 
reader in this interval from the poem’s inception. The poem begins immediately with 
betweenness, where the speaker fixes humans’ existence “between extremities.”  
However, like the feeling that plagued the Magi, this betweenness appears unsatisfying.  
Indeed, the extremities here seem to be problematic and unresolved rather than the 
favored space. Humans merely “run their course” between the limits of what we can 
assume are existence and nonexistence, shape and form, color and shade. The blankness 
of the “rough beast’s” stare returns to yield a space devoid of potent characteristic.  
However, the “betweenness” does not remain for long. In the third line, a 
concurrently destructive and procreative force manifests to release humans from that 
undesirable state. The speaker describes,   
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A band, or flaming breath, 
Comes to destroy 
All those antinomies  
Of day and night; 
The body calls it death, 
The heart remorse.361 
 
 
Like he does in A Vision, Yeats draws his attention to “antinomies,” those rational 
quandaries that expose an insurmountable chasm between humans and the divine. These 
antinomies puzzled both he and Kant, and each thinker drew upon nihilism to answer 
these metaphysical conundrums. 362 The “flaming breath” enters the scene to “destroy” 
everything that the subject knows, including the basic dichotomy of “day and night.” As 
in “Byzantium,” all idiosyncrasies are eliminated until presumably nothing remains.  
While the “body” and the “heart” appear discontented by this elimination—they deem it 
“death” and remorse,” respectively—the speaker holds a contrasting viewpoint. He asks, 
“But if these be right, / What is joy?”363  This rhetorical question implies that joy bounds 
from the antinomies’ annihilation, as if it is the only appropriate response to this 
outcome. Furthermore, as Gillis argues, the poem’s third section confirms that joy stems 
from an acceptance of death.364 However, the fundamental query for Yeats whether this 
acceptance is “bound by a vision of broader cohesion, of reincarnation and continuity, or 
                                                          
361 W. B. Yeats, “Vacillation,” in The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats, ed. Richard J. 
Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1997), 249-250. 
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whether it is a matter of nihilistically laughing in annihilation’s face.”365 For Gillis, Yeats 
fails to reveal an adequate answer to the questions, but the sixth and seventh sections 
utilize old nihilism’s disappearance and disaster to fully comprehend and utilize the 
prolific void.  
 Yeats ends each of Section VI’s stanzas with the haunting refrain, “Let all things 
pass away.” While such an utterance could appear abundantly pessimistic, this line 
embodies each of Spinoza’s, Kant’s, and Hegel’s fruitful negativity. For Gillis, nihilism’s 
“credibility” is postponed because of the “sheer bewilderment occasioned by the verse’s 
breakneck rapidity, authoritative specificity, and weird historicity.”366 Indeed, it is a 
“highly ambivalent atmosphere” that affords the possibility the speaker to conclude this 
section with “What’s the meaning of all song? / ‘Let all things pass away’.”367 However, 
Gillis seems to miss the tradition of old nihilism present in these stanzas. Spinoza’s 
removal of God and Nature and promise of nothing presents itself in the “meaning of the 
song.” As Altizer highlights, Spinoza’s “ultimate joy,” and one here uniquely released in 
pure thinking itself, is one in which the individual subject of thinking is wholly absent as 
such, even as an individual subject is inevitably dissolved in the deepest expressions of 
mystical vision.”368 The Spinozan metaphorical command of “Let all things pass away,” 
vocalized by the speaker, promotes an “emptying out” so that the void can be filled.  This 
passing away also elicits a Hegelian absolute negativity that ultimately commands 
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368 Altizer, Godhead and Nothing, 40. 
 
 
 
139 
 
creation. Hegel declares, “Out of this abyss of nothing…the feeling: God is dead…the 
highest totality in its complete seriousness and out of its deepest ground, at once all-
encompassing and in the most joyful freedom of its form can and must arise.”369    
Finally, “Vacillation’s” seventh section charges the individual to find truth now 
that value-creating old nihilism has replaced the disaster and abyss with the void. In 
another iteration of betweenness, this section sees a dialogue between soul and heart, 
where the Soul instructs the Heart to “seek out reality” and “leave things that seem”: to 
abandon the phenomenal realm for the world of the noumena. Here, fire returns again, 
but this time it strikes fear into the Heart, who is “Struck dumb in the simplicity of fire.”  
“Simplicity” connects this fire to the void, which in “Byzantium” seemed to both birth 
and contain the flames. However, rather than recommending a shrinking from the fire’s 
annihilating, purging power, the Soul instructs the Heart to “Look on to that fire,” for 
“salvation walks within.” This statement casts the Soul as possessing direct knowledge of 
annihilation and vanishing’s creative potential; it knows that deliverance rather than 
calamity awaits the Heart. Now the redeemed entity that started out as a triumphant swan 
leaping into the “desolate heaven” of “Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen,” the Soul exists 
as the quintessence of the void’s rejuvenating capacity. The disaster, catastrophe, and 
apocalypse all lead to a fruitful void of old nihilism that Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel all 
help Yeats to actualize.   
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Conclusion 
In “Modern Poetry” (1936), Yeats comments on Eliot’s “still point,” of the Four 
Quartets (1941), saying that “Eliot’s historical and scholarly mind seems to have 
added…this thought: reality is expressed in a series of contradictions, or is that 
unknowable something that supports the center of the see-saw.”370 The center of Yeats’s 
“see-saw” is the void left behind after catastrophe. This is the space of an “unknowable 
something” that, although beyond the realm of human comprehension, exists to stabilize 
the universe and its inhabitants. However, reaching the nonsubstantial void of old 
nihilism is an arduous task; it requires both trauma and catastrophe: an utter change and a 
loosening of anarchy. However, Yeats harnesses this Dionysian chaos and mixes it with 
an Apollonian order that enables the “dark” to finally “grow luminous” in his poetic 
system. His reading of the old nihilism of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, rather than 
Nietzsche’s new nihilism, aids the poet in his endeavor. In his last letter, written to 
Elizabeth Pelham on January 4, 1939, three weeks before his death, Yeats concluded: 
 
I am happy, and I think full of an energy, an energy I had despaired of. It seems to 
me that I have found what I wanted. When I try to put all into a phrase I say, 
“Man can embody truth but he cannot know it.” I must embody it in the 
completion of my life. The abstract is not life and everywhere draws out its 
contradictions. You can refute Hegel but not the Saint or the Song of Sixpence.371  
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Yeats finally reaches the still point and achieves a satisfaction with his life and poetic 
vision, and  this satisfaction imbues much of his late poetry. As he concludes in his 
“Supernatural Songs” (Parnell’s Funeral and Other Poems, 1935), 
 
There all the barrel-hoops are knit, 
There all the serpent-tails are bit, 
There all the gyres converge in one, 
There all the planets drop in the Sun.372 
 
 
The circularity that characterizes this stanza is not unresolved like the circularity of 
“Meru” or the “widening gyre” of “The Second Coming.” Instead, the Sun acts as a 
stable center, and the wild gyres all find unity in the amorphous “there.” Through his 
mode of disaster and catastrophe, his Apollonian stabilization of the Dionysian’s chaos, 
Yeats finds the new center that he seeks. He finds this center in the void that the disaster 
of old nihilism leaves behind.
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CHAPTER V 
“THEY ALL GO INTO THE DARK”: T. S. ELIOT READING NIHILISM 
 
 
And if anyone assert that immediate experience, either at the beginning or end of 
our journey, is annihilation and utter night, I cordially agree.  
—T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley 
 
  
Introduction 
By the time he reached success as a poet and literary critic, T. S. Eliot had 
abandoned any notion of considering himself as a profound philosophical mind.  In his 
“Scylla and Charybdis” (1952), a lecture that he delivered in Nice, France, Eliot claims 
that if he had turned to philosophy rather than switching to poetry, he would have 
attained only a modest position as a philosopher.373 Furthermore, in “To Criticize the 
Critic” (1965), he claims that all that was left of his years of studying philosophy was the 
linguistic style of three philosophers: Bradley’s English, Spinoza’s Latin, and Plato’s 
Greek, with no mention of philosophical influence.374 Despite his statements to the 
contrary, the poet picked up more than linguistic skills from his extensive reading of 
philosophy. That same year, Eliot reflects on his motive for abandoning philosophy as a 
discipline.  Looking back on his earlier philosophical career, Eliot cited the “divorce of 
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philosophy from theology” as the reason for his decision, approximately 37 years earlier, 
to leave philosophy behind as a viable profession.375 While Eliot’s view of philosophy 
may be bleak near the end of his career, the poet’s view of nothingness as generative and 
his path to conversion owe a debt to the old nihilism that he read as a Harvard graduate 
student.       
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate Eliot’s reading of nihilism by 
predominantly using his early letters, prose, and doctoral dissertation to demonstrate a 
strong philosophical foundation. I first acknowledge Eliot’s baptism into the Church of 
England in 1927 and demonstrate that his faith and philosophy are not antagonistic; 
rather, his reading of old nihilism facilitates an eventual return to belief. I then investigate 
Eliot’s understanding of Friedrich Nietzsche, and while elements of the philosopher’s 
dramatic theory seep into Eliot’s own dramas, I show that the poet ultimately rejects 
Nietzschean philosophy and the bleak nihilism of The Will to Power (1901). I then chart 
Eliot’s extensive graduate school reading of Benedict de Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, and 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, each of whom posits a generative view of nothingness 
and a god-like figure of negation that, for Eliot, connects philosophy to faith. To more 
clearly reconstruct Eliot’s reading of old nihilism, I draw upon my research at Cambridge 
University’s Archive Centre and argue that Eliot’s view of empty space, substance, and 
God are indebted to the old nihilistic ideas in Spinoza’s Ethica (1677). Finally, I show 
that Eliot’s dissertation, Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, 
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lays the epistemological foundation for the poet’s formal return to belief in 1927. By 
incorporating Spinozan, Kantian, and Hegelian concepts of the Absolute, utter vacuity, 
and emotion in his project, Eliot builds a system that imagines nothingness as a space for 
creation. In this way, God is never “dead” for Eliot, but hidden, and his understanding of 
old nihilism helps Eliot find the veiled deity. 
Eliot in Context: The Modern Nihil 
T. S. Eliot is no stranger to existential angst, a term that philosophers like Martin 
Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre will develop later in the 20th-century. His tumultuous 
marriage with wife Vivienne is well documented and his personal insecurities surface in 
his poetry as existential concerns. William Irwin, for instance, cites Prufrock’s 
“overwhelming question,” never actually uttered in the poem, as receiving concrete 
verbalization in Sartre’s Nausea (1938). Roquentin’s own question to himself, “Can you 
justify your existence then? Just a little…,” captures the concern driving many of 
Prufrock’s own mantra-like questions of “Do I dare?”376 Although the new nihilism can 
be a consequence of existentialism, the two concepts are not synonymous. Prufrock, for 
instances, shares more qualities in common with an existentialist than a nihilist. While he 
muses that “We have lingered in the chambers of the sea… Till human voices wake us, 
and we drown,” Prufrock does not actively condemn his existence; rather, he laments it. 
Indeed, it seems that many of his existential hang-ups would diminish or evaporate 
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entirely if he would simply “dare.”377 In a 1958 interview with writer Leslie Paul, 
however, Eliot talks explicitly about nihilism and deliberates its trajectory and longevity. 
It seems clear that Paul and Eliot consider nihilism in Nietzschean terms, given 
descriptions like “spiritual desert” that the men use to describe their topic. In response to 
Paul’s question of nihilism as an effective response to cultural deterioration, Eliot states, 
“I don’t think nihilism can be kept up indefinitely. What is the source of refreshment in 
nihilism?  One generation can find satisfaction in expressing nihilism, but where does the 
next generation go on from there?.”378 Given Eliot’s answer that nihilism is doomed to 
fail, his question of new nihilism’s next step does not appear rhetorical; rather, he directly 
criticizes the concept.   
Furthermore, Eliot’s use of “refreshment” in reference to the nihilism that grips 
modernity is significant. By choosing this word to underscore the new nihilism’s fatal 
flaw, he demonstrates that nihilism itself is not necessarily ineffective or problematic.   
Such a mindset might function effectively for a certain amount of time, but a Nietzschean 
interpretation of nihilism is finite and thus a fruitless response to the modern condition.  
His question of “refreshment” resurfaces a few questions later, when Eliot comments on 
the sustainability of the new nihilism. He observes, “… Nihilism would have been 
impossible without the things that nihilism condemned. If the objects of nihilist attack 
disappear, there is nothing left. Nihilism itself disappears with them.”379 Eliot’s statement 
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shows his own value construction and implies that nihilism itself depends on generative 
valuation for its own continued existence. Without creation, even nihilism cannot subsist.  
Even though the new nihilism is difficult to detect and overcome, Eliot’s 
interview answers hint that the poet did just that. When Paul indicates that Eliot actively 
sensed the new nihilism all along, the poet replies, 
 
I never venture to interpret my own poetry, and I would hesitate to make myself a 
prophet. In any case, you see, the prophetic element in poetry very often is 
unconscious in the poet himself. He may be prophesying without knowing it. 
What he absorbs from the atmosphere is not altogether conscious in him.380  
 
 
Although Eliot resists the label of “prophet,” he admits that a poet can perceive elements 
of the zeitgeist, even if passively and unconsciously, and then offer a written vision of 
his/her discernment. Through this statement, Eliot acknowledges his awareness—whether 
conscious or unconscious—of the new nihilistic atmosphere that hovered over 
modernism. This claim is further supported when Eliot mentions an essay by Gottfried 
Benn, a German poet who interestingly discussed the new nihilism recurrently in his 
essays. 381 For the poet, a poem functions as the “release” of “something inside of him 
that needs to come out and be shaped.”382 This “something,” for Eliot, can manifest as 
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“the hopes or the fears, the anxiety or the faith, which he shares unconsciously with the 
rest of humanity or with the rest of his people.”383   
Eliot’s statement implies his observance and awareness of a nihilistic atmosphere, 
and given that awareness, it follows that Eliot would offer a response and even resistance 
to Nietzschean nihilism. Eliot even notes that he wrote on a similar subject in his 1922 
“Marie Lloyd” essay. Here, the poet discusses the degradation of society as it marches 
toward ultimate boredom. He upholds Marie Lloyd as a pinnacle of genuine artistry for 
the masses, and with her passing, the “working man,” will no longer attend the music hall 
and participate in the chorus. He will thus not become part of the performing act in a 
“collaboration” between artist and audience.384 Instead, he will venture to the cinema 
where his mind will be “lulled by continuous senseless music and…will receive listless 
apathy,” thus causing him to lose “interest in his life.”385 This early essay, written around 
the time that Eliot wrote The Waste Land, indicates that his view concerning nihilism 
remains consistent. While he does not mention nihilism by name in “Marie Lloyd,” what 
he describes clearly refers to Nietzschean nihilism, and this statement connects Eliot’s 
early acknowledgement of the problem of nihilism.   
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Philosophy and Faith: Eliot and Anglo-Catholicism 
There is no question that Eliot’s faith strongly guided both his professional and 
personal lives.386 The poet’s first grand public expression of his Christian faith is a 
familiar story. In the summer of 1926, while exploring Rome with his wife, brother, and 
sister-in-law, Eliot visited the Basilica of St. Peter, where he viewed the Pietà for the first 
time.  What the poet did next shocked his entire family: As soon as he laid eyes on the 
statue, he immediately fell to his knees.387 When Eliot was baptized into the Church of 
England less than one year later in June 1927, his friends and the contemporary literary 
scene shared that same astonishment.388 As Ben Lockerd highlights, his contemporaries 
felt disappointed and even betrayed by Eliot’s conversion because his “avant-garde 
poetry” represented the “herald of their modern secular worldview.”389 Virginia Woolf 
sums up this sentiment in a letter to her sister where she laments, “Poor dear Tom Eliot 
… may be called dead to us from this day forward.”390   
Though Eliot’s conversion shocked his friends and colleagues, the poet’s faith 
weighs heavily on his writing, and even more interestingly, his conversion was not as 
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sudden as his friends and family presumed.391  Barry Spurr, for instance, calls Eliot’s 
conversion in 1927 the “culmination of his intellectual, cultural, artistic, spiritual and 
personal development to that point.”392 The seeds of this “culmination” were planted in 
his early childhood, as Spurr highlights, when the young Eliot would accompany Annie 
Dunn to church services. Eliot recalled these memories with fondness years later, where 
he reminisces, “she sometimes took me into the local Catholic Church when she went to 
say her prayers, and I liked it very much: the lights, the coloured statues and paper 
flowers, the lived-in atmosphere, and the fact that the pews had little gates that I could 
swing on.”393 For Spurr, these whimsical childhood experiences helped lay the 
foundation for Eliot’s conversion, which Eliot himself supports through his statement that 
a writer’s art “must be based on the accumulated sensations of the first twenty-one 
years.”394 
While Eliot’s early experiences with Christianity were instrumental to his 
conversion, his study of philosophy proved to be just as important. His graduate learning 
of philosophical systems at Harvard from 1909-1914, as Spurr argues, perhaps even more 
strongly led Eliot toward a path of faith and Anglo-Catholicism.395 Irving Babbit’s 
defense of classicism and Josiah Royce’s “organic nature of the Christian community,” 
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for instance, shaped Eliot’s worldview for years to come.396 For Manju Jain, Eliot’s 
“serious concern [was] with the whole question of the foundation of religious belief and 
its place in a scientific, secular society,” and in Royce’s seminars, the poet found an 
instigator of questions that would trouble his mind for years to come.397 Eliot’s 
connection of philosophy to faith becomes even more clear in his 1917 unsigned review 
of Peter Coffey’s Epistemology in The New Statesman. Here, the poet contends that the 
Catholic Church is “the only Church which can even pretend to maintain a philosophy of 
its own.”398   
Given his early study of philosophy, the argument that Eliot’s conversion began 
as an intellectual and philosophical pursuit is neither surprising nor new. As Lockerd 
notes, many critics have refused to acknowledge Eliot’s belief as genuine, and these same 
critics are equally as reluctant to see the poet’s faith as an influence on his writing.399  
Such criticism, however, evidently neglects to consider an entire facet of Eliot’s 
worldview, which is a grave oversight. My intent is thus to show that philosophy and 
faith need not be mutually exclusive, and that Eliot is an example of this. Although his 
work is perhaps the definitive exercise on Eliot’s faith, Spurr does not mention Spinoza, 
Kant, or Hegel as potential philosophical influences that lead to Eliot’s conversion and 
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shape his consideration of generative nothingness. However, my intent is to show how 
his specific reading of old nihilism both facilitated this return to belief and shaped his 
conception of God. Both of these outcomes allowed the poet to resist the new nihilism in 
favor of a generative view of nothingness and divinity.     
The Philosopher-turned-Poet and Poet-Philosopher: Eliot Reading Nietzsche 
Perhaps it is Eliot’s reading of old nihilism, his generative view of nothingness, 
and latent faith that allows him to apparently so easily dismiss Nietzsche and resist the 
new nihilism. Although the philosopher’s dramatic theory hovers in the background of 
Eliot’s plays, Eliot ultimately views Nietzsche and by extension his nihilism as 
unremarkable.  In the introduction to Charlotte Eliot’s drama Savonarola (1926), Eliot 
passively calls Nietzschean philosophy “a chaotic and immature intellectualism of the 
later nineteenth century,” but his disapproval of Nietzschean philosophy begins at a much 
earlier age.400 By 1909, a young Eliot had discovered the philosophy of Friedrich 
Nietzsche for the first time through his reading of James Huneker’s Egoists: A Book of 
Supermen. Between that year and 1916, he had several opportunities to read and learn 
about Nietzschean existentialism through different media and environments.  Eliot took 
courses while a student at Harvard that examined Nietzsche’s philosophy, with Royce’s 
lectures being the most instrumental; he also studied abroad in Germany on a traveling 
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scholarship in 1914 where he no doubt encountered Nietzschean philosophy.  401    
Furthermore, as he wrote to his mother in 1915, Eliot had already read some Nietzsche 
and planned to read more: “As for the book on Nietzsche [most likely Abraham Wolf’s 
Philosophy of Nietzsche], I have finished it, and now am reading some of Nietzsche’s 
works which I had not read before, and which I ought to read anyhow before my 
examinations.”402  
Early in his studies, Eliot reviewed Huneker’s Egoists: A Book of Supermen 
(1909) for The Harvard Advocate in 1909, which marks Eliot’s first encounter with a text 
that directly examines Nietzsche’s philosophy. 403 The review is short, equaling about one 
page of prose because, as Eliot states, “except in a detailed review, analysis of any of the 
articles which make up this book would be impossible.”404 Huneker, an American 
literary, art, and music critic, published his book in 1909. It includes a series of essays 
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402 T. S. Eliot, The Letters of T. S. Eliot, vol. I, eds. Valerie Eliot, Hugh Haughton, John 
Haffenden (New Haven: Yale University Press), 2011. 132. 
403 Also included in Huneker’s Egoists are Stendhal, Baudelaire, Flaubert, Anatole 
France, Huysmans, Barres, Blake, Ibsen, Stirner, and Ernest Hello.  Considering that 
Huneker doesn’t investigate only philosophers in this book, it is important to consider 
Nietzsche in the context of these other thinkers.  The connection, rather than being 
strictly philosophical, appears to be their advocacy for individualism rather than 
collectivism.  In his review, Eliot states that these men are “highly individual, some of 
perverse and lunary, genius.”   
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that he previously published in an assortment of literary magazines.405 Since Eliot 
initially encountered Nietzschean philosophy through this book, it is possible that 
Huneker’s portrayal of Nietzsche informed the way Eliot would consider Nietzsche as a 
philosopher in general, and thus shape his attitude toward the new nihilism. The language 
that Huneker uses to characterize Nietzsche’s temperament is rather unfavorable. He 
portrays Nietzsche as a “delicate” man who was “more of a poet than an original thinker” 
and a man possessing a “morbidly introspective Hamlet temper.”406 Furthermore, 
Huneker reduces Nietzsche’s philosophy to something “negligible,” and casts The Will to 
Power as having “resolved itself to the Will to Suffer.” He declares: 
 
Compared to [Nietzsche], Schopenhauer’s pessimism is the good-natured 
grumbling of a healthy, witty man with a tremendous vital 
temperament…Headache, eye trouble, and weak stomach, coupled with his abuse 
of intellectual work…colored his philosophy.  The personal bias was inescapable, 
and this bias favoured sickness, not health…His famous injunction ‘Be hard!’ was 
meant for his own unhappy soul, ever nearing…the abyss of black melancholy.407  
 
 
Huneker’s argument essentially reduces the Will to Power to the despondent grievances 
of a wounded man, an attitude that drains the philosophical significance from the text that 
introduced a new nihilism to literary modernism. Furthermore, since this book was likely 
Eliot’s first encounter with Nietzsche, Huneker’s rendering of The Will to Power aligns 
with a thread in Eliot’s poetry that opposes this “will to” and even exhibits a preference 
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for suffering for the sake of atonement. Even in poems like “The Burnt Dancer” and Ash 
Wednesday where suffering plays a key role, Eliot casts such actions in a penitent light in 
which purgation will eventually generate something, even if that something has not yet 
occurred.   
Despite his negative tone concerning Nietzsche’s philosophy, Huneker 
acknowledges that his ideas are frequently distorted. He recognizes that authors, critics, 
and even other philosophers misappropriate and misunderstand Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
Concerning this distortion, Huneker claims:   
 
Nietzsche has become the bugaboo of timid folk…Thanks to the conception of 
some writers, Nietzsche and the Nietzscheans are gigantic brutes, a combination 
of Gengis Khan and Bismark, terrifying apparitions wearing mustachios like 
yataghans, eyes rolling in frenzy, with a philosophy that ranged from pitch-and-
toss to manslaughter and with a consuming atheism as a side attraction.408  
 
  
This wild description of the way Nietzschean philosophy is understood and represented 
by contemporaries lends itself heavily to a nihilistic atmosphere characterized by frenzy 
and godlessness, whether or not that was Nietzsche’s intent. Despite this 
acknowledgement, Huneker’s overall characterization of Nietzschean philosophy casts 
the thinker in a negative light, and Eliot did not indicate that Nietzsche acted as a positive 
influence on his poetry or outlook. The point that Eliot awarded Huneker’s book an 
affirmative review suggests that Eliot perhaps at least passively agreed with Huneker’s 
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appraisal of Nietzsche’s philosophy, a mindset that continues in a later review of a 
Nietzschean-based text. 409  
Eliot’s 1916 review of Abraham Wolf’s The Philosophy of Nietzsche (1915) 
supports the argument that Huneker’s book noticeably influenced the poet’s view of 
Nietzschean philosophy. In his review, Eliot claims that “Nietzsche is one of those 
writers whose philosophy evaporates when detached from its literary qualities,” which 
indicates that he regarded Nietzsche as more of a “literary than philosophical mind.”410  
Through this statement, Eliot’s demonstrates an even more disapproving valuation of 
Nietzsche than in his Egoists review. In Wolf’s words, the book serves as an introduction 
to Nietzsche’s thought and is derived from the substance of a course of three lectures 
delivered by Wolf at the University of London, University College in February 1915.411 It 
is a study that provides a wide and succinct summary of the key elements in Nietzsche’s 
writings, though Wolf himself admits that he provides “broad outlines” of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy rather than extensive analysis or criticism. Because of its introductory ethos, 
Eliot calls the book “slight and unsatisfactory,” neither a guide for beginners nor an 
extensive study for advanced Nietzsche scholars, in a letter to his mother.412 Given the 
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way Wolf situates Nietzsche as a philosophical mind, however, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Eliot criticizes Nietzsche’s talent as a philosopher in his review.   
Like Huneker, Wolf questions Nietzsche’s importance vis a vi the “history of 
philosophy” and questions his uniqueness and adeptness at postulating astute arguments 
and concepts. According to Wolf, as a philosopher, Nietzsche “felt profound discontent 
with the current conceptions of human life and history.”413 While he does not argue that 
Nietzsche’s philosophy ought to be treated as “mad extravagances” and “ominous 
forebodings of the tragic mind that eventually overtook him” as some critics might be 
inclined to say, Wolf’s critical tone regarding followers of Nietzschean philosophy is 
especially biting. He declares that a Nietzschean views his namesake’s writings with 
“extraordinary originality” only because he is “unfamiliar with the history of 
philosophy,” a statement that undermines both Nietzsche as well as supporters of his 
philosophy.414 Despite the triteness of Nietzsche’s own philosophy, Wolf does grant that 
he demonstrates originality in positioning the material of past philosophers and providing 
nuanced views of their work. Considering this, Eliot’s criticism that Nietzsche appears 
more like a literary mind than a philosophical one could be influenced by Wolf’s 
statement. 
Despite the poet’s written disapproval of the philosopher, Eliot’s relationship with 
Nietzsche’s philosophy is on one hand almost nonexistent, but on the other hand, rather 
palpable. As Rafey Habib asserts, connecting Eliot’s study of philosophy to its influence 
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on his texts requires that one first understand the philosophical concepts on their own 
terms.415 While Eliot seems to reject Nietzsche as a philosophical mind, the philosopher’s 
dramatic theory outlined in The Birth of Tragedy appears to inspire Eliot’s own poetic 
drama in his later plays. As Linda Leavell argues, if not for Eliot’s use of Apollonian and 
Dionysian refrains in his plays, his connection with Nietzsche would be “more 
tenuous.”416 An investigation of their dramatic theories, however, shows that social 
harmony is missing from modern society, a concord that needs underlying “myth” in 
order to exist.417 For Leavell, this is an idea that Eliot chases before his conversion 
through The Waste Land (1922) and afterwards via The Idea of a Christian Society 
(1939) and Notes Toward the Definition of Culture (1948).418   
The idea of tragedy is integral to both Eliot and Nietzsche.  For Nietzsche, 
Socrates signifies Greek self-indulgence and departure from myth, a current that ought to 
be resisted in contemporary society. To resolve this loss and navigate back to the right 
stream, Nietzsche suggests a backwards move to tragedy.419 By putting his poetry on the 
wide-reaching stage, Eliot indirectly accepts the social mission of Nietzsche’s 
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challenge.420 This potential Nietzschean influence on Eliot’s outlook highlights the 
necessity of myth in each of their approaches if a cultural amalgamation is to be reached.  
As Leavell remarks, Nietzsche’s myth, while not a call for unity through Christian values, 
nevertheless functions as an integral piece to achieving cultural unity.  She quotes 
Nietzsche from The Birth of Tragedy: 
 
Every culture that has lost myth has lost, by the same token, its natural healthy 
creativity. Only a horizon ringed about with myths can unify a culture. The forces 
of imagination and the Apollonian dream are saved only by myth from 
indiscriminate rambling. The images of myth must be the daemonic guardians, 
ubiquitous but unnoticed, presiding over the growth of the child’s mind and 
interpreting to the mature man his life and struggles.421  
 
 
Leavell’s question of whether Eliot had Nietzsche’s statement in mind when 
characterizing the Guardians from The Cocktail Party is perceptive and can be answered 
in the affirmative. Even if Eliot did not have Nietzsche’s statement directly in mind, its 
spirit is represented through the Guardians, without whom, as Vinod Sena observes, the 
play would “be reduced to nothing.”422 As the ubiquitous forces who further the myth and 
goal of a unified culture, the Guardians “stage-manage” and “pronounce” the play’s 
actions by condensing life’s trajectory to two possible directions. These directions 
demonstrate that one path remains superior to the other insufficient avenue.423 Despite 
these similarities in dramatic method, however, Nietzsche’s philosophical effect on Eliot 
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still appears rather limited and as his interview with Leslie Paul implies Eliot’s 
interaction with Nietzschean nihilism is an understatedly objecting.    
Eliot also appears to glean a theoretical rather than philosophical influence from 
Nietzsche. Gesturing toward the theoretical influence, F.N. Lees notes a possible 
antecedent to Eliot’s objective correlative in The Birth of Tragedy. He cites the following 
passage as evidence:  
 
…we must admit that the import of tragic myth… never became transparent with 
sufficient lucidity to the Greek poets, let alone the Greek philosophers; their 
heroes speak…more superficially than they act; the myth does not at all find its 
adequate objectification [translated from the German adäquate Objectivation].  
The structure of the scenes and the conspicuous images reveal a deeper wisdom 
than the poet himself can put into words and concepts.424 
 
 
The language that Eliot uses to define the objective correlative in “Hamlet and His 
Problems” (1919) shares similarities with Nietzsche’s statement. Specifically, Eliot’s “set 
of objects” and “chain of events” that act as a “formula for a particular emotion” 
similarly reflect Nietzsche’s “scene structure” and “conspicuous images” that expose an 
intense insight. The connection becomes more palpable, as Lees indicates, through 
Nietzsche’s discussion of Hamlet’s pitfalls immediately following the above quote and if 
Francis Golffing’s translation of adäquate Objectivation as “objective correlative” is 
considered.425      
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Eliot’s understanding of metaphysical perceptions also aligns with Nietzsche’s on 
certain occasions. For instance, when considering order and reality, Nietzsche contends 
that “appearance is an arranged and simplified world, at which our practical instincts 
have been at work.”426 Eliot seems to take a similar stance; that is, his criterion for reality 
lies ultimately in social practice.427 More striking still is Eliot’s statement that practical 
reality as a “system of relations,” a consideration that closely mirrors Nietzsche’s idea 
that “the world of appearance is essentially a world of relationships” whose “being is 
essentially different from every point.”428 Finally, perhaps the most potent of these 
similarities concerns the “viewing of reality as comprising the identical references of 
various points of view.”429 Nietzsche states that “the world of ‘phenomena’ is the adapted 
world which we feel to be real.  The ‘reality’ lies in the continual recurrence of identical, 
familiar, related things in their logicized order.”430  
Eliot takes more linguistic cues from Nietzsche in his dissertation. As Habib 
highlights, Eliot echoes Nietzsche’s language in several sections of the project, an 
observation that widens the overlap between these two thinkers. 431 Furthermore, Jewel 
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Spears Brooker notes that Eliot’s view of history, the notion that history involves a 
perception not only of the “pastness of the past, but of its presence” and it is “a sense of 
the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and the temporal together, is 
what makes a writer traditional” derives from Nietzsche’s meditation on the subject.432  
Despite areas of intersection and concession, however, Eliot never admits to fully 
accepting Nietzsche as more than a middling thinker whose literary talents outweigh his 
arguments on common weighty philosophical issues. This lack of influence, though, is 
significant because it serves to further exhibit Eliot’s adoption of an old interaction with 
nihilism rather than one informed by Nietzsche’s Will to Power, a rejection that manifests 
even in his early poetry given the way that Eliot positions the subject of madness.      
 Eliot challenges Nietzschean nihilistic madness in “Prufrock’s Pervigilium” 
(1912), an omitted section of “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” (1915) that Eliot 
most likely copied into his March Hare notebook around 1912.433 In these excluded lines, 
the speaker first closely connects madness to “A blind old drunken man who sings and 
mutters, / With broken boot heels stained in many gutters” whose singing coincides with 
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the “world fall[ing] apart.”434 Here, madness is dissonant: he is inebriated and dirty, his 
singing is subverted by senseless muttering, his boots are useless because they are 
damaged, and he is blind, a stark contrast to Tiresias of The Waste Land who may be 
blind, but possesses a prophetic sight and understanding that can reveal a type of 
resolution. Overall, though, madness here is forlornly ineffectual, which coincides with 
the decay of modern society. This fragmented image of madness incarnate leads to 
Prufrock’s first-person account of despair.  He declares:       
  
I have seen the darkness creep along the wall 
I have heard my Madness chatter before day 
I have seen the world roll up into a ball 
Then suddenly dissolve and fall away.435  
 
 
The repetition of “I have” followed by “seen or heard” imbues Prufrock with an air of 
clairvoyance, even if he does not actually possess prophetic insight. Although Prufrock’s 
description of his vision appears rather bleak, it does not entirely vanish into a nihilistic 
abyss; instead, Eliot’s language evokes a reduction of the subject to nothingness, a 
metaphysical exercise that aims to produce order rather than chaos.   
The madness that Prufrock perceives in these lines is used to reveal something, 
even if he cannot yet perceive that “something.” It is worth noting that, even though he 
perhaps did so under the direction of Conrad Aiken, Eliot chose to omit the only lines in 
“Prufrock” that explicitly address “madness” by name from the poem’s final draft. He 
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does, however, retain the spirit of the line concerning the world “rolled up into a ball” 
and renders it as “Would it have been worth while… / To have squeezed the universe into 
a ball / To roll it towards some overwhelming question.”436 As David Spurr suggests, 
“squeezing the universe into a ball would counteract the world’s tendency to fall apart 
and to spread itself out like yellow fog.”437 While the explicit madness departs from the 
poem, the “squeezing” that offsets it remains intact, which adds to Eliot’s early and 
overall disinclination to accept Nietzschean nihilism as an acceptable philosophical 
reality.  
Something from Nothing: Eliot Reading Spinoza 
While the veil of Nietzsche may linger over Eliot’s dramatic theory and their 
views of reality nearly intersect at certain points, Eliot dismisses Nietzsche as an 
unexceptional philosophical mind. This dismissal coupled with Eliot’s faith in value 
systems, even as a young poet, suggests that he adopts a stance on nihilism that aligns 
closely with philosophers that he admired and read meticulously as a student of 
philosophy rather than a Nietzschean conception. Interestingly, Eliot likely read Spinoza 
and Nietzsche contemporaneously since he studied both of their texts while a graduate 
student at Harvard. Spinoza’s philosophy, however, captures Eliot’s engagement with 
modern nihilism, a reaction that deviates from the Nietzschean casting of the abyss and 
nothingness. It is clear that Eliot was especially familiar with Spinoza’s work; he 
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references Spinoza in his early prose writings such as in “The Development of Leibniz’s 
Monadism” published in The Monist in 1916 as well as a review of Wolf’s biography of 
Spinoza in 1927. 438 This extensive time span shows that Eliot’s interest in Spinoza 
continues at least through the middle of his career. Unlike the disapproving words that 
Eliot wrote in his Nietzsche reviews, he showered Spinoza with overwhelming praise. In 
his review of Spinoza’s biography, Eliot labels Spinoza “a man of the greatest reticence, 
but with nothing to conceal; a man of intensely “private life,” but wholly transparent” as 
well as “unquestionably a hero” and “a symbolic hero of modern Europe.”439     
While Eliot’s view of new nihilism seems clear, I wanted to gain a more intimate 
understanding of Eliot’s grasp on old nihilism. So, while at the King’s College Archive 
Center, I dusted off Eliot’s 1895 copy of Spinoza’s Opera, a book that he likely 
purchased as a graduate student and perhaps even earlier. His edition the Opera contains 
three different treatises, but my interest rested in the philosopher’s magnum opus: the 
Ethica (1677).440 In this five-part treatise, Spinoza intends to demonstrate the truth about 
God, nature, and human existence as well as the chief ideologies of humanity, religion 
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and the “good life.”  Given the frequency of Eliot’s annotations, however, he showed 
most interest in Parts I and II: “Of God” and “Of the Mind,” respectively. These sections 
contain frequent underlining, blocking, and marginalia, a pattern that demonstrates what 
struck Eliot as the essential components of Spinoza’s system: God, substance, negation, 
and existence.441 These components also correspond with Kant’s, Hegel’s and Spinoza’s 
formulations of nihilism, which see the void of creative potential in negativity where new 
nihilism perceives an abyss of fruitlessness. Eliot understands the complexity of 
Spinoza’s philosophy, and he declares in his review of the philosopher’s biography that 
“few people have mastered the Ethics.”442 In a marginal comment on the book’s title 
page, Eliot scribbles in near-illegible French, “Spinoza is difficult…[his] concept of God 
is difficult [to understand]”443 Difficulty aside, my investigation of Eliot’s notes and 
scrawls reveal his solid grasp of Spinoza’s nihilism.       
For Spinoza, the One Substance is an infinite, god-like entity of pure negation, 
and Eliot’s notes show that he recognizes its properties. The first indication of his 
understanding occurs in Proposition VIII of Part I. In this proposition, Spinoza argues 
that “every substance is necessarily infinite,” but since “we cannot infer the existence of 
several substances … it follows that there is only one substance of the same nature.”444 
                                                          
441 Benedictus de Spinoza, Opera, 1895, MS-HB, Box B, Folder 27, The Hayward 
Bequest, King’s College Archive Centre, Cambridge, England.  
442 T. S. Eliot, “Spinoza,” 56. 
443Benedictus de Spinoza, Opera, 1895, MS-HB, Box B, Folder 27, The Hayward 
Bequest, King’s College Archive Centre, Cambridge, England.  
444 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, trans. W.H. White (Wordsworth Editions Limited: 
Ware), 2001. 6. 
 
 
 
166 
 
Eliot’s annotation directly below this proposition shows him actively deciphering this 
riddle; he concludes, “If limited by another substance of the same nature, it would 
coincide with that substance & therefore not be limited; and it cannot be limited by a 
subs. of a different nature.”445 Thus, substance cannot be limited. Next, Eliot blocks off 
the following phrase in Proposition X: “Each particular attribute of the one substance 
[my emphasis] must be conceived through itself.”446 This is Eliot’s only mark on this 
page and it is one of only a few places that Spinoza mentions the One Substance by 
name. For Spinoza, all things flow back into the One Substance, and Eliot’s underlining 
indicates that he understands this idea’s magnitude and it interests him.    
Eliot’s notes also establish his interest in Spinoza’s generative negation, a core 
facet of the philosopher’s nihilism. Under the first note to Proposition VIII, “every 
substance is necessarily infinite,” Eliot scribbled the phrase “all determination is 
negation,” quotes included.447 This phrase comes directly from Hegel’s Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History (1837), a text that Eliot also read in detail, where Hegel 
paraphrases one of Spinoza’s key ideas: his meditation on substance. To claim a thing is 
something is to simultaneously say it is not many other things. This negative approach to 
“determination” permeates Eliot’s poetry as well as his dissertation, and it enables him to 
see nothingness as plentiful.     
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While Eliot pays close attention to Spinoza’s negation, he also shows an interest 
in the philosopher’s view of divinity. In Proposition XV, Spinoza meditates on his idea of 
God.  Eliot blocks off the phrase “without God, nothing can be or be conceived”448 If we 
consider that God and substance are interchangeable for Spinoza, we see Eliot making a 
connection between the One Substance, an entity of infinite generative negativity, and 
existence itself. That is, without the infinitely negative One Substance, nothing can exist.  
In Spinoza’s note to that same proposition, Eliot rather emphatically underlined the 
phrase “qui negant dari vacuum,” roughly translated as “Those who deny the existence of 
a vacuum.”449  In this note, Spinoza denies that an unredeemable abyss of absolute 
nothingness, or a “vacuum,” can possibly exist. He declares, “…there does not exist a 
vacuum in nature…but all parts are bound to come together to prevent it, it follows from 
this that the parts cannot really be distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as 
it is substance cannot be divided.”450 For Spinoza, complete nothingness cannot possibly 
exist; indeed, such a thing is unnatural. It is this divine presence that guides Eliot late into 
his career, including in the Four Quartets. 
Eliot’s interpretation of Spinoza’s “all determination is negation” maxim reflects 
a trend in his writing that identifies nothingness as holding the capacity for creation, a 
disposition that starkly contrasts with Nietzschean nothingness. Indeed, as Altizer claims, 
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rather than the One Substance existing as complete nothingness, Spinoza is instead one of 
the only modern philosophers who does not succumb to the “nihil,” the complete abyss, 
and instead aims to “deconstruct a uniquely modern nothingness.”451 He argues that 
Spinoza, rather than maintaining an abyss filled with nothing, removes the “negativity of 
nothingness” and that he “renders it as divine plentitude.” If so, this seems to concur with 
the “very logic of nihilism,” which is to condense the “something into metaphysically 
nothing and to attempt to have the nothing perform as something.”452 To extrapolate 
further, it appears that Spinoza’s brand of nihilism discussed in the Ethics interprets the 
void and nothingness as having the potential for promoting an Apollonian order that 
contrasts with Nietzsche’s Dionysian chaos instigated by nihilistic tendencies. Given 
Eliot’s reading of Spinoza, it seems fitting that Eliot incorporates images of the abyss that 
align with his philosophical concepts in an effort to keep the Nietzschean, Dionysian 
abyss at bay and at a distance.  
Reason and the Absolute: Eliot Reading Kant 
The connection that Eliot sees between philosophy and faith is even more clear in 
his thoughts on Kant. Like Nietzsche’s and Spinoza’s philosophies, Eliot also 
encountered Kant’s philosophy as a student at Harvard. However, unlike Nietzsche and 
Spinoza, Eliot studied and wrote extensive commentary on Kant’s philosophy, 
metaphysics, ethics, and conception of God. Eliot took a graduate seminar with Charles 
Montague Bakewell on Kant while at Harvard, and the assigned text was The Philosophy 
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of Kant as Contained in Extracts from his Own Writings (1908). 453 This book contains 
selections from each of Kant’s three Critiques—Pure Reason, Practical Reason, and 
Judgment—and Eliot wrote frequent annotations throughout the text. In his 1913 papers 
written for his seminar with Charles Montague, he wrote three papers that interrogate 
Kant’s philosophy and show the poet beginning to consider Kant’s nihilism. This 
consideration is evident in “Report on the Relation of Kant’s Criticism to Agnosticism,” 
where Eliot asserts that “experience is by definition essentially relative; for it is a 
complex relation so organic that, taken as a whole, no element can be separated or wholly 
distinguished from the rest.” Here, Eliot’s idea of an all-encompassing experience 
indicates the notion of an equalizing nihil.454  
Through his reading of Kant’s nihilism, we see a clear connection between 
philosophy and faith. This same essay shows, as Brooker observes, Eliot’s emphasis on 
faith as an “element in epistemology.”455 Eliot declares, “in order to know, we must begin 
with faith, that is to say, the conception of an external relation, a real which is outside of 
ourselves.”456  
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Similarly to his reading of Spinoza’s nihilism, Eliot also considers Kant’s 
depiction of God as an ultimately negating, ultimate reality:  
 
…we have assurance of God’s existence, only by mercilessly plucking him of all 
the qualities which constitute a God, and reducing him to a mere term; whether 
God or not, it is all one. And I cannot see that our “pure practical” knowledge of 
such a God differs at all from our speculative assumption of noumena “behind” 
physical existence, except in so far as we assign priority to the material order.457 
 
 
Here, Eliot equates Kant’s God to a noumenon—a thing that exists independently from 
human perception.  Kant uses “Absolute” and “God” rather synonymously; the Absolute 
is by definition unknowable, but it nevertheless drives existence. As Jain articulates, 
Eliot’s conclusion concerning Kant’s God and Absolute is that the entity exists as a “state 
of nothingness.”458 This inference is clear in his “Report on the Ethics of Kant’s Critique 
of Practical Reason” where Eliot casts Kant’s God as “quite as real as anything else! Not 
this God or that God–but at any moment some God.”459 He continues “All ethical 
questions, and the existence of God, and freedom, depend ultimately on a vague entity 
(felt rather than seen) known variously as common sense, or faith, or response to 
environment; but surely not determinable.”460 In Eliot’s eyes, Kant’s God resembles a 
guiding presence rather than a paternalistic, omnipresent, omnipotent entity.  That this 
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God is “quite as real as anything else” for Eliot shows an early philosophical influence on 
his idea of God, and from this guiding presence, the ordering of existence through 
Kantian categories is possible. Eliot again sees the categories of Kant as regulators of the 
of the natural world’s overall organization.461 This thought is demonstrated in his essay 
“Report on Kantian Categories,” in which Eliot declares that Kant’s categories are “a list 
of ways of thinking about reality.”462 Kant’s categories, which include space, time, 
relation, and quantity, ascribe an order to reality that combined with the nothingness 
allowed by the phenomena/noumena dichotomy shows an old nihilism that is impossible 
according to Nietzsche. Given Eliot’s statement, his alignment with this Kantian nihilism 
shows him brushing the haze of Nietzschean nihilism away from his work.  
The Annihilation of Annihilation: Eliot Reading Hegel 
Perhaps most potently, Eliot garners his understanding of annihilation as 
procreative from Hegel’s nihilism. During Eliot’s undergraduate years, the Harvard 
philosophy department was dominated by the idealism of Hegel.463 Eliot therefore had 
purchased Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History as a student and heavily 
annotated the book with underlining and marginalia.464 As Lyndall Gordon notes, he 
underlined the phrase “Thought ought to govern spiritual reality” on the book’s flyleaf, 
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and in the same place, he questions whether there is any connection between our present 
selves and the past, whether one can argue about anything but the present, and whether 
anything but the present exists. Eliot eventually concludes that the past holds just as 
much reality as the present.465 These are ideas that Eliot interrogates recurrently in his 
poetry, perhaps most explicitly in the Four Quartets (1943). Conceivably more closely 
than Kant’s and Spinoza’s positions, Eliot’s worldview aligns with Hegelian philosophy 
on multiple levels, including the idea that there is only a provisional relationship between 
the “real and the “ideal,” a conclusion that Eliot ultimately derives from Hegel.466 As 
Habib states, Eliot hints at this conclusion in his Kant papers through his reading of 
Plato’s Forms and his rejection of Kant’s distinction between the form and the content of 
experience.467   
Eliot expresses the madness and chaos of Nietzschean nihilism that he absorbed 
from his environment beginning with his March Hare poems, and similarly, Hegel also 
perceives the potential pitfalls of a nihilism that only affords nothingness. The 
philosopher recognized the danger of romantic nihilism and attempted to overcome it by 
showing that the principle of negation did not lead to meaningless and despair.468 Rather, 
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it yielded absolute knowledge and a rational, methodical ethics.469 In his Science of Logic 
(1816), Hegel outlines his view of absolute negativity: 
 
Becoming in essence, its reflective movement, is the movement of nothing to 
nothing, and so back to itself. The transition, or Becoming, sublates itself in its 
transition: that Other which arises in the course of this transition is not the Not-
being of a Being, but the nothingness of a Nothing, and this, to be the negation of 
a nothing, constitutes Being — Being only is as the movement of Nothing to 
Nothing, and as such it is Essence; and Essence does not have this movement 
within it but is this movement, as a being that is itself absolutely illusory, pure 
negativity, which has nothing without it that could negate it, but negates only its 
own negativity, which is only in this negation, which latter is only in this 
negating.470 
 
 
This Hegelian idea of a determination through negation appears in Eliot’s poetry as early 
as the March Hare poems and reemerges through to his late career.   
Eliot’s use of Hegelian nihilism and iterations of negation are clear in the Four 
Quartets, despite the former’s conversion to Christianity and later renunciation of 
philosophy. In “East Coker,” for instance, the speaker meditates on deciphering a deeper 
connection between human existence, nature, and the present moment. He states,   
 
In order to arrive at what you are not  
You must go through the way in which you are not. 
And what you do not know is the only thing you know 
And what you own is what you do not own 
And where you are is where you are not.471 
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Here, Eliot even mimics Hegel’s language in The Science of Logic when he discusses the 
notion of negation and productive self-destruction. 472 The speaker’s negative language 
takes over the lines: both the first and last lines end in “not,” which reveals a beginning 
and an ending that both transpire in nothingness. Furthermore, whenever the speaker 
indicates positive motion, he immediately halts it with more negative language. He states 
that “you must go,” but ends the motion with “not.” The subject may “own,” but the 
speaker instantly takes that ownership away with another “not.” To reach a point where 
meaning and value can be reached, humans must pass through some sort of experience 
where our egos are totally broken down. Through this Hegelian absolute negativity, 
meaning beyond the new nihilism is possible.   
While Eliot may be searching to revitalize his faith during his early years, his 
reading of old nihilism helps him establish a concrete system that values a generative 
nothingness. This view of emptiness aligns rather seamlessly with the thought process of 
a man who sought metaphysical answers in a broken world, a process that ultimately led 
him to passionately profess his faith in front of the Pietà. His early reading of old 
nihilism facilitates Eliot’s “return to belief,” an action that whispers to the reader in his 
dissertation. 
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A “Return to Belief”: Eliot’s Nihilism in “Knowledge and Experience” 
Between 1913 and 1916, Eliot labored to write a doctoral dissertation that he 
would never return from London to defend.473 Originally titled “Experience and the 
Objects of Knowledge in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley,” Eliot’s dissertation focuses on 
F.H. Bradley’s Appearance and Reality (1893), where Bradley argues that most things 
are appearances and describes the reality that these appearances misrepresent. During the 
writing process, Eliot lived as a troubled young man who struggled with existence.   
These haunted feelings also permeate his poetry at the time, the “sanity” of Bradley’s 
explorations saved Eliot from a terrifying sense of intellectual isolation.474 Despite the 
respite that Eliot found in Bradleyan philosophy, however, Bradley’s ideas fail to satisfy 
the poet for a sustained amount of time. It is the specters of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel that 
linger over his dissertation and guide Eliot toward a generative nothingness. The old 
nihilists help Eliot lay the groundwork for what Brazeal asserts is “a foundation [for] a 
return to belief in God” rather than an agenda of “self-torturing and utter nihilism” like 
some contemporaneous interpretations frame the final lines of The Waste Land: that is, a 
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justification for a return to faith despite the lack of any metaphysical substance to prove 
God’s existence.475 Eliot’s desire for what Gordon calls a “higher truth contained in 
moments of lived experience” allows him to pull such ideas from the old nihilists that he 
read as a graduate student and use their systems to find redemption in a seemingly empty 
space. 
In a June 1916 letter, James Woods informs Eliot that the Harvard Philosophy 
Department accepted his dissertation “without the least hesitation,” and that Josiah Royce 
regarded it as “the work as an expert.”476 These favorable comments aside, scholars have 
since debated the exact school of philosophy that Eliot ultimately defends in his 
dissertation. They also debate the many philosophical systems that Eliot uses in his 
dissertation. Childs, for instance, fills the introduction of his study on Eliot’s philosophy 
with the various perceived stances taken in his dissertation, including hermeneutics, 
phenomenology, and existentialism.477 Scholars have contended that the philosophy 
contained in Knowledge and Experience is “so ambiguous” that it perhaps does not even 
effectively treat of its subject’s system of ideas, and it can be “molded to fit any 
philosophical system.”478 Jeffrey Perl adds to this argument and remarks, “by the 
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centennial of his birth, Eliot had been associated with nearly every school or category of 
philosophy with which he could conceivably have been familiar.”479   
This criticism, however, is a boldly relative view of the dissertation that allows 
Eliot the philosopher to overshadow Eliot the modernist poet and critic. As Eliot himself 
admits, he would have made a mediocre philosopher at best. Thus, using his dissertation 
to illuminate his poetry bears fruitful insight into the connection between his brand of 
modernism and his reading of old nihilism, the latter being informed by his extensive 
training in philosophy. As Brooker states, Eliot’s reading of Bradley as well as his 
dissertation are both directly relevant to the type of poetry he was writing at the time.480 
While writing his dissertation, Eliot also worked on revising “The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock,” so it is not surprising that similar metaphysical and epistemological questions 
appear in both texts. If anything is certain for Prufrock, it is that his insecurities are 
immobilizing. Statements like “There will be time… / to murder and create…/ And time 
yet for a hundred indecisions / And for a hundred visions and revisions / Before the 
taking of a toast and tea” as well as “In a minute there is time / For decisions and 
revisions which a minute will reverse” demonstrate the instability not only of Prufrock 
himself but speak to the epistemological uncertainly due in large part to the new 
nihilism’s assertion that “nothing is real.”481 However, something real does exist for 
Prufrock, even if he fails to fully realize it: His desire to act. He spends 131 lines of 
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poetry thinking about “daring” and how he might “dare,” a consideration that continues 
even after seeing the “moment of [his] greatness flicker.”482 Placing value on something, 
even an idea as nondescript as desire, shows Eliot’s unwillingness to accept complete 
nothingness as an accurate characteristic of existence. 
 Despite his own admission otherwise, Eliot does ruminate on the philosophical 
interests that preoccupy Knowledge and Experience in his poetry. Because of this 
connection between his dissertation and poetry, Eliot’s dissertation and the ideas it 
contains serves as a foundational structure for the old nihilism that he will continue to 
develop throughout his career. Broadly, Knowledge and Experience is a study of an 
inquest into the self, and more pointedly, a questioning of whether the possibility exists 
for knowledge to occur outside of one’s self; this question appears in some iteration in 
each volume of Eliot’s poetry up to and including The Waste Land. “The Love Song of J. 
Alfred Prufrock,” for instance, depicts an individual’s self that is unable to initiate 
forward motion due in part to an inability to differentiate reality—that is, true 
knowledge—from assumed but imaginary outcomes. This inquiry is directly related to 
Eliot’s reading of and ultimate siding with the old nihilists; while the new nihilism makes 
it difficult for any concrete knowledge base to exist, old nihilism sees the possibility and 
capitalizes on nothingness. Furthermore, even if Eliot draws from and includes multiple 
philosophical influences in his dissertation, this does not render it an entirely subjective 
and moldable document.   
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Critics have recognized the nihilistic undertones in Eliot’s dissertation, but their 
acknowledgments align Eliot’s claims with the new nihilism rather than a generative old 
nihilism. For instance, Brazeal contends that Eliot’s investigation of Bradley’s 
philosophy contains “frequent nihilistic claims” and that the most central element of 
Eliot’s philosophical system as demonstrated in his dissertation is “annihilation and utter 
night.”483 While the phrase “annihilation and utter night” does on one hand conjure 
images of complete nothingness that could place Eliot’s philosophical system in a new 
nihilistic tradition, his reading of Spinozan nihilism— “all determination is negation”—
suggests that the system presented in his dissertation removes the negativity of 
nothingness and replaces it with plentitude. This, coupled with Kantian “Absolute” and 
transformation and Hegelian annihilation of annihilation mounts a countercurrent against 
the nihilism that Nietzsche foresees in The Will to Power.  
Given Eliot’s language, which uses concepts like “instability” and “dependency” 
to characterize reality, it perhaps appears that he ascribes to a consideration of reality that 
is rooted in nothing but existential meaninglessness, but upon further examination, Eliot 
denies the existence of a total vacuity. The poet admits that his account of objectivity is 
“anything but lucid,” but an investigation of his language points to the following 
concepts. As Spinoza’s conception of the One Substance states, a seeming nothingness 
allows for “divine plentitude” in which the “world of practice” can ascribe its own order 
to reality. Equally as important to Eliot’s dissertation, however, is Spinoza’s view of 
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“total vacuum,” and idea that Eliot heavily marked in his copy of the Ethics. Eliot states, 
“there is an identity which persists, an identity due to which the objectivity is not 
annihilated, but rendered meaningless.  The thing does not cease to exist, it exists in other 
ways.”484 The similarity of Eliot’s language to Spinoza’s is uncanny. Where for Spinoza 
“all parts are bound to come together to prevent it a vacuum,” Eliot sees not the 
disappearance of an object, but a transformation.485 Eliot also appears to borrow this 
transformation from Kant’s stripping down an object to a nonsubstantial void: The 
“thing” in this case is stripped of meaning, but not completely destroyed, so in the wake 
of this “vanishing” comes the opportunity for its utility and rebirth as something else fills 
the void.   
To compound this point, Eliot also makes a similar contention in “Do I know how 
I feel? Do I know how I think?.” The poem’s inconsistent rhyme scheme shows a speaker 
on the cusp of an epistemological truth, but one that he cannot quite ascertain.  Here, the 
speaker states that “A black bag with a pointed beard and tobacco on his breath / …Will 
investigate the cause of death that was also the cause of life.”486 Eliot’s grotesque image 
of the “black bag” is threatening and grimy, and not an expected keeper or investigator of 
weighty concepts like life and death. Nevertheless, this dark figure holds the answer to 
the speaker’s question. This meditation aligns closely with Hegel’s assertion that utter 
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destruction yields ultimate order: that through annihilation, or the “cause of death,” the 
“cause of life” that is regeneration begins. Eliot does not quite reach this conclusion yet, 
but these ideas indicate a foundational return to belief rather than a succumbing to 
meaninglessness.   
Eliot’s interest in generative emptiness becomes clear through his objections to 
Bradleyan philosophy and acceptance of the old nihilist Absolute. He criticizes Bradley 
because the philosopher’s system does not account for true transcendence. Eliot then 
offers an alternative to Bradley that facilitates an object’s transformation: “The alteration 
from error to truth is not a change in the object, but in a change in the whole situation, 
and the object, so far as it is an object, must be admitted to persist as a real object in 
history.”487 This statement is reminiscent of Hegel’s view of history outlined in Lectures 
on the Philosophy of History, where the philosopher casts history as a manifestation of 
the “Geist,” or “Absolute Spirit,” an “essentially and eternally present entity.488 Hegel 
states, “Spirit is immortal; without it there is no past no future, but an essential now.”489 
Furthermore, when connecting the Spirit to what Hegel calls the “Infinite,” nothingness 
becomes essential. He declares, “Nothingness is the principle of all things…all proceeded 
from and returns to Nothingness…To obtain happiness, therefore, man must seek to 
assimilate himself to this principle by continual victories over himself; and for the sake of 
this, do nothing, wish nothing, desire nothing.”490 Hegel’s Geist is a god-like entity of 
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infinite negativity that contains and propels all of reality, something that Bradley fails to 
facilitate. By drawing from his reading of Hegel’s Geist, Eliot shows both the visages of 
a return to belief and a penchant for prolific nothingness. 
The Absolute again appears as a god-like figure for Eliot that enables a generative 
nothingness. For Bradley, the aim of reality is to provide a positive account of the 
Absolute — the ultimate, unconditioned reality as it is in itself, not distorted by 
projection through the conceptual mechanisms of thought. In “The First Debate Between 
Body and Soul,” for instance, Eliot calls upon the Absolute in an almost prayer-like 
fashion to “assist [him] to the pure idea -- / Regarding nature without love or fear” and 
deliver him from “The withered leaves / Of [his] sensations.”491 These lines contain a 
recurring but implicit theme that is central to Eliot’s philosophical and poetic approaches: 
immediate experience, the Hegelian “annihilation of annihilation,” that can only be 
approached through the most refined transcendental inferences. This perhaps defies 
knowledge and practical difference, but nevertheless, has a validity that cannot be denied.  
In the final pages of his dissertation, Eliot professes his interpretation of the Absolute.  
Eliot’s definition shows him applying Kant’s iteration of the idea into his methodology 
rather than a Bradleyan explanation. For Eliot, the Absolute is neither real, unreal, 
imaginary, nor from a practical point of view true or false.  He states:   
 
If I have insisted on the practical (pragmatic?) in the constitution and meaning of 
objects, it is because the practical is a practical metaphysic. And this emphasis 
upon practice – upon the relativity and instrumentality of knowledge – is what 
                                                          
491 T. S. Eliot, “First Debate between Body and Soul” in Inventions of the March Hare: 
Poems, 1909-1917, ed. Christopher Ricks (San Diego: Harcourt Brace), 1998. 65. 
 
 
 
183 
 
impels us towards the Absolute… The Absolute, we find, does not fall 
within any of the classes of objects: it is neither real nor unreal nor imaginary.492  
 
 
Eliot recognizes the Absolute as an ultimately negating, god-like entity. Despite his 
conclusion that the Absolute is “neither real nor imaginary,” Eliot refuses to deny the 
Absolute altogether. Rather, Eliot suggests that we are impelled toward the Absolute 
because it could make a difference to our lives. If knowledge is instrumental, then belief 
in the Absolute might be a very worthwhile practical instrument for us.493 This statement 
contains Kantian echoes but also indicates a sentiment that aligns with Hegelian and 
Spinozan nihilism, which broadly deals with making a type of “objective” reality out of 
subjectivity.  
The backdrop of Eliot’s statement is nothingness, with the “unreal abstractions” 
containing no objective meaning in themselves. The philosophies of Spinoza and Hegel, 
assuming that Hegel extends Spinoza’s response to nihilism, require conditions of 
nothingness for a metaphysical system of significance to occur. For Paul Franks, with 
Spinozan nihilism acting as a “solvent” in which traditional metaphysical systems would 
be dissolved, Hegelian “self-negating negativity” could be actualized by annihilating 
itself and forming a positive response to that nothingness.494 Similarly, Eliot posits a 
reality, while not objective, that teeters on pragmatism and is fashioned from an 
                                                          
492 T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience, 169. 
493 Gregory Brazeal, “The Alleged Pragmatism of T. S. Eliot,” 259. 
494 Paul Franks, “Nothing Comes from Nothing: Judaism, the Orient, and Kabbalah in 
Hegel’s Reception of Spinoza,” The Oxford Handbook to Spinoza, ed. Michael Della 
Rocca (New York: Oxford University Press), 2018. 529. 
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environment that does not contain intrinsic value but can nevertheless be “defended” as 
real due to its meaning to the individual. Even at this basic level, Eliot demonstrates a 
view of what should be done with nothingness that contrasts with new nihilism’s position 
that worth or value is metaphysically unreasonable. 
Still, if epistemological and metaphysical “truths” cannot unconditionally buttress 
the modern reality, then the question becomes, what can? For Eliot, a significant 
component of the answer is “feeling.”495 This is particularly noteworthy considering the 
poet’s warning of the dangers of solipsism, which certain critics accuse him of 
committing.496 Although Eliot admittedly comes dangerously close to succumbing to this 
philosophy given its similarities to the new nihilism, he avoids it in favor of a type of 
relativism. 497 Nevertheless, this then omits the “self” as Eliot’s point of metaphysical 
foundation. Turning back to his dissertation, on one hand, Eliot notes that feeling is “an 
abstraction from anything actual,” but on the other hand, feeling allows the objects from 
which feeling “is differentiated have a kind of union which they themselves did not 
                                                          
495 While the philosophy of feeling and emotion is far too complex to expound in a 
footnote, we may broadly think of “feeling” as a pure (though perhaps fleeting) reflection 
of a particular state of being.  For a more thorough introduction, see Peter Goldie, The 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2010.   
496 While Eliot did not aim to condone solipsism in his dissertation, critics have argued 
that he nevertheless succumbs to its pull.  George Whiteside argues that, although Eliot 
aimed to refute solipsism, “his philosophy led to it…anyway” because it “does not 
establish a world of objects shared by all.” Furthermore, Lyndall Gordon contends that 
Eliot was “more willing than Bradley” to “indulge in solipsistic speculation.” See 
Whiteside, George. “T. S. Eliot’s Dissertation.” ELH 34.3, 1967: 421. JSTOR and 
Gordon, Lyndall. Eliot’s Early Years.  New York: Oxford UP 1977. 51. 
497 A similar skepticism concerning the concrete world can be found in solipsism. 
However, despite the fact that both deny the certainty of objects’ true existence, the 
nihilist would deny the existence of self whereas the solipsist would affirm it 
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account for” and exist as “real objects in the world of objects.”498 This description 
contains whispers of the more fully augmented “objective correlative” that Eliot presents 
in “Hamlet and Its Problems” (1919) that calls for a “set of objects, a situation, a chain of 
events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion” that the poet feels and hopes 
to evoke in the reader. Emotion, in this case, is the foundation of a “reality” with the 
ability to connect with audiences across time and place.  
The validity of emotion is a concept that Eliot meditates on in his March Hare 
poems as well. To return to “Do I know how I feel? Do I know what I think?,” the 
speaker is consumed with epistemological questions of what it means to “know” and 
“exist.” Turning to a porter for potential answers, the speaker asks, “If I questioned him 
with care, would he tell me what I think and feel / --Or only ‘You are the gentleman who 
has lived on the second floor / For a year or more’.”499 The first answer the porter might 
provide could reveal the knowledge that the speaker searches for, while the latter 
provides only a superficial response; it fails to provide enlightenment. However, the 
speaker notes a third potential response from the porter, an answer imbued with a “flash 
of madness” that the speaker “dreads”: “Sir we have seen so much beauty spilled on the 
open street...Or left untasted in villages or stifled in dark chambers / That if we are 
restless on winter nights, who can blame us?.”500 When confronted with the most 
substantial piece of epistemological truth, that is, the squandering of an authentic 
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499  T. S. Eliot, “Do I know how I feel? Do I know how I think?,” 80. 
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existence in the form of untapped or wasted beauty, the speaker reals with fear.  If the 
speaker could overcome his dread and confront the porter’s potential third question, 
however, that “something…slip[ping] just at [his] fingertips” could be grasped and 
unravel his “twisted brain.”501   
For Eliot, the old nihilism of Spinoza and Hegel also accentuates the metaphysical 
strength of emotion. Spinoza investigates emotions in “On Emotion,” the third part of the 
Ethics, and contends that emotions are central to human existence, are intelligible and 
explicable, and that it is more effective to understand and harness emotions than ridicule 
them.502 The “nature and strength” of emotions, for Spinoza, provides foundation for 
cognition, and in a way, reality. Although Eliot’s annotations are less frequent in this part 
of the Ethics, short bursts of underlining and blocking show that he carefully read and 
considered Spinoza’s arguments. Similarly, Hegel also contends that emotions are 
foundational for cognition and reality. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1827-
8), Hegel argues that “feeling is the being for self of the individual soul, so that it is at the 
same time dissolved in its universality…so far that my determinateness is a being, this 
determinacy is feeling.”503 Here, it seems clear that Eliot’s discussion of feeling mimics 
the language of that of Spinoza and Hegel: all three highlight the authenticity of emotion 
and even hint at emotion’s ability to provide a basis for reality to grow.   
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Perhaps even clearer than his use of Spinoza and Hegel, Eliot’s reading of Kant 
connects feeling to transcendence. This enables the poet to combine his latent faith with 
generative nothingness. He writes, “although we cannot know immediate experience 
directly as an object, we can yet arrive at it by inference, and even conclude that it is the 
starting point of our knowing.”504 The Kantian, “transcendental nature” of this 
“inference” becomes apparent when he continues, “immediate experience seems to be in 
one aspect a condition of the conscious subject.”505 For Eliot, in order that thought and 
will “may be possible, feeling must have been given.”506 “Feeling,” which is “self-
transcendent,” appears to be identical to “immediate experience” in Eliot’s argument.507 
Bringing these claims together, for Brazeal, shows that Eliot sees immediate experience 
“as a self-transcending” even in the early state of his dissertation.508 For Kant, when the 
subject transcends, it becomes unknowable and empty. However, this emptiness allows 
the subject to construct an epistemological foundation. Eliot does appear to double back 
and states that he does not know his own feeling better than an outsider.509 Nevertheless, 
                                                          
504 T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience, 19. 
505 T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience, 20. 
506 T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience, 19. 
507 T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience, 21. 
508 Gregory Brazeal, “The Alleged Pragmatism of T. S. Eliot,” 256. 
509 Eliot seems to abandon feeling as an adequate foundation for reality in The Waste 
Land. While he still views feelings as actual experiences, feelings can isolate an 
individual from the collective. This is most evident in the following lines from “What the 
Thunder Said”:  
 
Dayadhvam: I have heard the key 
Turn in the door once and turn once only 
We think of the key, each in his prison 
Thinking of the key, each confirms a prison 
Only at nightfall, aethereal rumours 
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by using “feeling” as even an unsteady or underdeveloped underpinning on which 
humans can build a reality, Eliot resists the proverbial nothingness of the new nihilism 
and the anguish it brings. 510 
Finally, in his dissertation’s conclusion, Eliot ultimately criticizes the limitations 
of all metaphysical systems. Speaking specifically of Bradley, Eliot states:  
 
To the builder of the future system, the identity binding together the appearance 
and the reality is evident; to anyone outside the system it is not evident.  To the 
builder of the process is the process of reality, for thought and reality are one; to a 
critic, the process is perhaps only the process of the builder’s thought.  From the 
critic’s standpoint the metaphysician’s world may be real only as a child’s bogey 
is real…Metaphysical systems are condemned to go up like a rocket and come 
down like a stick.511  
 
 
Echoing the formulation that he proposed in his Kant papers, Eliot, as Habib states, 
insists that any criterion for an ultimate truth rests on an act of faith.512 Eliot pushes this 
criticism further and directly connects it to nihilism, stating that “The virtue of 
metaphysical analysis is in showing the destructibility of everything…In analyzing 
knowledge, we merely reduce the fact that knowledge is comprised of ingredients which 
are themselves neither known nor cognitive, but which melt into the whole which we call 
                                                          
Revive for a moment a broken Coriolanus (412-417) 
 
His footnote to these lines cites Bradley’s discussion of feeling in Appearance and 
Reality where the philosopher calls feelings “peculiar and private” to an individual 
“soul.” 
510 T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience, 3. 
511 T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience, 167-168. 
512 Rafey Habib, 144. 
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experience.”513 Even though Eliot criticizes metaphysical systems, he can still resist a the 
new nihilism; to be critical of metaphysics as a branch of philosophy is not to condemn 
oneself to the abyss by default. 
Conclusion 
While Eliot does not accept Bradley’s vision of the Absolute because it aims to 
answer metaphysical troubles with metaphysics, his dissertation directs towards a return 
to belief that will continue to develop through his career. By ultimately rejecting 
Nietzsche’s philosophy in both his poetry and philosophical ideology and employing the 
responses to nihilism proposed by Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel contained in his dissertation, 
Eliot lays the foundation for a disposition that does not become consumed by unmitigated 
nothingness. The problem presented by Eliot in his dissertation was his own: should he 
live like a visionary in a dangerous space between two worlds and court madness, or fall 
back into the net of the material world, risk his gift for sublime knowledge, and live 
enmeshed in it artificial customs and beliefs?514 Additionally, it is significant that 
Nietzsche read all three of the discussed philosophers; he wrote detailed responses to 
each of their ideas; and even expressed admiration for Spinoza and Hegel.515 Given this 
                                                          
513 T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience, 157. 
514 Lyndall Gordon, T. S. Eliot: An Imperfect Life, 75-76. 
515 In a postcard to Franz Overbeck dated July 30, 1881, Nietzsche says this about 
Spinoza: “I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted! I have a precursor, and what a 
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dialectic from his Phenomenology of Spirit is considered by many scholars to be a man 
influence of Nietzsche’s master/slave morality, and though Nietzsche’s reaction to Kant 
is rather harsh, some scholars argue that the two philosophers occupy the same 
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familiarity, it seems that Nietzsche’s deviation from an “old” nihilism was deliberate; 
while he may not have intended to obscure the term’s true meaning, he did perhaps 
consider his definition more fitting for the modern condition. Similarly, Eliot’s deviation 
from the nihilism that surrounded the modernist landscape was also deliberate. Through 
his reading of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel and an adoption of their “old nihilism,” a 
foundation that is firmly established in Knowledge and Experience, Eliot finds the 
language to interrogate the Dionysian abyss from a traditionally Apollonian standpoint 
that he deploys in his poetry
                                                          
conception of moral autonomy.  See Sokoloff, William W. “Nietzsche's Radicalization of 
Kant.” Polity 38.4, 2006. 501–518.  
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CHAPTER VI 
  
“NEITHER PLENTITUDE NOR VACANCY:” T. S. ELIOT, ABSOLUTE 
NEGATION, AND THE GENERATIVE VOID
 
  
O dark dark dark. They all go into the dark, 
The vacant interstellar spaces, the vacant into the vacant, 
The captains, merchant bankers, eminent men of letters, 
The generous patrons of art, the statesmen and the rulers, 
Distinguished civil servants, chairmen of many committees, 
Industrial lords and petty contractors, all go into the dark, 
—T. S. Eliot, “East Coker” 
 
 
Introduction 
“There is a difference,” T. S. Eliot declares, “between philosophical belief and 
poetic assent.”516 To elucidate this contention, Eliot recommends that when reading The 
Divine Comedy, for instance, 
 
You are not called upon to believe what Dante believed . . . but you are called 
upon more and more to understand it. If you can read poetry as poetry, you will 
‘believe’ in Dante’s theology exactly as you believe in the physical reality of his 
journey; that is, you suspend both belief and disbelief.517 
 
 
The notion of “reading poetry as poetry” as Eliot suggests is a perceptive one. If applied 
to his own poetry, for instance, Eliot’s theology can be separated from the words he 
writes and this opens a space for discussing his philosophical influences, like the 
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philosophies of old nihilism that he read while a graduate student at Harvard. It is 
undeniable, though, that Eliot demonstrates a penchant for order and value construction 
in his poetry that is guided by his Christianity, including a use of the via negativa.  
Furthermore, while he acknowledges that Eliot wrote during a time when the new 
nihilism was impossible to ignore, Miller gives Eliot’s commitment to Christianity as the 
reason for the poet’s ordered reality that manifests in Ash Wednesday (1930) and the 
Four Quartets (1943) as well as his later plays. 518 Indeed, Miller argues that Eliot’s 
experience is “genuinely Christian” in his later career, and he fails to acknowledge Eliot’s 
reading of old nihilism as a viable influence on his poetry.519 Although Eliot’s Christian 
faith unquestionably contributes to his vision of an ordered reality, I argue that it is only a 
piece of the puzzle and does not fully account for the deliberate, methodical discussions 
of generative nothingness that Eliot labors to articulate in the poems that Miller 
highlights.   
In this chapter, I show that Eliot’s reading of old nihilism enables him to 
reimagine images of prolific nothingness for a modern audience. I investigate images of 
stillness, silence, “betweenness,” and emptiness in Eliot’s poetry and argue that they are 
all manifestations of a generative void, iterations of which are all present in the old 
nihilism of Benedict de Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, and Georg W. F. Hegel. To do this, I 
                                                          
518 In his introduction to Poets of Reality, Miller acknowledges the profound effect of 
Nietzsche’s “Death of God” on literary modernism. Eliot’s own response to and 
overcoming of nihilism, for Miller, is his realization that “the Incarnation is here and 
now.” 
519 J. Hillis Miller, Poets of Reality, 179. 
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first examine both the “abyss” and the “void” and show that Eliot indeed conceives of 
nothingness as a void. I then demonstrate the evolution of Eliot’s generative void 
beginning with his March Hare poems, continuing to The Hollow Men (1925) and Ash 
Wednesday (1930), and ending with the Four Quartets (1943). Considering Eliot’s 
consistent use of nothingness as a space for creation, I argue that he applies Spinoza’s 
Principle of Plentitude and One Substance, Kant’s reduction of the subject into a 
nonsubstantial void, and Hegel’s annihilation of annihilation to reach an ultimately 
empty, ultimately generative “still point.” Through this still point, Eliot then infuses the 
void with creative capacity, an objective that he meets in the Four Quartets.   
More Than Faith: Eliot’s Generative Void 
The idea that Eliot discusses images of the “void” in his writing is not a new 
observation. However, the connection between Eliot’s void and the generative 
nothingness of old nihilism has been noticeably overlooked. Eloise Hay pinpoints the 
“Buddhist peace of negation and emptiness” in “Silence,” for instance, as “more real” to 
the poet than a Christian serenity, even though that peace “terrified” him at the time.520  
For Childs, on the other hand, Eliot’s appreciation of the void is best explained through 
Christian mysticism.521 It seems that even the poet himself backs up this claim.  In a 
February 1929 letter to Paul Elmer Moore, Eliot’s spiritual leader, he reveals, “I am one 
those whose sense of void tends to drive toward asceticism or sensuality, and only 
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Christianity helps to reconcile me to life which is otherwise disgusting.”522 To be ascetic, 
one must practice self-denial, a type of emptying or negation, and Eliot’s faith 
undoubtedly shaped his poetry and the images therein. While Eliot credits his faith with 
moderating his spiritual life and conception of the void, his statement fails to explain the 
presence of generative nothingness in his poetry. For this nothingness, we must look to 
his reading of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel and consider the way that he renders their 
something-from-nothing- philosophies. As argued previously, Eliot’s early reading of 
philosophy helped facilitate his official return to belief in 1927, so the connection 
between faith and philosophy is not so stark for the poet. Iterations of the generative void 
appear continuously throughout Eliot’s poetry, beginning as early as his March Hare 
poems and continuing through to the Four Quartets.   
To understand Eliot’s generative void, we must first investigate its opposing 
force: the Dionysian abyss of new nihilism. Eliot references the abyss in his 1933 lecture 
on Matthew Arnold, where he states, “At bottom: that is a great way down; the bottom is 
the bottom. At the bottom of the abyss is what few ever see, and what those cannot bear 
to look at for long; and it is not a ‘criticism of life’.”523 For Eliot, the abyss appears 
clearly Nietzschean: It is threatening and unbearable but for a short time. Just as scholars 
cast nihilism as an intricate, multi-layered concept, they also consider the abyss to be 
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equally nebulous. Iterations of the abyss, (or abgrund) are perhaps just as contentious 
even within Nietzsche’s own writings.524 Nietzsche discusses the abyss in several of his 
texts, including The Birth of Tragedy (1872), The Gay Science (1882), and The Will to 
Power (1901). In The Will to Power, Nietzsche calls “the Will to Power” itself an 
abgrund, “the groundless chaos beneath all the grounds, all the foundations,” an entity 
that leaves “the whole order of essences groundless.” 525 Furthermore, according to 
Nietzsche, the abyss shares properties with the Dionysian, which he continuously defines 
as “an abysmal loss of self,” a completely imageless space, and what John Sallis calls a 
fundamentally contradictory level of existence, since it is both at the core of human 
existence while it simultaneously annihilates any sense of humanity’s importance 
altogether.526   
Nietzsche uses a labyrinth to symbolize the abyss of nihilism. This rhetorical 
choice adds shape to the amorphous properties of this enigmatic space, and as Adrian Del 
Caro observes, Nietzsche’s elucidation is most evident in Beyond Good and Evil (1886), 
                                                          
524 Leading nihilism scholar Shane Weller discusses the complexities of nihilism in 
Literature, Philosophy, Nihilism: The Uncanniest of Guests (2008) and nihilism’s 
relationship to modernism in Modernism and Nihilism (2011).  
525 The “will to power” describes what Nietzsche may have believed to be the main 
driving force in humans – achievement, ambition, and the striving to reach the highest 
possible position in life. These are all manifestations of the will to power; however, the 
concept was never systematically defined in Nietzsche's work, leaving its interpretation 
open to debate.  See Clark, Maudemarie, 1990. Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP; Alfonso Lingus, “The Will to Power,” in The New Nietzsche, 
ed. D.B. Allison (New York: Dell Publishing) 1977. 150. 
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196 
 
aphorism 295.527 In this aphorism, Nietzsche imagines a conversation between himself 
and Dionysus, the “tempter-god” with a “halcyon smile” and Ariadne, a silent, external 
listener. Speaking as Dionysus, Nietzsche reveals the god’s relationship with the nihilistic 
labyrinth-abyss:  
 
‘Under certain circumstances I love mankind’—and referred thereby to Ariadne, 
who was present; ‘in my opinion man is an agreeable, brave, inventive animal, 
that has not his equal upon earth, he makes his way even through all labyrinths. I 
like man, and often think how I can still further advance him, and make him 
stronger, more evil, and more profound’.528 
 
 
If Dionysus acts as a “tempter” in this aphorism, then Ariadne symbolizes humanity 
groping their way through the deep, dark, disordered labyrinth. As Del Caro states, 
Dionysus, as a guide-like figure, entices the individual to the edge of the abyss, and at 
that edge, self-overcoming becomes possible.529 Despite the abyss perhaps indirectly 
yielding self-overcoming in Nietzsche’s anecdote, it is important to note that the journey 
to the threshold rather than the abyss itself is responsible for that affirmative outcome.  
The abyss, like the Minotaur’s labyrinth, remains just as empty, sinister, and chaotic as 
ever. Sallis takes this one step further and calls the abyss a direct result of the Dionysian, 
which he argues “reveals not ground but the dissolution of ground and determination.”530 
Like Nietzsche, Eliot also demonstrates a desire for both a self and cultural overcoming 
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2004. 176. 
528 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern (New York: 
Macmillan), 1907. 263. 
529 Adrian Del Caro, Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric, 75. 
530 John Sallis, Crossings, 58. 
 
 
 
197 
 
in his work, but his consideration of the abyss imbues it with Apollonian, generative 
qualities that more closely resemble an old nihilistic void than the entity that both allures 
and alarms Nietzsche.  
The Apollonian, conversely, responds to the Dionysian through the emergence of 
images and forms, as a type of every-day state. The Apollonian is a way to cope with the 
despair felt in face of the Dionysian, what Nietzsche calls “the terrors and horrors of 
existence.”531 An individual’s existence is asserted by means of the Apollonian and 
because of this mode, he/she is capable of contemplation, order, and the creation of 
images.532 For Sallis, beautiful images serve as “transfiguring mirrors in which one 
appears to oneself more perfect, more complete” and “shining in a higher truth.”533 In 
other words, in the Apollonian image “one is given a measure by which to measure 
oneself, a measure by which to draw around oneself the limits of an individuality, even 
one never entirely measures up to it.”534 Such truth can cover over the abysmal Dionysian 
truth but can never cease to be threatened by it.535 This understanding of the 
Apollonian—a channel for reaching a “higher truth” and “self-knowledge” as well as 
forcing the Dionysian into remission—describes Eliot’s pursuit of order and value in his 
poetry. Scholars like Leavell identify the Apollonian/Dionysian dichotomy in Eliot’s 
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drama, Murder at the Cathedral particularly, and Douglas Burnham calls attention to 
echoes of The Birth of Tragedy in The Waste Land—that is, the depiction of a culture in 
decline.536 Given these similarities, it is reasonable to see this dichotomy and ultimate 
preference for the Apollonian at work in Eliot’s poetry. 
While the Apollonian is not an abyss itself, this mode can interpret the abyss as 
something other than chaos and emptiness. As Gillespie argues, if, according to 
Nietzsche, the abyss is yet another manifestation of the Dionysian, the Apollonian 
interpretation of this revelation creates distance from the Dionysian abyss that allows 
individuals to view it without being consumed by it.537 In this way, the abyss is still real, 
but the Apollonian defends against it, places it at a distance, and makes it bearable and 
even beautiful, which provides a way back into everyday experience and 
understanding.538 Furthermore, the philosophical and theological definitions of an 
“abyss” cast it as a bottomless chasm, an endless pit, a primeval chaos that is all 
encompassing, and this characterization aligns closely with the Dionysian abyss of 
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy.  
Alternatively, a void is an empty space, a place that has not yet been occupied or 
filled; this allows for the possibility of generation, a property that the abyss does not 
possess. Kant, Spinoza, and Hegel all envision a generative nihilism that stems from an 
act of something-from-nothing. For Kant it is a metaphysical evaporation of the world, 
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and for Spinoza, a removal of the negativity of nothingness. By extension, Hegel’s 
annihilation of annihilation and a subsequent recognition of negation is where growth 
occurs. By implementing an Apollonian mode, Eliot forces an order, design, and creation 
onto his poetry. Thus, he envisions the abyss in a fashion that more closely resembles the 
void of old nihilism rather than the disconcerting entity that Nietzsche illustrates in The 
Birth of Tragedy.   
Eliot’s Apollonian response to the Dionysian abyss reconceives the abyss as a 
void, which, while empty, is capable of generation. This claim, however, is perhaps 
ostensibly complicated in Murder at the Cathedral (1935), where Eliot calls out “the 
void” by name. Regardless of his meditation on the subject and use of the particular 
terminology, this “void” has more in common with the Dionysian abyss of new nihilism 
rather than an old nihilistic void that holds the possibility of design. While considering 
death’s shadow and martyrdom’s replenishment, the women of Canterbury who make up 
the Chorus face a darkness more foreboding than death: 
 
…behind the Judgement the Void, more horrid than active 
 shapes of hell; Emptiness, absence, separation from God;  
The horror of the effortless journey, to the empty land  
Which is no land, on the emptiness, absence, the Void,  
Where those who were men can no longer turn the mind  
To distraction, delusion, escape into dream…  
For there are no objects, no tones…to divert the soul  
From seeing itself, foully united forever, nothing with nothing.539 
 
 
                                                          
539 T. S. Eliot, Murder at the Cathedral in The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 
(San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), 1980. 210. 
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Eliot’s intent here, argues John Brenkman, is to “project the modern, Pascalian terror of 
nothingness” onto the medieval peasants.540 While Pascal’s theistic fear of nothingness is 
present in these lines, Linda Leavell perceptively highlights that Eliot’s intended 
audience here is demonstrably Christian.541 If, however, we read the Chorus’s chant in a 
philosophical rather than a theological light, Eliot’s language is rather similar to 
Nietzsche’s characterization of a Dionysian abyss, demonstrated through words like 
“terror,” “horrid,” and “hell.” Eliot, perhaps even unintentionally, calls attention to the 
hazards that new nihilism poses to modern society through these similarities in language.  
These hazards, as David Harvey remarks, explain the “troubled and fluctuating aesthetic 
response to conditions of modernity produced by a particular process of modernization” 
(98).542 The “empty spaces” in Eliot’s poetry therefore share properties of a void rather 
than an abyss. The poet meditates on this void as early in his career as 1910 when he was 
only writing in his March Hare notebook.  
                                                          
540Approximately three years earlier in 1932, Eliot published his essay on Pascal’s 
Pensées.  He seemed to have the fragments in mind as he wrote Murder at the Cathedral.   
This appears to be the passage that inspired Eliot’s Chorus: “He who regards himself in 
this light will be afraid of himself, and observing himself sustained in the body given him 
by nature between those two abysses of the Infinite and Nothing, will tremble at the sight 
of these marvels; and I think that, as his curiosity changes into admiration, he will be 
more disposed to contemplate them in silence than to examine them with presumption. 
For in fact what is man in nature? A Nothing in comparison with the Infinite, an All in 
comparison with the Nothing, a mean between nothing and everything. Since he is 
infinitely removed from comprehending the extremes, the end of things and their 
beginning are hopelessly hidden from him in an impenetrable secret; he is equally 
incapable of seeing the Nothing from which he was made, and the Infinite in which he is 
swallowed up” (sect. II, 72). 
541 John Brenkman, “Wrestling with (my God!) my God”: Modernism, Nihilism, and 
Belief, Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences 21, vol. 2 (2013): 112. 
542 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of 
Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell), 1990. 98. 
 
 
 
201 
 
Stillness and Silence: The Early Generative Void in the March Hare 
Eliot begins experimenting with the generative void early in his career as a 
philosophy student at Harvard.   We see glimmers of such a void in his March Hare 
poems, perhaps most clearly in “Silence” (1910), “Bacchus and Ariadne” (1911), and “In 
silent corridors of death” (undated).543 In these poems, Eliot recognizes the sublime terror 
of the Dionysian abyss and already shows an unwillingness to be overcome by it. It is 
important to remark that this early resistance predates his formal embrace of Christianity 
by over a decade and continues after it.   
The year 1909 marks a shift in Eliot’s thinking, as he abandons “morning flowers 
and flowers of yesterday” of “Before Morning” in favor of stylistically experimental lines 
informed by French symbolism and meditations on suffering, temporality, and existence.  
The title’s allusion to Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland implies a 
wasteful stillness: the March Hare feels compelled to behave as if it’s perpetually tea-
time, stuck in an abyss of apocalyptic circularity because the Mad Hatter “murdered the 
time.”544 While the Cheshire Cat’s declaration that “we’re all mad here” evokes emotions 
more closely associated with the abyss, themes and images present in “Silence,” 
“Bacchus and Ariadne,” and “In silent corridors of death” establish a move away from 
such a philosophical system in favor of a particularly old conception of nihilism and the 
                                                          
543 I ordered these poems chronologically for the sake of continuity, not necessarily 
because their order beyond “Silence” is important to Eliot’s evolving conception of the 
generative void.  
544 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 29. 
 
 
 
202 
 
void. 545 Through an annihilation that removes the “negativity of nothingness” and instead 
“renders it as divine plentitude,” Eliot begins to pose an ordered reality that emerges from 
a reclaiming of the abyss of new nihilism. 
Eliot’s initial representation of the generative void occurs in “Silence” as a 
sublime, still quietness that immobilizes the poet. As critics have observed, this poem 
narrates what is perhaps Eliot’s first encounter with what he later will call a mystical 
experience, the “kind of unexplainable experience which many of us have had, once or 
twice in our lives, and been unable to put into words.”546  The poem is set in the middle 
of a city, perhaps at rush hour or another busy time. For Lyndall Gordon, this poem 
represents Eliot’s “most lucid description of a timeless moment,” and narrates an instant 
when Eliot was walking along the streets of Boston and experienced, what he later 
described as “either a communion with the Divine or a temporary crystallization of the 
mind” that froze him in place and plunged him into a profound, peculiar quietness.547 The 
speaker reveals his experience: 
 
Along the city streets, 
It is still high tide, 
Yet the garrulous waves of life 
Shrink and divide 
With a thousand incidents 
Vexed and debated:— 
This is the hour for which we waited— 
 
                                                          
545 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 26. 
546 T. S. Eliot, “The Significance of Charles Williams,” in The Complete Prose of T. S. 
Eliot: The Critical Edition: The War Years, 1940−1946, eds. David E. Chinitz, and 
Ronald Schuchard (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 2017. 775. 
547 Lyndall Gordon, T. S. Eliot: An Imperfect Life, 23. 
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This is the ultimate hour 
When life is justified. 
The seas of experience 
That were so broad and deep, 
So immediate and steep, 
Are suddenly still. 
You may say what you will, 
At such peace I am terrified. 
There is nothing else beside.548 
 
 
The first line of the poem appears to depict a rather typical day; the speaker views the 
“city streets,” which are not described in detail, and do not receive explicit physical 
attention for the remainder of the poem. The “shrinking and dividing” of the “garrulous 
waves of life” mimic the poem’s form, with its consistent rhythm and rhyme scheme 
acting like waves lulling the poem into a revelation of sublimity and alarm by the poem’s 
close.   However, the “profound” but “peculiar” quietness that dominates the poem is 
strangely is immobilizing, and fully grips the speaker in its embrace. Here, Eliot draws 
directly from Kant’s definition of the sublime. Since the poet read all three Critiques as a 
student, we can assume that Eliot was familiar with Kant’s description of the sublime as 
an entity that incites terror in the human subject, but through that terror, yields revelation 
and transcendence.   
Through the peculiar, petrifying stillness, Eliot connects the generative void with 
sublime revelation. The speaker repeats the word “still” twice: once in reference to “high 
tide” and again concerning the “seas of experience.” Interestingly, Eliot places the word 
                                                          
548 T. S. Eliot, “Silence,” in Inventions of the March Hare: Poems, 1909-1917, ed. 
Christopher Ricks (San Diego: Harcourt Brace), 1998. 18. 
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“still” in close proximity to phrases that describe a most unstill entity: The ocean. This 
juxtaposition renders the chaotic, ever-moving ocean as powerless against the existential 
stillness that has the ability to halt its motion. While “stillness” is often interpreted as 
events of calm and tranquility, the speaker claims to be “terrified” at the “peace” he feels.  
This eliminates the possibility for a purely serene stillness. Instead, this framing of the 
concept of stillness implies nothingness; that is, if a thing is “still,” it is unmoving, 
unanimated, and even aimless. However, rather than succumbing to this abyss of 
motionlessness, the speaker calls it “the hour for which we waited.” The collective “we” 
shows that this revelation effects not only him, but perhaps the whole modern landscape.   
Specifically, his removing the nothingness’s unconstructiveness, and ascribing the feature 
of abundance to it, as Cunningham argues, uses nothing as a metaphysical tool out of 
which “something” generates. For the speaker in “Silence,” something indeed does 
emerge from the stillness: a sublime event, the “ultimate hour / When life is justified.” 
While Eliot does not say what the stillness reveals, this sublime, generative void divulges 
something, and this “something” is profound. 
While Eliot illustrates the revelatory properties of stillness in “Silence,” the poet 
adds a transformative capacity to the generative void in “Bacchus and Ariadne: 2nd 
Debate between the Body and Soul” (1911). Rather than eliciting a “terrifying peace,” 
Eliot’s silence in this poem shows a space that directly facilitates a progressing change in 
condition. Interestingly, this poem’s first title bears a striking resemblance to Nietzsche’s 
anecdote in Beyond Good and Evil that casts Dionysus as the tempter who leads 
humanity to the abyss’s precipice. For Gordon, “Bacchus and Ariadne” shows Eliot’s 
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movement toward a religious and specifically Christian disposition that pushes beyond 
the unresolved spirituality of “Silence.”549 However, this poem can be read through a 
philosophical lens given Eliot’s thorough and contemporaneous reading of Kant’s, 
Spinoza’s, and Hegel’s old nihilism while writing his March Hare poems. The speaker 
describes “a ring of silence” that “closes around [him] and annuls / These sudden insights 
that have marched across / Like railway-engines over desert planes.”550 The silence here 
acts as a barrier between the speaker and the noise of the outside “drums of life” that 
threaten to “break like waves” on his “skull,” as they ultimately shattered the lives of 
other individuals alluded to in the poem.551 It is the soul that experiences a change in this 
poem due to the silence’s protective embrace.552 Therefore, a generative, transformative 
void in the poem’s busy midst effectively deflects the chaos of the “drums” and “floods 
of life.” In this instance, something “pure” is growing from the void that the silence 
cultivates:  
 
Not to set free the purity that clings   
To the cautious midnight of its chrysalis 
Lies in its cell and meditates on its wings 
Nourished in earth and stimulated by manure.553 
 
 
 
                                                          
549 Lyndall Gordon, T. S. Eliot: An Imperfect Life, 61. 
550 T. S. Eliot, “Bacchus and Ariadne: 2nd Debate between the Body and Soul,” in 
Inventions of the March Hare: Poems, 1909-1917, ed. Christopher Ricks (San Diego: 
Harcourt Brace), 1998. 68. 
551 T. S. Eliot, “Bacchus and Ariadne,” 68. 
552 Lyndall Gordon, T. S. Eliot: An Imperfect Life, 56. 
553 T. S. Eliot, “Bacchus and Ariadne,” 68. 
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The soul hangs in a transformative “chrysalis.” The void of silence encloses it in a 
generative sheath that implies metamorphosis; this transformation is made possible by 
silence’s nurturing power. As Gordon observes, the soul longs to “unfurl its purity” but 
remains in its cocoon because it is “fearful that it will miss its moment of birth due to 
excessive caution.”554 Because of silence’s ability to repel the poem’s piercing clamor, 
something beautiful is conceivable, if not actualized yet. In this poem, Eliot has thus 
expanded his conception of the generative void: Through silence, the void functions as a 
protective barrier and a space for creation.  
Eliot also hints that the void must first be completely emptied before it can foster 
creation. More like a poetic exercise than a finished piece, the undated “In silent corridors 
of death” shows Eliot developing the language of negation that he will use more 
viscerally in The Hollow Men and the Four Quartets. This exercise begins and ends in 
death, the ultimate metaphysical nothingness. However, the speaker’s rendering of 
“death” is complex and rather than signifying utter despair and darkness, it possesses 
pleasing qualities. The speaker meditates, 
 
In silent corridors of death  
Short sighs and stifled breath,  
Short breath and silent sighing;  
Somewhere the soul crying.  
And I wander alone  
Without haste without hope without fear  
Without pressure or touch —  
There is no moan  
Of Souls dying  
Nothing here  
                                                          
554 Lyndall Gordon, T. S. Eliot: An Imperfect Life, 56. 
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But the warm  
Dry airless sweet scent  
Of the alleys of death  
Of the corridors of death555 
 
 
Eliot begins the exercise in rhyming couplets, only to break that scheme in the fifth line.  
The couplets’ quick pace and “short sighs” immediately slow with the speaker 
“wandering alone” in the next image. This slowing reflects the vastness of death, or 
nothingness, which the speaker navigates “without haste.” More significantly, however, 
Eliot employs Spinoza’s maxim that “all determination is negation” to characterize his 
response to the void through which he walks. The speaker eliminates “haste,” “hope,” 
and “fear” from his being and even appears to lose his bodily senses of “pressure and 
touch.” In effect, he reduces himself to a type of “nothing” to better understand the void’s 
nothingness.  Interestingly, this space contains nothing, not even a “moan” of a “dying 
soul.” However, the speaker senses a “sweet scent,” the only discernable characteristic of 
this void. Here, Eliot indicates that the void, while vast and empty, is a generative space 
with a positive capacity. By perceiving the nothingness as a “nothing” himself, the poet 
shows that complete emptiness does not exist. For Eliot, the generative void becomes 
clearer. 
 In his March Hare poems, Eliot does not fully realize the generative void’s power 
to sustain reality. However, through images of stillness and silence, he gestures toward a 
                                                          
555 T. S. Eliot, “in silent corridors of death,” in Inventions of the March Hare: Poems, 
1909-1917, ed. Christopher Ricks (San Diego: Harcourt Brace), 1998. 93. 
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procreative nothingness that sees the void’s creative potential. During this time, the poet 
was already reading Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, and he even borrows from Spinoza’s 
negation and Kant’s sublime to articulate the potential in nothing that he perceives. This 
is a vision that Eliot develops as his career progresses.   
“Between” and “The Shadow”: A Generative Nothing in The Hollow Men 
After the March Hare poems, Eliot’s formation of the generative void becomes 
more refined. During the decade following writing his early March Hare poems, Eliot 
experienced spiritual and personal deterioration not in small part due to his marriage to 
Vivienne Haigh-Wood, the tumult which ultimately fostered the mindset that “led to The 
Waste Land” in 1922.556 In a sense, Eliot indeed saw himself led to the edge of the abyss, 
and his journey back from its threshold is due in no small part to his conversion to 
Christianity. In The Hollow Men (1925), Eliot depicts the endgame of The Waste Land’s 
society: a stripping away and disappearance of the world in true Kantian fashion, but 
after such an abstraction transpires, the search for meaning and truth can begin.  
As what is perhaps his most outwardly desolate poem, Eliot’s generative void in 
The Hollow Men is hidden from view. “We are the hollow men / We are the stuffed 
men,” the characters almost proudly declare; they compare themselves to effigies “filled 
with straw” who reside in the “dead…cactus land” where the dryness is almost 
suffocating.557 Even when their voices “whisper together,” the result is “quiet and 
                                                          
556 Lyndall Gordon, T. S. Eliot: An Imperfect Life, 119. 
557 T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men in The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 (San 
Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), 1980. 56,57. 
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meaningless.”558 In the poem’s handwritten draft, I noticed that Eliot squeezed the line 
“Walking alone” between “In death’s other kingdom” and “At the hour when we are,” as 
if the setting demanded another injection of loneliness.559 The poem’s structure, with its 
short lines and stanzas, underscores the setting’s materially and spiritually forsaken 
atmosphere. However, Eliot’s underlining of “qui negant dari vacuum” in his copy of the 
Ethics (1677) coupled with his consistent marking of passages that discuss the 
infiniteness of substance suggests that the land of the hollow men is not an empty 
vacuum. Rather, it is a setting primed for change.  
Eliot’s interest in Spinoza’s “vacuum” statement is particularly relevant for The 
Hollow Men; it shows the poet’s disinclination to accept absolute nothingness. In an 
innovative investigation of Spinozan vacancy, Jonathan Bennett renders Spinoza’s 
assertion that “there cannot be vacuum” as follows:  
 
Suppose there are three contiguous cubic bodies—A, B, and C—of which the 
middle one, B, is annihilated while every other body in the universe, including A 
and C, is held still…The annihilation of a body B was just a thinning out…in that 
region of space, that the ‘something’ lying between A and C after the annihilation 
of B is the very same ‘something’ that lay there before B was annihilated.560  
                                                          
558 T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men, 56. 
559 Typescript of poem The Hollow Men by T. S. Eliot, 1925. MS-HB, Box V, Folder 5, 
Hayward Bequest, King’s College Cambridge Archive Centre, Cambridge, England. 
560 Spinoza’s footnote reads as follows: “If corporeal substance could be so divided that 
its parts were redly distinct, why, then, could one part not be annihilated, the rest 
remaining connected with one another as before? And why must they all be so fitted 
together that there is no vacuum? Truly, of things which are really distinct from one 
another, one can be, and remain in its condition, without the other. Since therefore there 
is no vacuum in Nature (this is discussed elsewhere), but all of its parts must so concur 
that there is no vacuum, it follows that they cannot be really distinguished, i.e. that 
corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, cannot be divided.”; Johnathan Bennett, A 
Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing), 1984. 396. 
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Though Bennett’s distillation might seem as dense as Spinoza’s original wording, he 
makes a significant observation: That for Spinoza, true annihilation is not possible, and 
absolutely empty space is impossible. In other words, Spinoza denies that an abyss of 
absolute nothing can exist; rather, while annihilation might render a change in the form of 
a body, such an act does not eradicate it absolutely. This idea combined with Spinoza’s 
argument from the Ethics that “For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, 
both for its existence and for its nonexistence” demonstrates Spinoza’s attraction to a 
generative nothingness. As Jeffery Howard argues, the imagery and setting of this poem 
allow for “the presence of both nihilism and hopeful expectation on the part [of the 
hollow men].”561  Their posture, outlook, and act of “leaning together” back to back and 
head to head, as Howard argues, functions as an imitation of Janus, the Roman god of 
beginnings, whose two faces see the past and know the future.562   
Eliot’s language of negation picks up on this “hopeful expectation” and suggests 
that the hollow men occupy a prolific void rather than a fruitless abyss. The speakers’ 
repeated references to “without” and “between” exemplify this. While the second stanza, 
“Shape without form, shade without color, / Paralyzed force, gesture without motion” 
describe these hollow, incomplete entities, the lines also illustrate the land itself. The 
“raised, stone images” of this “dead land” lack vigor, and even the hollow men’s gestural 
plea, the “supplication of a dead man’s hand,” evaporates “under the twinkling of a 
                                                          
561 Jeffrey Howard, “T. S. Eliot’s The Hollow Men,” The Explicator 70, no.1 (2012): 8, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00144940.2012.656736.  
562 Jeffrey Howard, “The Hollow Men,” 9. 
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fading star.” However, “shape,” “shade,” and “gesture” all scrape together a forward 
potency: the three repetitions of “without” do not indicate “without the possibility of 
meaning,” but instead that meaning fails to exist yet. The hollow men inhabit a plane of 
flat, one-dimensional “shape” rather than the three-dimensional composition of “form.”  
They see in “shades,” but not the more potent “color,” and the small “gesture” rather than 
the large “motion” characterizes the movement that the hollow men perceive. Here, Eliot 
seems to again borrow from Spinoza’s Ethics. Under the first note to Proposition VIII, 
“every substance is necessarily infinite,” Eliot scribbled the phrase “all determination is 
negation,” quotes included.563 This phrase comes directly from Hegel’s Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History, a text that Eliot also read in detail, where Hegel paraphrases one 
of Spinoza’s key ideas: his meditation on substance. To claim a thing is something is to 
simultaneously say it is not many other things. Eliot followed this logic when fashioning 
the void in The Hollow Men: to say what the poem’s personae and their environment are, 
he first needed to say what they are not. Since Eliot read these texts before his clear 
conversion to Christianity, this philosophical negation predates his reading of St. John of 
the Cross and thus his clear use of the via negativa.  
At this point, the poem’s space is incomplete and transitionary, but the idea of 
“between” begins to animate the void. While Hay maintains that the hollow men exist 
strictly between Heaven and Hell, I contend that Eliot’s use of “between” begins the 
concrete formation of the generative void, an endeavor that Eliot began in his March 
                                                          
563 Benedictus de Spinoza, Opera, 1895, MS-HB, Box B, Folder 27, The Hayward 
Bequest, King’s College Archive Centre, Cambridge, England. 
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Hare poems. 564 Eliot first introduces “between” by name in Part V, directly after the 
hollow men chant “Here we go round the prickly pear…at five o’clock in the 
morning.”565 In a play on the children’s nursery rhyme “Here We Go ‘Round the 
Mulberry Bush,” the hollow men lack the concept of a green, lush plant filled with 
nourishing berries, so they sing about the only paradigm of vegetation that they seem to 
know: a sharp, arid, prickly pear cactus. Interestingly, though, prickly pear cacti do 
produce consumable fruit and strikingly vibrant flowers; the potential for beauty, 
creation, and satiation therefore exists for the hollow men, but the speakers fail to fully 
comprehend this opportunity. Furthermore, Eliot’s inclusion of “five o’clock in the 
morning,” the traditional time of Christ’s resurrection, emphasizes the latent creative 
possibility of the hollow men’s environment. While their dancing in an apocalyptic circle 
around the cactus could be read as the hollow men’s ignorance of Christ’s resurrection, 
                                                          
564 In T. S. Eliot’s Negative Way, Hay argues that the hollow men exist between “The 
Kingdom of Heaven…and evidently Hell,” which is “no dream and all to possible” for 
the hollow men to enter (85-86); Interestingly, Eliot’s meditation on “betweenness” 
extends late into his career.  Fir instances, Eliot discusses the concept of “between” as it 
relates to the human mind in his 1937 introduction to Revelation, a compilation of 
theological essays.  He states:  
“The human mind is perpetually driven between two desires, between two dreams each of 
which may be either a vision or a nightmare: the vision and nightmare of the material 
world, and the vision and nightmare of the immaterial. Each may be in turn, or for 
different minds, a refuge to which to fly, or a horror from which to escape. We desire and 
fear both sleep and waking; the day brings relief from the night, and the night brings 
relief from the day; we go to sleep as to death, and we wake as to damnation. We move, 
outside of the Christian faith, between the terror of the purely irrational and the horror of 
the purely rational.”   
565 T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men, 58. 
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this act again ushers in the concept of “between”: the hollow men exist somewhere 
between salvation and barrenness. 
Developing this concept further, Eliot also uses “between” to combat the utter 
nothingness of the landscape by offering respite through the Shadow. However, this is 
not the first time that Eliot introduces a shadow into his poetry. In The Waste Land 
(1922), the speaker commands the listener to take shelter from the suffocating dryness in 
the shadow: 
 
There is shadow under this red rock, 
(Come in under the shadow of this red rock), 
And I will show you something different from either 
Your shadow at morning striding behind you 
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you; 
I will show you fear in a handful of dust.566 
 
 
The shadow of The Waste Land is tempting, and the speaker promises a revelation if the 
listener “comes in” under it.  That revelation, however, is decay. Despite this shadow’s 
ominous nature, Eliot’s allusion to Isaiah 32 in these lines suggests an eventual 
generative void. 567 The Bible verse promises that “The effect of righteousness will be 
                                                          
566 T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land in The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 (San 
Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), 1980. 38. 
567 The full verse of Isaiah 32 is as follows: “See, a king will reign in righteousness, and 
princes will rule with justice. Each will be like a hiding-place from the wind, a covert 
from the tempest like streams of water in a dry place, like the shade of a great rock in a 
weary land. Then the eyes of those who have sight will not be closed, and the ears of 
those who have hearing will listen.” 
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peace, and the result of righteousness, quietness and trust for-ever. My people will abide 
in a peaceful habitation.”568   
Eliot’s shadowy space in The Hollow Men, on the other hand, is less opaquely 
generative and ushers in a betweenness that can foster transformation. The personae state:  
 
Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion  
And the act 
Falls the Shadow569 
 
 
Here, the proper noun “Shadow” is the closest entity in the poem to a void.  The personae 
seem to lack first-hand knowledge of this void-like space—they have never seen it 
themselves and can merely speculate—but they are aware of its existence. A shadow, 
while a body of uncertainty, personifies betweenness; one only forms when an object 
stands between a light source and the surface. Though a place of obscurity and partial 
darkness, a shadow also represents a trace, or an indistinct image or idea: a thing that is 
evolving. The shadow serves as a third space amid two related but different concepts that 
defines a missing catalyst. This catalyst will turn an “idea” into “reality” and usher the 
“potency” into “existence.”   
In a stanza that pits Platonic and Aristotelian considerations of essence and 
existence against one another, Eliot again locates an additional place the “shadow” can 
possibly be: “Between the potency / And the existence / Between the essence / And the 
                                                          
568 Isaiah 32: 17-18 Revised Standard Version. 
569 T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men, 58. 
 
 
 
215 
 
descent.”570  Plato declares that essence is the ideal and can be expressed in less perfect 
terms on our plane. Aristotle, however, responds that matter only has potency until form 
gives it essence, an idea that opens the possibility for something to generate from 
nothing.571 Kant takes this idea one step further in Section VI of his Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781) and states that existence is not a property:  
 
Everywhere around us we observe a chain of causes and effects, of means and 
ends, of death and birth; and, as nothing has entered of itself into the condition in 
which we find it, we are constantly referred to some other thing, which itself 
suggests the same inquiry regarding its cause, and thus the universe must sink into 
the abyss of nothingness, unless we admit that, besides this infinite chain of 
contingencies, there exists something that is primal and self-subsistent—
something which, as the cause of this phenomenal world, secures its continuance 
and preservation. 572 
 
 
It is toward this Kantian “something,” represented by the murky, nondescript image of a 
“shadow,” that Eliot is moving in The Hollow Men: a “something” that incorporates 
essence, existence, and potency that resists the abyss of nothingness. The italicized “For 
Thine is the Kingdom” that concludes the stanza, while a clear allusion to the Lord’s 
Prayer, also could be a narrative voice pointing to that “space between” as the answer to 
two competing ideas in the stanza; that is, the “shadow” is the personae’s “kingdom.”   
                                                          
570 T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men, 59. 
571 Eliot studied both Plato and Aristotle while a graduate student at Harvard with Irving 
Babbitt and George Santayana and Harold Joachim, respectively.  As Joseph Maddrey 
states in The Making of T. S. Eliot, a young Eliot had endeavored to replace the religious 
studied of his youth with Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies, which “left him with a 
fragmented view of the metaphysical world.” 
572 Scholars mostly agree that Aristotle’s and Kant’s philosophies align on this issue; 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 348. 
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In this yet undefined “between” space, prayer operates as another indication of an 
emptying out that forecasts a building up. While the hollow men abandon their 
incomplete, broken prayer rather abruptly, it indicates a movement toward resolution 
instead of a glaring failure. As the personae attempt to recite the Lord’s Prayer, rather 
than becoming stronger and ending as a completed undertaking, the prayer manifests as 
fragments that diminish in physical line length as well as finished content:     
  
For Thine is the Kingdom   
 
For Thine is 
Life is 
For Thine is the573 
 
 
Eliot structures these lines in a way that shows the hollow men dissecting the meaning of 
the completed line of prayer, struggling to comprehend it. The fragments diminish in 
dimension until only the idea of “Life is” remains, as if that is the query that needs to be 
answered. The next fragment then begins to swell in length and content; while the idea is 
still incomplete at the stanza’ close, it gestures toward the desire to build upon its 
forward-progress. Eliot signifies this through the lack of punctuation at the stanza’s close.  
Finally, Eliot ends The Hollow Men with a Hegelian maneuver that elicits an 
annihilation of annihilation itself. For Hegel, the absolute is the nothing that negates 
itself, but this annihilation is not the harbinger of utter destruction. Instead, Hegelian 
annihilation is temporary, and to understand such obliteration is to overcome it.574 
                                                          
573 T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men, 59. 
574 Michael Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, 117. 
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Hegel’s “overcoming” leaps directly from the void, born into the world as an opportunity 
for creation; he declares, “out of this abyss of nothing…the feeling: God is dead…the 
highest totality in its complete seriousness and out of its deepest ground, at once all-
encompassing and in the most joyful freedom of its form can and must arise.”575 In other 
words, no finite or infinite being exists, but all things are collapsed into the idea of 
negation, which then facilitates a surmounting. This is a nihilism that rebounds and 
reconstitutes itself as the most comprehensive form order.576 In the poem’s final stanza, 
the hollow men chant “This is the way the world ends … / Not with a bang but a 
whimper.”577 Their repeating of “This IS the way the world ends” (my emphasis added 
on “is”) appears almost like a command: the hollow men, in perhaps their only deliberate 
exploit, actively will the obliteration of their domain. However, that obliteration does not 
terminate with an abrupt, harsh “bang” but rather a quiet, soft, prolonged “whimper.” As 
Howard observes, the poem’s ending is an “unexpected and almost silent precursor to a 
spiritual beginning at which they may arrive only by breaching the barrier of despair and 
death.”578  By the poem’s close, Eliot uses the silence of the void to elicit a multiplicative 
outcome that annihilates the world and reduces it to nihility.   
 
 
                                                          
575 Georg Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, 358. 
576 Michael Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, 117. 
577 T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men, 59. 
578 Jeffrey Howard, “The Hollow Men,” 11. 
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Between and Negation: Ash Wednesday 
While the stylistic elements of Eliot’s poetry may have evolved by the time he 
wrote Ash Wednesday, he has not reached a theological answer to the “overwhelming 
question” despite officially converting to Christianity three years earlier. Because of this, 
Eliot’s adoption of old, generative nihilism continues to be valuable in Ash Wednesday 
regardless of the poem’s potent religious references and contemplative tone. This post-
conversion connection to old nihilism further underscores Eliot’s reliance on Spinoza, 
Kant, and Hegel for his images of generative nothingness.  
After the publication of The Hollow Men, Eliot experienced several significant 
life changes. In 1927, he renounced his American citizenship and officially became a 
British subject, and also formally converted to Anglicanism when he was baptized into 
the Church of England. Perhaps unsurprisingly, such changes also elicited demonstrable 
shifts in his way of thinking and, by extension, his poetry, as scholars have investigated.  
As John Xiros Cooper observes, it is a mistake to say that Ash Wednesday (1930), for 
example, does not contain instances of irony as “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” 
and “Portrait of a Lady” do. However, more precisely, the irony’s “aim and function are 
quite different”: the focus in Ash Wednesday is instead the “believer himself” rather than 
the “emblem of a culture rotted through relativism.” 579 
                                                          
579 John Xiros Cooper, T. S. Eliot and the Ideology of Four Quartets (Cambridge: 
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Ash Wednesday is a “conversion poem” that possesses noticeable philosophical 
underpinnings. Craig Raine argues that the poem serves to narrate the journey, struggle 
and experience of an individual who previously lacked faith and has since resolved to 
turn to God; however, discussion has moved beyond the poem’s theological implications 
to interrogate its philosophical engagement.580 Donald Childs, for instance, notes that a 
piece of Eliot’s religious struggle in Ash Wednesday is to “allow not just the dogmatic 
Truth of Christianity, but the small ‘t’ truth of pragmatism.”581 Eliot’s own explanation of 
the poem, however, perhaps obscures rather than elucidates his own intent,  and when 
explaining the rationale behind Ash Wednesday, the poet has a few things to say. He calls 
the poem a “modern Vita Nuova,” but and understanding of the Vita only might be 
helpful in deciphering the poem.582 Eliot also addresses the poem’s association with 
Christianity. In a May 1930 letter to M. C. D’Arcy, Eliot claims,  
 
I don’t consider [Ash Wednesday] any more ‘religious’ verse than anything else I 
have written: I mean that it attempts to state a particular phase of progress of one 
person. If that progress is in the direction of ‘religion’, I can’t help that; it is I 
suppose the only direction in which progress is possible.583  
 
 
                                                          
580 Craig Raine, T. S. Eliot (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2006. 22. 
581 In Childs’s investigation of Ash Wednesday, he argues that the pragmatic statements in 
Eliot’s dissertation are strongly echoed in the poem.  For instance, the lines “Because I 
know that time is always time / And place is always and only place / And what is actual 
is actual only for one time / And only for one place” appear in Eliot’s dissertation as “the 
line between the experienced, or the given, and the constructed can nowhere be clearly 
drawn.”  
582 T. S. Eliot, The Letters of T. S. Eliot: Volume 5, 1930-1931. Eds. Valerie Eliot and 
John Haffenden (New Haven: Yale University Press), 2015. Xli. 
583 T. S. Eliot, Letters Volume 5, 201. 
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Regardless of its potential religiosity, Eliot extends his consideration of the generative 
void in Ash Wednesday to more comprehensively elucidate the “between” space that he 
carved out in The Hollow Men.   
The generative void gains more clarity in Ash Wednesday as Eliot applies his 
reading of old nihilism to the poem. Compared to its seven appearances in The Hollow 
Men, “between” appears 15 times in Ash Wednesday, so this idea is clearly still on Eliot’s 
mind after his conversion. While the speaker, much like the hollow men, narrates the 
experience of “One who moves in the time between sleep and waking,” he consistently 
ruminates on the notion of the “Word,” a thing of potency and reality.584 It is perhaps the 
speaker’s fixation on this Word that most clearly separates him from the barren hollow 
men.  He states:  
 
The Word without a word, the Word within 
The world and for the world; 
And the light shone in darkness and 
Against the Word the unstilled world still whirled 
About the centre of the silent Word.585  
 
 
While Eliot’s use of the “Word” conjures religious connotations, its close physical 
placement to “silent” in the stanza is reminiscent of the old nihilistic use of silence in 
“Silence” and “Bacchus and Ariadne.” That is, the “silent Word” acts as a container, a 
void that contrasts with the “unstilled world” from which the metaphysical meaning that 
                                                          
584 T. S. Eliot, Ash Wednesday in The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 (San 
Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), 1980. 64. 
585 T. S. Eliot, Ash Wednesday, 65. 
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the speaker desires can spring. While the speaker’s language, with its abundance of 
alliteration and slant rhyme, may inject the stanza with an air of bewilderment, the 
“Word” exists as the fixed point around which the world “whirls,” whose “centre” can 
sustain reality. Furthermore, in an evolution from the description of the moth’s feverish 
circling around the candle flame in “The Burnt Dancer” (1914), Eliot uses dance imagery 
to consider a generative void. Here, however, the dance becomes more structured. For 
A.V. C. Schmidt, the formal pattern and fluid movement of the above stanza is evocative 
of a melodic dance’s rhythmed vacillations that encourages the whirling of the world 
around the Word.586 Through this structure, Eliot again uses the typically Dionysian 
dance as a way to implement order in the space of the poem and reclaims it as 
Apollonian, thereby distancing the abyss of the “darkness,” an ambition that he will fully 
actualize in the Four Quartets.  
This idea coupled with the speaker’s repeated, prayer-like chant of “Teach us to 
care and not to care / Teach us to sit still” shows the need for a stillness that is neither 
motion nor arrest.587 Here, idea of “betweenness” is perhaps where Eliot establishes his 
first palpable motion toward the idea of a “still point,” which he will meditate on intently 
in the Four Quartets. In the poem’s fourth section, the speaker meditates: 
 
This is the time of tension between dying and birth 
The place of solitude where three dreams cross 
Between blue rocks 
                                                          
586 A.V.C. Schmidt, Passion and Precision: Collected Essays on English Poetry from 
Geoffrey Chaucer to Geoffrey Hill (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing), 2015. 
320. 
587 T. S. Eliot, Ash Wednesday, 67. 
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But when the voices shaken from the yew-tree drift away 
Let the other yew be shaken and reply.588   
 
 
The speaker grasps that by learning to “sit still,” he may find quietness that he seeks, 
which lies in a land of dreamy, amorphous “solitude.” This stillness and solitude again 
indicates a “space between,” a generative void that facilitates creation. Furthermore, the 
speaker’s command that the “other yew” be shaken suggests a sublime transformation.  
At this point, the yew tree’s transformative capacity is latent. However, once the tree is 
shaken, its power will be prompted in one sublime moment that leads us to the poem’s 
serene “cry unto thee.” 
 In The Hollow Men and Ash Wednesday, Eliot uses his reading of old nihilism to 
both eliminate the world in Hegelian fashion and find a generative void that can buttress 
a strong metaphysical and epistemological reality. Through Spinozan negation, Eliot 
makes the idea of “betweenness” desirable and prepares the landscape for the “still point” 
that he reaches in the Four Quartets.     
The Plentitude of Vacancy: The Four Quartets 
After 1935, Eliot solidified his authority as a master of modern and avant-garde 
poetry through a string of successful poems and plays, and his publishing authority at 
Faber & Faber helped to shape a second generation of modernist writers.589 As the threat 
of yet another world war loomed over Europe and America, the late 1930s and early 
                                                          
588 T. S. Eliot, Ash Wednesday, 64. 
589 John Xiros Cooper, Ideology of the Four Quartets, 103-104. 
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1940s witnessed a repeat of societal upheaval, and during this time, Eliot wrestled with 
his own internal tumult. The Four Quartets (1943) exhibit Eliot’s struggle with both 
internal and external enigmata. As Gordon observes, beginning with “acute personal 
reminiscence—reunion with an old love or ‘things ill done and done to others’ harm’—
Four Quartets recounts Eliot’s struggle to recast his lot during his years in the 
clergyhouse at Kensington,” which inspired the initial title, “Kensington Quartets.”590  
Eliot views ordinary life as “waste”: In The Waste Land waste is “a place, a city 
full of hopeless inhabitants,” while in the Four Quartets, the “waste is time.”591 This 
“waste,” the modern manifestation of physical and metaphysical useless emptiness, 
however, can be overcome and reconciled if considered in terms of old nihilism. As 
Cooper points out, the Four Quartets show Eliot’s response to a nihilistic threat that 
Herbert Read, a coworker of Eliot’s at Faber & Faber, claimed had all but entirely 
engulfed the mindset of the time.592 To further expand upon this point, literary critic F. R. 
Leavis astutely observes that “the explorations which [the Four Quartets] propose for 
itself mean plunging deep into regions of the equivocal.”593 Leavis does not have old 
nihilism in mind when considering Eliot’s “regions of the equivocal,” but he nevertheless 
                                                          
590 Lyndall Gordon, T. S. Eliot: An Imperfect Life, 338. 
591 Lyndall Gordon, T. S. Eliot, An Imperfect Life, 4. 
592 In the introduction to his “War Diary,” Read asserts, “The greatest task of humanity, 
not that ‘God is dead’, is, as Nietzsche was the first to realize, the conquest of nihilism. 
The world has not made much progress in that direction since his famous 
announcement…Nihilism—nothingness, despair, and the nervous hilarity that goes with 
them—remains the universal state of mind” (69). 
593 F.R. Leavis, The Living Principle: English As a Discipline of Thought (New York: 
Oxford University Press), 1975. 160. 
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calls attention to a negative, amorphous space that Eliot uses to buttress reality and reveal 
truth. While Eliot does interrogate the quandary of the new nihilism in his previous 
poetry, the resolution that he presents in the Four Quartets contains his most visceral 
poetic image of the generative void: A “still point” that the poet gleaned from his reading 
of old nihilism around which the ever “turning world” rotates, a place that facilitates 
motion and growth.594 
Eliot’s reading of old nihilism even gives a more comprehensive picture of his 
poetic method in the Quartets. Although Eliot’s use of the via negativa in his poetry—
especially the Quartets—has garnered much critical attention, his old nihilistic response 
to emptiness and disarray is sensible; this approach directly takes into account the 
metaphysical nothingness to which Eliot responds. 595 In the Four Quartets, Eliot aims to 
answer the question “in what way does one go about locating value in a painful, 
seemingly meaningless, modern history?” The via negativa and its endeavor to know and 
understand an intangible and eternal God might be one way to interrogate this 
conundrum, but Eliot’s question is grounded in the present and corporeal. The old 
                                                          
594 Conversely, as William Skaff contends, these “still points” represent Eliot’s mystical 
experiences, and Miller argues that they embody the places where God’s pattern can be 
perceived (21; 188).  Indeed, poetry is mystical according to Eliot, “when it intends to 
convey, and succeeds in conveying, to the reader...the statement of a perfectly definite 
experience which we call the mystical experience ... Instead of being obscure, it will be 
pellucid” (“The Silurist” 190).  However, Eliot’s statement, Skaff insightfully proposes, 
is the reason why other scholars have “studied Eliot’s intellectual and poetic development 
strictly in terms of mystical experience and religious vision” (208).  But to do so is to 
miss the generative old nihilism that Eliot draws upon to make sense of new nihilism in a 
modern society that is on the cusp of change.      
595See Hay, T. S. Eliot’s Negative Way (1982) and Fayek Ishak, The Mystical Philosophy 
of T. S. Eliot (1970) 
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nihilism of Kant, Spinoza, and Hegel that Eliot read as a graduate student speaks to the 
worldliness of this question, a consideration that the via negativa alone does not entirely 
reflect. Here, Eliot realizes what the personae in The Hollow Men and even the speaker of 
Ash Wednesday do not: the uniting of the Apollonian mode and old, generative nihilism. 
Through this uniting, Eliot fashions a third space as a position that orders time and place 
and unites the three old nihilist’s philosophies. This unity reimagines the abyss as a void 
with filling potential that can order the Dionysian chaos and draw sense out of the 
nonsensical. 
In the Quartets, Eliot recognizes the need for a stable space where the relationship 
between the order of logos and the change of flux can exist concurrently. This is the point 
where an emptied void, a metaphysical space between “plentitude and vacancy,” 
promotes the possibility for a generative, old nihilism to reclaim the Nietzschean abyss. 
Eliot imagines this void, the “space between” that the poet references in his March Hare 
poems, The Hollow Men, and Ash Wednesday, as a foundational, Apollonian structure 
that has the power to sustain order and existence and remove the negativity of 
nothingness. For Spinoza, plentitude and emptiness exist together, but are not 
contradictory or dichotomous. Generally, the principle of plentitude from the Ethics (or, 
the principle of sufficient reason) asserts that the universe contains all possible forms of 
ideas. Specifically, Spinoza, according to historian of ideas Arthur Lovejoy, “expressed 
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the principle of plentitude in its most uncompromising form” and “represented it as 
necessary in the strict logical sense.”596   
Eliot’s idea of plentitude is another instance where the poet gains important from 
Spinoza’s old nihilism. In his copy of the Ethics, Eliot annotated Proposition I; this is 
where Spinoza first introduces his principle of plentitude, which the philosopher 
describes as, “What cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through 
itself.”597 Furthermore, Lovejoy states that Spinoza’s interest in the principle of 
plentitude was not the idea that everything that “logically can and will be must be,” but 
rather a “consideration that everything that is must, by the eternal logical nature of things, 
have been, and have been precisely as it is.”598 Plentitude is the “consequence” of 
Spinoza’s dialectic, the sense of the utter inevitability of every characteristic and every 
vicissitude of human life, that was most congenial to his own moral temper and seemed 
to him most fitted to free men from the torment of the passions.599 Eliot employs this 
“freedom from” that Spinoza aims to gain via the principle of plentitude in the Four 
Quartets. In “Burnt Norton,” for instance, the speaker meditates on “The inner freedom 
from the practical desire, / The release from action and suffering, release from the inner / 
And the outer compulsion” that will yield a sense of spiritual fulfillment.600 Plentitude on 
                                                          
596 Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea 
(London: Taylor and Francis), 2017. 155. 
597 Benedictus de Spinoza, Opera, 1895, MS-HB, Box B, Folder 27, The Hayward 
Bequest, King’s College Archive Centre, Cambridge, England; Spinoza, Ethics, 4.  
598 Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 155. 
599 Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 155. 
600 T. S. Eliot, “Burnt Norton,” 119. 
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its own, however, is not enough to supply Eliot or Spinoza with the answer. Emptiness is 
also necessary because it provides that space for a generative void, that from which 
creation and fulfillment can spring.    
In The Hollow Men, Eliot primes the modern landscape for a prolific void, but he 
gives that void substance in the Four Quartets. This void, a space preceded by the 
“shadow” in The Hollow Men, is the metaphysical consequence of “betweenness” and 
“the still point”; it exists as a space not yet made or imagined and is a plane beyond time. 
Eliot continues to determine the void through negation as “Burnt Norton” progresses. In 
the second section, the speaker states:    
 
At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless; 
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is, 
But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity, 
Where past and future are gathered. Neither movement from nor towards, 
Neither ascent nor decline.601 
 
 
Interestingly, according to the typescript for “Burnt Norton,” which I examined while at 
the King’s College Archive Center, this stanza remained essentially unchanged from the 
first draft to the poem’s published copy. This idea, then, must have been evident to Eliot 
from the beginning. For his point to be clear, Eliot must form one unified image of what 
two opposing concepts might look like. The repetition of “neither from nor towards” 
reinforces a stillness that first appears in “Silence,” but instead of being “terrified” at the 
“peace,” the speaker yearns for it. Furthermore, Eliot’s use of negative language to 
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describe the still point is, as Francesca Cauchi observes, a reaction against Nietzsche’s 
argument602 that a “turning away” is a “will to nothingness, to nihilism.”603 For Eliot, this 
turning away and subsequent fixating on a particular point represents a search for the 
value construction that the still point, a void where the seeds of order and meaning, can 
be planted. The opposing concepts, “flesh” and “fleshless”; “arrest” and “movement”; 
“ascent” and “decline” negate each other to form a space that combines “past and 
“present.”  
Eliot progressively translates the still point’s immateriality into a more palpable 
terms as the Quartets continue, and to do so, he borrows more language from his reading 
of old nihilism. In the third section of “Burnt Norton,” uses more negative language to 
describe the still point, but he implies that it exists beyond purgation:  
 
Here is a place of disaffection 
Time before and time after 
In a dim light: neither daylight 
Investing form with lucid stillness 
Turning shadow into transient beauty 
With slow rotation suggesting permanence 
Nor darkness to purify the soul 
 
 
                                                          
602 For Nietzsche, the aesthetic ideal “suffering was interpreted, the enormous emptiness 
seemingly filled, [and] the door shut against all suicidal nihilism. … [T]his abhorrence of 
the senses, of reason itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this longing for the beyond, 
away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, desire, even longing itself—all this 
means, let us dare to grasp it, a will to nothingness, an antipathy to life, a revolt against 
the most fundamental conditions of life, but it is and remains a will!” (On the Genealogy 
of Morals, III, sec. 28) 
603 Francesca Cauchi, “Romantic Skepticism and the Descent into Nihilism in T. S. 
Eliot’s ‘Burnt Norton’,”Journal of Language, Literature and Culture 64, no. 1: 9. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/20512856.2016.1221619.  
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Emptying the sensual with deprivation 
Cleansing affection from the temporal.604  
 
 
This “place” cannot “cleanse” or “purify” because those acts have conceivably already 
occurred. The “disaffection” that begins the stanza harkens back to the shadowy 
betweenness of The Hollow Men.  It is a space of disillusionment, isolation, and 
emptiness. However, “disaffection” implies action, a deliberate purgation to reach a space 
of complete nothingness. As the speaker implies through “here,” we have finally reached 
such a place. The “betweenness” of The Hollow Men and Ash Wednesday still exists, but 
this betweenness exists beyond the realm of the “shadow” and possesses God-like 
qualities; qualities of Spinoza’s One Substance.   
After Eliot uses negating language to purge the still point until only generative 
emptiness remains, he gives it qualities that resemble Spinoza’s One Substance. In the 
third section of “Burnt Norton,” Eliot uses several words in a short space that 
characterize this void: 
 
Neither plenitude nor vacancy. Only a flicker 
Over the strained time-ridden faces 
Distracted from distraction by distraction 
Filled with fancies and empty of meaning 
Tumid apathy with no concentration 
Men and bits of paper, whirled by the cold wind 
That blows before and after time, 
Wind in and out of unwholesome lungs 
Time before and time after.605  
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When Eliot states “neither plentitude nor vacancy,” he does not mean to reject either 
concept.  Instead, Spinoza’s axiom “all determination is negation” returns. Eliot uses 
negation to say what the void is not so that he can describe what it is. “Tumid” and 
“apathy” together paint an image of lethargy that is swollen and bulging over, a 
meaningless scene of fury whose indifference renders it useless. This idea elaborates on 
“filled with fancies and empty of meaning,” adding to the hollowness of the “strained 
time-ridden faces.” Eliot’s use of “and” to connect these ideas indicates a simultaneity 
between fullness and emptiness that both contradicts and resolves in a way that reflects 
Spinoza’s argument that perfection, which he uses synonymously with existence, requires 
both plentitude and “parsimony.” Considering perfection, Eliot’s notes in his copy of the 
Ethics give us a clearer indication of the still point’s infinitely negative, infinitely 
generative attributes. First, In Prop. VIII, Eliot underlined the following phrase: 
 
…existence appertains to the nature of substance, [thus] existence must 
necessarily be included in [the One Substance’s] definition; and from its 
definition alone existence must be deducible…from this definition, we cannot 
infer the existence of several substances; therefore it follows that there is only one 
substance of the same nature.606   
 
 
Furthermore, in Prop. X, Eliot blocked off the following phrase: “Each particular 
attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.”607 The One Substance 
thus has many attributes that extend from it and collapse back into it; that is, this entity is 
                                                          
606 Benedictus de Spinoza, Opera, 1895, MS-HB, Box B, Folder 27, The Hayward 
Bequest, King’s College Archive Centre, Cambridge, England;  
607 Benedictus de Spinoza, Opera, 1895, MS-HB, Box B, Folder 27, The Hayward 
Bequest, King’s College Archive Centre, Cambridge, England; Spinoza, Ethics, 53. 
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a “still point,” a single space with many attributes. If all things flow back into the One 
Substance and it is the only substance that truly exists, then it is the highest form of 
reality. While not a direct transcription, Eliot uses Spinoza’s One Substance to imagine 
the still point as his highest reality, a space of total negation that is bound by neither time 
nor flesh.   
In addition to employing language of negation, in another perhaps contradictory 
technique, Eliot uses the image of “the dance” in to elucidate the still point’s dynamic yet 
unmoving nature. The speaker in “Burnt Norton,” for instance, states “Except for the 
point, the still point, / There would be no dance, and there is only the dance.”608 Here, the 
dance seems dependent upon the still point, but the still point is simultaneously 
dependent upon the dance in a way that echoes Yeats’s question of “How can we know 
the dancer from the dance?”, a query he poses at the end of “Among School Children” 
(1926). Eliot uses “the dance” as a symbol for the “unmoving motion of the timeless” 
without relegating the “still point” to a state of true motionlessness, which would indicate 
death.609 Like Yeats, Eliot uses the dance and its relation to the still point to obscure the 
boundary between two images that ought to be separate, like a dancer and the dance 
itself. Eliot pushes this idea even further and shows “the dance” as simultaneously and 
perhaps paradoxically exhibiting motionless and motion, the attribute of the “still point.” 
This image of dancing implies pattern and harmony, and therefore, as William Klein 
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argues, correlates skillfully with the classical concept of the logos, with which Eliot 
equates it.610 This is a striking rhetorical inversion of Nietzsche’s consideration of 
dancing as a representation of Dionysian fervor and ecstasy, an act of wild unrestraint. 
For Eliot, the dance is therefore rendered beautiful and the still point remains an ideal 
space beyond time and materiality.   
To reach the void—Eliot’s “still point,”—however, a total emptying out must 
indeed occur.  If considered alongside Eliot’s repeated reference to “between,” a Kantian 
reduction of the subject to nothingness—a version of nothingness that utilizes an 
“emptying out” to prepare a space for growth—moves further toward rationalizing the 
void of old nihilism. As Cunningham states, Kantian philosophical discourse is 
“predicated on the disappearance of the world” and requires a “vanishing” to take place 
so that Kant can “say something about the truth.”611 Kant’s formulation of nihilism takes 
a rational approach as defined in his three Critiques: The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), 
The Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and The Critique of Judgment (1790).612  
Perhaps fittingly, nihilism enters the discussion through an act of disappearance. For 
Žižek, the Kantian subject becomes “a non-substantial void” where Kant “asserts that the 
                                                          
610 William Klein, “Aspects of time in Eliot’s Four Quartets,” Yeats Eliot Review 13: 28. 
611 Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 74. 
612 In The Critique of Pure Reason, considered by many as most important labor, Kant 
interrogates the nature of knowledge and concludes that, while human knowledge cannot 
move beyond individual experience, it is indeed a priori to a certain extent and is thus not 
learned a posteriori.  The Critique of Practical Reason outlines Kant’s moral philosophy 
and contains the discussion of the categorical imperative, his most substantial 
contribution to ethics.  Finally, in The Critique of Judgment, Kant explains his aesthetics 
and teleological philosophy.  This work also discusses his view of “the sublime.”  
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transcendental subject is unknowable, empty.”613 This fading of the subject is an arduous 
undertaking and the process requires an epistemological regression, so to speak, to 
complete it. In the first Critique, Kant wants to stake a claim about the truth, and in doing 
so, he reduces the world to mere appearance. As Cunningham suggests, the world must 
dissolve before the Kantian subject can make any assumptions, to “say” anything. The 
second Critique steals nature away from the subject to examine “the good life” without 
any phenomenal intrusion, and thus the subject has lost the ability to “do” anything. 
Finally, in the third Critique, the subject’s world loses all “visible objects,” and so he/she 
can no longer “see” anything.614 
Having read each of the Critiques, Eliot’s endeavor resembles Kant’s own; Eliot, 
too, was interested in arriving at an ultimate “truth” about the divine, time, and the 
universe. This pursuit is clear in “Little Gidding,” where the speaker aims to reach a 
veracity through “…detachment / From self and from things and from persons” and 
“indifference” that will unlock “not less of love but expanding / Of love beyond desire, 
and so liberation / From the future as well as the past.615 To reach this detachment, the 
speaker moves through stages of Kantian vanishing. He continues his journey toward the 
void of the still point and begins the process of shedding the extra clamor, the 
“attachment to self and to things and to persons,” that inhibit him from reaching the 
                                                          
613 Slavoj Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters 
(London: Verso), 1996. 124. 
614 Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 74-75. 
615 615 T. S. Eliot, “Little Gidding” in The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 (San 
Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), 1980. 142. 
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stillness and silence of the fixed point. For the speaker, though, the movement toward the 
void perhaps takes Kant’s idea of vanishing one step further where the world of 
appearances itself will dissipate in the form of a disappearing of human history: 
 
History may be servitude, 
History may be freedom. See, now they vanish, 
The faces and places, with the self which, as it could, loved them, 
To become renewed, transfigured, in another pattern.616  
 
 
People, places, and concepts “vanish” and are “renewed” at this point in the poem. Their 
“vanishing” is a negation that aims to rejuvenate and “renew,” and like Kant’s nihilism, is 
necessary to reveal an authentic state. The subject disappears along with everything he 
knows, and an embrace of that disappearance reveals a reconfigured reality. Through the 
“emptying out” of Kantian vanishing, Eliot finally approaches the “still point,” the void 
and a nihilistic space that fosters generation rather than chaos.  
The Four Quartets, like The Hollow Men, end with an image of comprehensive 
annihilation. However, the speaker of the Quartets reaches a conclusion that eludes the 
hollow men: that through annihilation, a reduction to silence and the absolute nihil, the 
process of recreation can begin within that consequential void. Eliot concludes “Little 
Gidding” with a nothingness that forecasts “A condition of complete simplicity / (Costing 
not less than everything),” which rather directly specifies that to reach the “still point” of 
simplicity, modern society must first undergo an unqualified voiding of worldly desire.617 
                                                          
616 T. S. Eliot, “Little Gidding,” 142. 
617 T. S. Eliot, “Little Gidding,” 145. 
 
 
 
235 
 
Indeed, Eliot’s use of “simplicity” conjures imaginings of a lack or an absence, or even a 
stripping away of excess in an endeavor to empty the void and prepare it for cultivation. 
As Miller argues, the “infinite plentitude” of “the instant of intense experience” is 
affirmed through certain images that occur at the “culminating passages of Eliot’s 
poetry.”618 The two contrasting ideas that Miller highlights collapse into the “still point” 
of an always-existent present from which collective humanity has purged futility, 
disarray, and total emptiness itself. Through the speaker’s second reference to Julian of 
Norwich’s “all shall be well,” the Dionysian abyss and the grip of Nietzschean nihilism 
are banished. Instead, the generative void that Eliot fashions through old nihilism holds 
the capacity for a rebirth of meaning and morality “When the tongues of flames are in-
folded / Into the crowned knot of fire / And the fire and the rose are one.”619 The hopeful, 
optimistic tone of the final stanza resolves the uncertainty that concludes The Hollow 
Men and Ash Wednesday and is perhaps the most potent antidote against the new 
nihilism’s wayward, bleak attributes.    
Conclusion 
By the time he finishes writing the Four Quartets, Eliot identifies the 
metaphysical “still point,” the idea that can imbue reality with the order, meaning, and 
optimism that preoccupies his poetry since his March Hare notebook writings. This 
“point” represents the generative void, and Eliot reaches this place by applying the 
concepts that he learned from his reading of old nihilism. Eliot’s reimagined void makes 
                                                          
618 J.H. Miller, Poets of Reality, 189. 
619 T. S. Eliot, “Little Gidding,” 145. 
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the abyss bearable and even desirable and demonstrates his ultimate resistance to the 
nothingness of the new nihilism. The “peace” that terrifies the speaker in “Silence” no 
longer inspires fright, and the image of the foreboding “shadow” in The Hollow Men 
becomes the “place of solitude” in Ash Wednesday. Finally, at the conclusion of “Little 
Gidding,” a descent into the “stillness / Between two waves of the sea,” flows 
melodically into “A condition of complete simplicity,” two images connected through 
rhyme that demonstrate the void’s allure. Eliot’s conclusion reveals a redemptive space 
amidst the turbulence of modernity that originates from his reading of Kant, Spinoza, and 
Hegel and their life-affirming nihilism while a philosophy student at Harvard. Although 
the hazards that the Dionysian abyss poses have not entirely vanished for the modern 
world, Eliot has reimagined it as a space for design, and this reimagination keeps the 
abyss at a distance, and reclaims absolute nothingness as an opportunity for regeneration, 
just as the philosophies of Kant, Spinoza, and Hegel insinuate
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION: 
RECLAIMING THE NIHILIST: MODERNISM READING NIETZSCHE
 
 
In the previous five chapters, I have shown the ways that W. B. Yeats and T. S. 
Eliot resist the new nihilism in favor of a generative, old nihilism. This old nihilism 
coincides with the original spirit of nihilism, an idea with a centuries-old lineage.  
However, there is a figure central to this project who, in a way, may be unfairly 
considered by literary modernists: His name is Friedrich Nietzsche. As I mentioned 
earlier, there are as many “Nietzsches” as there are readers of Nietzsche, and it seems that 
modernists chose the figure who advocated for the destruction of all value systems as 
their understanding of the philosopher. I therefore wish to conclude with two points.  
Firstly, while much of his philosophy deliberates annihilation and utter nothingness, 
Nietzsche also views emptiness as potentially procreative. This thread manifests though 
the philosopher’s concepts of amor fati and, interestingly, the death of God. It is even 
present, though only through glimpses, in The Will to Power. The second point considers 
The Will to Power’s publication and Nietzsche’s involvement in that process. Although 
Nietzsche penned extensive notes and outlines for the future text, his failing health 
prevented him from preparing a print copy of The Will to Power. The endeavor thus fell 
to his sister, whose radically-altered version became the 1901 text that a modernist 
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audience read. These events thus solidified Nietzsche’s reputation as the herald of 
destruction and complete annihilation.  
The literary and critical voices of modernism largely understood nihilism, and 
Nietzsche’s new nihilism specifically, as a destructive force. Gottfried Benn argues that 
the nihilism of modernity, a consequence of Darwinian “survival of the fittest,” 
represents the “dissolution of all old ties, the destruction of substance, the levelling of all 
values” and “from them came the inner situation that produced that atmosphere in which 
we all live, from which we all drank to the bitter dregs.”620 While his statement seems to 
buttress the nihilism that Nietzsche presents in The Will to Power, Benn claims that 
Nietzsche did not authentically engage with nihilism until Ecce Homo (1908), his last 
work. Elliot Paul takes this even further and claims that what emerges from a loss of 
value caused by WWI is even a step beyond Nietzsche’s “immoralist” nihilism to an 
“amoralist” nihilism that “neither feels nor shows superiority, only an utter amorality and 
clear head which finds futility everywhere and accepts it as natural law.”621 As Paul de 
Man reflects, “Nietzsche could rightly be criticized for having warned too much and 
perhaps for not having thought enough.”622 Similarly, in his publications, Alfred Orage 
emphasizes the language in Nietzsche’s works that calls for annihilation. Highlighting 
Nietzsche’s Dionysian-Apollonian dichotomy, Orange was convinced that Dionysus 
needed to impede and abolish Apollo if Europe was to undergo a transvaluation of 
                                                          
620 Gottfried Benn, “After Nihilism” in Prose, Essays, Poems (New York: Continuum), 
1987. 100. 
621 Elliot Paul, “The New Nihilism.”  Transition, ed. Eugene Jolas.  May 1927.  165-166. 
622 Paul De Man, “The Literature of Nihilism,” 164. 
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values.623 An event like this—one that forecasts the loss of value—can undoubtedly court 
bleak meaninglessness. 
It is not surprising that Nietzsche’s modernist readership broadly understood 
nihilism in terms of complete emptiness. In the preface of The Will to Power, Nietzsche 
frames the concept as a cataclysmic event that humankind should fear. Donning the mask 
of a prophet, Nietzsche foretells that nihilism will grip the “next two centuries,” and its 
arrival can “no longer come differently.”624 European civilization instead fatally plunges 
“restlessly” and “violently” toward this unavoidable conclusion with no hope of belaying 
its end. These words are undoubtedly alarming and appear to describe the early 20th-
century European landscape, thus giving Nietzsche’s prophecy a menacing veracity. And 
it is these words that most closely inspire modernism’s reading of the new nihilism that 
Podhortz, Benn, Paul, and Read all transmit. Like the beat of a fatalistic drum, 
Nietzsche’s words continuously characterize nihilism as a completely forlorn state that 
“becoming” itself exacerbates. He states,      
 
Nihilism as a psychological state will have to be reached when we have sought a 
‘meaning’ in all events that is not there: so the seeker eventually becomes 
discouraged. Nihilism, then, is the recognition of the long waste of strength, the 
agony of the ‘in vain’, insecurity, the lack of any opportunity to recover and to 
regain composure — being ashamed in front of oneself, as if one had deceived 
oneself all too long … now one realizes that becoming aims at nothing and 
achieves nothing. — Thus, disappointment regarding an alleged aim of becoming 
as a cause of nihilism.625 
                                                          
623 Paul Jackson, Great War Modernisms and the New Age Magazine (London: 
Continuum), 2012. 23. 
624 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 3.  
625 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 12. 
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Here, “becoming” refers to the possibility of change for a thing that has being or 
existence. Superficially, the act of “becoming” appears positive and perhaps should yield 
growth for the subject. Nietzsche, however, not only removes any possibility of change, 
but he also argues that “becoming” is indeed a fantasy. Individuals essentially court 
nihilism themselves by ascribing to a belief that both promises and ends in nothing. 
Nietzsche writes many other foreboding statements similar to this one throughout The 
Will to Power. Although Nietzsche’s words appear ingrained with utter nothingness and 
despair, Nietzsche was not a nihilist in the “new” sense.  Instead, the philosopher desired 
individuals to be free from old systems of value and love their own existences, which he 
represents through amor fati and, perhaps counterintuitively, “the death of God.” These 
positive concepts surface in Nietzsche’s earlier work: The Gay Science (1882). 
For Nietzsche, amor fati, to “love one’s fate,” represents the highest goal for an 
individual. To meet this objective, the individual must view all of his/her life experiences, 
whether positive or negative, as necessary components of existence. In section 276 of The 
Gay Science, Nietzsche defines this goal: 
 
I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then 
I shall be one of those who makes things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love 
henceforth! I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to 
accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my 
only negation. And all in all and on the whole: some day I wish to be only a Yes-
sayer.626 
 
 
                                                          
626 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Walter Arnold Kaufmann. The Gay Science: With 
a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs. Translated by Walter Kaufmann.  New 
York: Random House, 1974. 223. 
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There is a stoic acceptance in Nietzsche’s words. He sees the beauty in necessity and 
endures the unpleasant and “ugly” facets of existence. Nietzsche’s repeated use of “I 
want” shows that he desires this outcome but has not yet attained it; he must work to 
become a “yes-sayer” who uncompromisingly accepts his reality. To place value on a 
thing, especially something as immense as one’s fate, fends off nihilism and prevents 
collapse into complete nothingness. 
Throughout his canon, Nietzsche places consistent emphasis on human freedom, 
an aim that forms the basis of the death of God.627 The philosopher frames God’s 
metaphorical passing as a liberating, essential event in “Parable of the Madman.” He 
declares, 
 
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. ‘Whither is 
God?’  he cried; ‘I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his 
murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us 
the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we 
unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we 
moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? … God is dead. 
God remains dead. And we have killed him… There has never been a greater 
deed; and whoever is born after us—for the sake of this deed he will belong to a 
higher history than all history hitherto.628 
 
 
                                                          
627 The first mentioning of “the death of God” in Nietzsche: The Gay Science, 108: “After 
Buddha was dead, people 
showed his shadow for centuries afterwards in a 
cave,—an immense frightful shadow. God is dead: 
but as the human race is constituted, there will 
perhaps be caves for millenniums yet, in which 
people will show his shadow.—And we—we have 
            still to overcome his shadow!”   
628 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 181. 
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For Nietzsche, God is a concept that humans invented to restrain and direct themselves.  
In this parable, the “madman” functions as a purveyor of light and truth—he carries a 
lantern to illuminate a future where the individual is the ultimate creator. To do this, 
however, society must renounce the notion of a rival creator: God. Through his litany of 
questions, the madman attempts to show that society is indeed not “plunging continually” 
now that God has “died.” Instead, order exists and will persist through future generations.  
For Nietzsche, the era after God’s death will presumably be the most inventive epoch yet.  
Individuals create their own system of values in the absence of an omnipotent deity, thus 
the vacancy that Nietzsche’s death of God leaves is thus potentially generative. Though 
perhaps concealed, such a framing of nothingness is even present in The Will to Power.     
The Will to Power does present nihilism as constructive at key moments, but it 
appears that modernist readers passed over them. While Nietzsche does associate nihilism 
with destruction in this book, the philosopher also provides clues that frame such a loss as 
positive and even essential. He ends the book’s preface with the following statement:    
 
For why has the advent of nihilism become necessary? Because the values we 
have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; because nihilism represents 
the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals — because we must 
experience nihilism before we can find out what value these ‘values’ really had. 
— We require, sometime, new values.629    
 
 
That Nietzsche italicizes “new values” is significant: It suggests that he expects society to 
fill the nothingness that nihilism leaves with something new. For him, this is a 
                                                          
629 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 4. 
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“requirement,” lest society will cease to progress. In fact, nihilism is a necessity—
something that we “must” experience so that we can understand the importance of values 
and whether they are still applicable. Without question, Nietzsche’s descriptions of 
desolation and hopelessness vastly outnumber positive statements such as this. However, 
since Nietzsche chose to end the preface with this phrase, perhaps he intends the reader to 
hold onto that idea. However, Nietzsche’s “intent” concerning The Will to Power is 
difficult if not impossible to ascertain because his original notes may have been altered 
beyond recognition.     
As indicated previously, The Will to Power was published posthumously, and so 
Nietzsche did not have a voice in either the editing or circulation processes. Instead, this 
duty fell to his sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, a well-known German nationalist and 
anti-Semite who would later join the Nazi party. Elisabeth revised Nietzsche’s 
unpublished writings to fit her own ideology, often in incomplete or manipulated ways.630  
In 1889, Nietzsche’s health began to deteriorate. Psychological and physical ailments 
plagued the philosopher until a series of strokes in 1898 left him paralyzed; he passed 
away from a stroke in 1900. When she decided to publish The Will to Power, Elisabeth 
impressed to editors that her brother not only desired this outcome but had also written a 
full draft of the book before his health failed. To prove this, she cited a 17 March 1887 
letter in which Nietzsche communicated his outline for what she called his “magnum 
                                                          
630 Carol Diethe, Nietzsche’s Sister and the Will to Power: A Biography of Elisabeth 
Förster-Nietzsche (Urbana: University of Illinois Press), 2003. 
 
 
 
244 
 
opus,” a plan that included four main headings and several subsections.631 However, as 
Carol Diethe highlights, this letter is not found in Nietzsche’s collected correspondence, 
thus casting doubt onto Elisabeth’s claim.632   
While Nietzsche did scribble ideas and outlines of what would become The Will 
to Power in his notebooks, a complete, coherent draft has yet to be discovered.633 In fact, 
Nietzsche’s notes are anything but coherent—at times, he wrote backwards, in 
abbreviated font, and scribbled so many annotations and corrections that it would take 
years of careful consideration to assemble the jumbled pieces.634 After much insistence, 
however, Elisabeth selected one of Nietzsche’s many different potential outlines for The 
Will to Power, then “raided his notebooks for passages” that would fit her chosen format.  
Some of Elisabeth’s selected passages even appeared crossed out in Nietzsche’s original 
notes and outlines, but she failed to indicate this in an appendix.635 The published copy of 
the book thus contains ideas that Nietzsche presumably would have either omitted or 
revised.   
Some scholars even cast The Will to Power as a grand forgery that ultimately 
sullied Nietzsche’s reputation.  William Schaberg calls the belief that The Will to Power 
is “Nietzsche’s book” a “fiction” that the general public and scholars alike often buy 
                                                          
631 Diethe, Nietzsche’s Sister and the Will to Power, 95. 
632 Nietzsche’s Sister and the Will to Power, 95. 
633 Diethe, Nietzsche’s Sister and the Will to Power, 95-96. 
634 Diethe, William Schaberg, and Mazzino Montinari all describe Nietzsche’s notebook 
as such.  
635 Diethe, Nietzsche’s Sister and the Will to Power, 96. 
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into.636 Schaberg even excludes The Will to Power from his extensive study on 
Nietzsche’s canon because the philosopher never prepared a print copy.637 For Schaberg, 
this sheds doubt on Nietzsche’s intent to publish the book.  Philologist and leading 
Nietzsche scholar Mazzino Montinari uses even harsher language to criticize The Will to 
Power; he called the book a “historic forgery” and blamed it emphatically for the 
philosopher’s unsavory 20th-century reputation.638 Given the dubious nature of this 
book’s publication, perhaps we can excuse Nietzsche for the ideas contained therein.  
While this may relieve Nietzsche of some of the blame for the new nihilism, it still fails 
to absolve The Will to Power. Though current scholarship recognizes Elisabeth’s liberal 
editing-hand, this discovery was not “unambiguously clarified” until the mid-1930s and it 
took until the 1960s to gain extensive critical attention.639 The modernist readership thus 
remained wholly unaware of this issue, and so associated the nothingness and despair of 
the new nihilism with Nietzsche, the “author” of The Will to Power. 
In the Musarion edition The Will to Power, Nietzsche writes that his work is a 
“book for thinking, nothing else: it belongs to those for whom thinking is a delight, 
nothing else.”640 Here, Nietzsche’s words cast the Will to Power as nothing more than a 
                                                          
636 William H. Schaberg, The Nietzsche Canon: A Publication History and Bibliography 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1995.  178. 
637 Schaberg, The Nietzsche Canon, 5-6. 
638 Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, and R.J. Hollingdale, “A Continual Challenge: On Mazzino 
Montiaari's Relationship with Nietzsche.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, no. 4/5 (1992): 
112. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20717573. 
639 Mazzino Montinari, Reading Nietzsche, trans. Greg Whitlock (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press), 2003. 18. 
640 Thatcher, Nietzsche in England, 160. 
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lengthy thought exercise, a series of musings that could spur intellectual progress rather 
than pose a definitive new view of nihilism. This quote does not appear in popular 
editions of the book, nor was it included in editions that the modernists would have 
conceivably read. Nietzsche’s new nihilism, an idea that changed the landscape of 20th-
century Western society, was at best a thought exercise and at worst a blatant forgery.     
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